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Imagination, Desire, and Irrationality: A Defense of i-desire Account

Abstract : There are three competing theories (imagination + i-desire, imagination + desire, and desire + desire) to account for our affective responses to fictional events. The proponents of imagination + i-desire argue that the alternative accounts imply that consumers of fiction are irrational. In Imagination, Desire and Rationality, Spaulding challenges this claim and argues that the imagination + desire and desire + desire accounts do not imply that consumers of fiction are irrational. In this paper, I attempt to rebut Spaulding’s arguments.
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Submitted on : Saturday, January 9, 2021 - 3:16:11 PM
Last modification on : Monday, January 11, 2021 - 3:25:20 AM

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Yuchen Guo. Imagination, Desire, and Irrationality: A Defense of i-desire Account. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 2020, pp.1-13. ⟨10.1080/09672559.2020.1851283⟩. ⟨hal-03104659⟩

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