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# Relations between military forces and the population of Hawaii

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**RELATIONS BETWEEN  
MILITARY FORCES  
AND THE  
POPULATION OF HAWAII**

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**Working Report**



There is a realm beyond the narrow concept of loyalty versus disloyalty, the world of free intellectual inquiry.

— Minoru Kiyota, *Beyond Loyalty* (1997, p. 228)

“Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?”

“Yes, to the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.”

“The dog did nothing in the night-time.”

“That was the curious incident,” remarked Sherlock Holmes.

—Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, *Silver Blaze* (1892)

There is a strong family resemblance about the misdeeds, and if you have all the details of a thousand at your finger ends, it is odd if you can't unravel the thousand and first.

—Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, *The Valley of Fear* (1915)



# RELATIONS BETWEEN MILITARY FORCES AND THE POPULATION OF HAWAII

## 1941–1955

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Version of 29 May 2014. Comments are welcome.

We hope that these notes will enable us to get in touch with American scholars; needless to say, this is an essential condition for the success of this project. Please, if you happen to know people who have a working interest in this kind of historiography do not hesitate to send them a copy of the present draft.

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### Purpose

Along with war inevitably comes censorship. It can be more or less severe depending on whether it is auto-censorship, post-censorship or pre-censorship. In Hawaii, for fairly obvious reasons, censorship was particularly strict and it lasted until at least October 1945 (as will be seen later on).

Censorship has two facets.

The fact that some news are not published is the most-well known aspect but at the same time news are released by the public relations sections of the armed forces. Of course, censorship and news release have the same purpose which is to advance the cause and objectives of the armed forces.

This means that the press releases may be outright lies or, more frequently, distorted news. For instance, one may read that the death toll of an explosion that occurred on a pier was 6 US Navy servicemen. That news may be correct but at the same time it may shroud the deaths of 47 Filipino workers who, of course, were not servicemen. In addition, as is well known, in wartime some stories served to the medias by the military may be just complete fabrications for propaganda purposes.

For the historian one way to test the reliability of the accounts is to compare different sources. Thus, for military operations it may be possible to compare the official accounts given by the two sides. However, as the present study does not focus on military operations but on events that occurred during the war in the Territory of Hawaii itself, the only sources which are available are US military sources or censored civilian sources. Globally, the accounts from these sources give the impression that something is missing. Why?

For events occurring in one and the same place one would expect a kind of permanence in the course of time. If the place turns out to be very quiet in one decade one would expect to see it quite as quite in the next decade (unless there are some new circumstances). On the contrary, if a place is rather unruly and rebellious in one decade one would also expect some tumultuous or riotous events in the next decade.



It turns out that before and shortly after the war Hawaii was a rather tumultuous place. However during the war, according to official accounts, there were no riots, no strikes, no sabotage, no brawls. May be that is really true, may be it is not. We want to find out. Why?

Our purpose is not only to discover what happened in Hawaii. There is a broader objective and significance. Clearly during the war, Hawaii was heavily supervised by the US Army and US Navy. Was that control sufficient to suppress completely the forms of protest that occurred before and after the war? In short, the wartime years in Hawaii provide an “experimental” insight into the suppression of spontaneous social reactions. For instance, one may wonder what were the attitudes and behaviors that were the most difficult to suppress.

A second interesting test concerns the attitude of the Japanese community. As the Japanese community of the West Coast was interned one cannot learn much about their real feelings. It is true that in Hawaii many persons of Japanese ancestry were also interned, interrogated or tried by provost courts. Nevertheless, the history of Hawaii gives us an opportunity to see how the Japanese community managed to resist to pressure and stress.

As an illustration of the kind of events that seem to be missing in official accounts, one can mention the following. In November 1945, that is to say 3 months after the end of the war and one month after the end (or mitigation) of censorship, there were violent race riots between servicemen and the population of Hawaii on the one hand and between white and black enlisted men on the other hand. It is natural to think that the tension which led to these riots had been building up over several months. The fact that they seem to occur out of the blue is probably due to the blanketing of previous events.

At first sight, if the only accounts available are from military sources, finding out the truth may seem a hopeless task. Fortunately, there are two ways to overcome this difficulty.

- One can expect that internal messages and documents, that is to say not aimed for public release, may provide a more realistic picture.

Even this is not obvious however. Why?

For any government whatsoever, the occurrence of riots will be seen as a sign of poor management. Thus, unless they are too widespread to be covered up, riots will usually receive little publicity. It was the same in Hawaii. As the military authorities were in charge of governing the Territory, there was at all levels (and particularly at highest levels) an incentive to minimize such events even in internal correspondence. Paying them attention would have been acknowledging a failure.

- In Hawaii there were between 50,000 and 100,000 trials by military provost

AARONA, Arthur	1536 Fort St.
7816 11-21-42 Street-Pedestrian	\$5.00 bail forfeited.
ABABA, Suila	Puuahale And Kanakanui Sts.
P2 #4557 4-27-42 Sel. Ser. Act.	2 years hard labor, susp. Ordered to keep Draft Board informed.
ABAD, Eugenio	1221-A Makalapua
1661-43 3/1/43 Gen.Ord. 139/3	Fined \$20.00 paid
ABAD, Eugenio	1326 Vineyard St. E2
#4069 2-19-42 BlackOut	Fined \$2. paid
ABAD, Eugenio	1513 Gulick Avenue
#1260 1-12-42 Sec. 6.25 T.C.	Fined \$10.00 - paid License suspended one year.

**Fig. 1.1 Short excerpt of the card index of persons tried by provost courts in Honolulu.** The card index is arranged alphabetically. Altogether for the trials that took place in the provost courts of Honolulu there are 49 boxes. The charge appears in the middle of the cards but in fairly cryptic form. The “Selective Service Act” enacted on 16 September 1940 required that men between the ages of 21 and 35 register with local draft boards. It is likely that Mr. Suila ABADA omitted to register. *Source: NARA 26c*

courts. If one remembers that the total population was only about 400,000 it means that 20% or 30% of the adults were arrested, tried and sentenced. It is true that most of the charges were rather insignificant (e.g. curfew violations) but some were more serious.

Although NARA (the US National Archives) has indeed *some* information about these trials, the most important point, namely the detailed description of the charge, is not well documented This is illustrated in Fig. 1.x.

## The population of Hawaii

The archipelago of Hawaii is composed of several islands. In terms of population the most important are (from north to south, with populations given according to the Census of 1940):

- Kauai: 35,000, main town: Lihue (4,200)
- Oahu: 257,000, main city: Honolulu (180,000)
- Molokai: 5,300, main town: Kaunakakai (700)
- Maui: 40,000, main town: Wailuku (7,300)
- Hawaii: 73,000, main city: Hilo (35,000)
- Total: 410,300

It should be kept in mind that these figures do not include the forces of the army and navy. Hawaii belonged to the “Central Pacific Base Command”. Just to give an order of magnitude, it can be mentioned that in 1944 the total Army strength in the Central Pacific Area was approximately 296,000 men<sup>1</sup>. Naturally, apart from the Territory of Hawaii, this area comprised also other islands. On the other hand, in addition to the Army, the Navy had also important installations in Hawaii, particularly the Pearl Harbor Navy Base.

There were several airfields on Oahu, namely: Barbers Point Naval Air Station, Bellows Army Air Field, Ewa Marine Corps Air Station, Hickam Field, Kaneohe Naval Air Station, Ford Island Naval Air Station.

Oahu had also two forts namely Fort Kamehameha and Fort Shafter. The important Army Base of Schofield Barracks was also on Oahu.

During the war the strength of the armed forces in Hawaii fluctuated depending upon the operations taking place in the Pacific. That is why it is difficult to give a precise estimate. Based on the figure of 296,000 given above and the fact that one division represented about 15,000 persons it can be said that the number of soldiers in Hawaii was roughly of the same order of magnitude as the civilian population.

In 1940 the total civilian population of 423,000 comprised 158,000 residents (i.e. 37%) of Japanese ancestry. They are commonly referred to as Nikkei<sup>2</sup>. Of these, 120,000 (i.e. 76%) were born in Hawaii and were therefore US citizens. They are commonly referred to as Nisei which means “second generation”. To avoid complications we will use this term fairly broadly even for third generation Japanese (sometimes called Sansei). The other 38,000 (i.e. 24%) persons of Japanese ancestry were not citizens; they are referred to as Issei (which means first generation). However, among the Nisei there was another important distinction, namely between so-called dual citizens and non-dual citizens. Dual citizens were persons of Japanese ancestry born in Hawaii (and therefore US citizens) but whose birth had also been registered at the Japanese consulate and who for that reason were also Japanese citizens. Often these dual citizens were sent by their parents to Japan to be educated there. This had the result of making them dual citizens not only from a legal perspective but also from a cultural perspective. For instance, when they came back to Hawaii as teenagers they were able to speak, read and write Japanese but were almost unable to speak English.

What was the number of the dual citizens? An answer is provided by a US Navy intelligence report (NAVY 1941) “Out of a total Japanese population of 320,000 in the United States and its possessions, it is estimated that more than 127,000 have

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<sup>1</sup>Source: [http://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/wwii/orgadmin/org\\_admin\\_wwii\\_chpt9.htm](http://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/wwii/orgadmin/org_admin_wwii_chpt9.htm)

<sup>2</sup>The proportion is almost the same for the city of Honolulu: there were 180,000 residents, 34% of whom were of Japanese ancestry (Census of 1940, Hawaii, p. 5)

dual citizenship.

In the Territory of Hawaii alone, dual citizens constitute approximately 35% of the total Japanese population.”

In short, the 158,000 residents of Hawaii of Japanese ancestry fall in three groups (the numbers of male adults were computed by multiplying the total population by the proportion 0.57/2 (0.57 for the age group and 2 for gender) given by the Historical Statistics of the United States; of course this is only valid for those who were born in Hawaii)

- Japanese aliens: 38,000 (adults: unknown)
- Dual Japanese-US citizens: 55,000 (male adults: 15,675)
- Non-dual US citizens<sup>3</sup>: 65,000 (male adults: 18,500)




Fig. 1.2 Map of the Hawaiian islands

For the 162,000 residents of Japanese ancestry in the continental United States the figures (in 1940) were as follows.

- Japanese aliens: 38,000 (adults: unknown)
- Dual Japanese-US citizens: 62,000 (male adults: 17,670)
- Non-dual US citizens: 62,000 (male adults: 17,670)

According to an FBI memorandum of 1940 (FDRL1, reel 1), there were 234 Japanese language schools in Hawaii with a total enrollment of 42,855 students and employing 731 Japanese language school teachers. These schools were supervised by representatives of the Japanese Government.

There were also Japanese youth associations such as the “Dai Nippon Butoku-kai”

<sup>3</sup>Either not registered at birth or who dropped Japanese citizenship.

and the “Dai Jingu Youth Society” which are believed to sponsor Japanese nationalistic ideals.

As will be seen in the chronology chapter, the Japanese language teachers and the leaders of the youth associations were among the first group of Japanese people to be arrested after the Pearl Harbor attack.

Martial law and Military Government was introduced on December 7, 1941. Martial law was terminated by a Presidential proclamation dated October 27, 1944<sup>4</sup>.

## Main issues

During the Pacific War a considerable number of troops stayed in Hawaii. For the island of Oahu, Gwenfread Allen (1950, p. 219) gives the following figures:

December 1941: 43,000    May 1942: 135,000    June 1945: 253,000

These figures do not include Navy men<sup>5</sup>. Naturally, the troops did not stay in Hawaii permanently; concentration and training of forces took place there, then they were sent to war theaters for several months before coming back to Hawaii for resting time and training; this was the beginning of a second cycle. The previous figures show that in spite of monthly fluctuations average troop strength was of an order of magnitude equal to the population of Hawaii itself. As far as the ratio troops/population is concerned, Hawaii was in a situation similar to Iceland after it was occupied by American troops in June 1942.

This study focuses on three points which so far seem to have been largely overlooked.

### Persons of Japanese ancestry who were arrested, tried, detained, interned

It is often stated that in contrast to what happened on the West Coast, on Hawaii only a small proportion of Nikkei were interned<sup>6</sup>. This statement must be modified if instead of internment one considers the fact of being arrested and tried by a military tribunal.

It is estimated (see below) that there have been between 55,000 and 120,000 trials by provost courts<sup>7</sup>. If there is the same ethnic composition for the trials than for the population (a fairly conservative estimate) implies that between  $55000 \times 0.37 = 20,350$  and  $120000 \times 0.37 = 44,400$  Nikkei were tried by provost courts<sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup>The transition from military to civilian government was carried out progressively in several steps.

<sup>5</sup>Because Navy men were on board of ships which could be at Pearl Harbor or at sea, it is not easy to give strength figures for sailors in Hawaii. For the whole Central Pacific area, Allen gives a Navy strength of 350,000 in October 1944.

<sup>6</sup>As an example of such statements one can cite John Stephan (1984, p. 174): “Only a tiny proportion of Hawaii Nisei experienced internment, (about 480 out of 120,000”. [which corresponds to a percentage of 0.4%]

<sup>7</sup>For the year 1942 alone there were 37,162 trials (see below) so the figure of 55,000 may be rather an underestimate.

<sup>8</sup>We assume here that Nikkei defendants in provost court trials were in the same proportion as in the general population, namely 37%. This assumption is likely to *under-estimate* the number of Nikkei who were tried. If instead we assume that 60% of the defendants in provost courts were Nikkei, then we get  $55000 \times 0.60 = 33,000$  Nikkei who were tried.



To this number one should add the persons who were arrested and detained for some time without being tried. It will be seen below that these detainees numbered at least 1,234. Indeed, on the electronic catalog of the American National Archives (NARA) there are 1,234 files each of which corresponds to a civilian internee in Hawaii. From the names of these persons it can be seen that about 96% of them are of Japanese ancestry. One may wonder whether or not this list includes *all* civilian internees from Hawaii. To get an answer we can perform tests with names of internees known from other documents:

- After the incident in the island of Niihau (in the days following 7 December 1941) two persons were interned: Ms. Umeno (Irene) Harada and Mr. Ishimatsu Shintani. Another well known internee was Otto Kuehn (see below) who was tried and sentenced on the charge of being a German spy. All three names are indeed in the list of 1,234 names.

- In the source “NARA 13” the investigation board gives the names of two detainees from Hawaii: Yoshio Oshida (ISN-HJ-1133-CI) and Usabu Morahara (ISN-HJ-1148-CI). None of them is in the list. It would be of interest to understand why.

So we know that this list of names does not include all the internees. How many are missing remains an open question. Based on the Internment Serial Numbers (see below) one would conclude that there were ) at least 1,800 internments. But we do not really know if these interments also include persons who were imprisoned after a trial.

Thus, adding the 1,234 to the 20,350 we get a total of 21, 584 Nikkei tried or arrested.

Naturally, almost all the persons who were arrested were adults and even more precisely male adults. What was the number of male adults (i.e. over 18) of Japanese ancestry in Hawaii? For the total population of Hawaii the proportion of residents over 18 years was 57% in 1940 (Historical Statistics of the United States 1975, p. 26). This gives a number of  $158000 \times 0.57 = 90,000$  adult Nikkei, and a number of  $90000/2 = 45,000$  male adults. In other words,  $21584/45000 = 47\%$  of the male adult Nikkei population of Hawaii was arrested, tried and/or detained, almost one half of the male adult population.

If one broadens the category considered by including the people who were interrogated by the military one arrives to the conclusion that nearly all the male population was concerned.

There were several reasons for such interrogations:

- 1 Investigating the loyalty of persons of Japanese descent. For instance a program was started on 25 November 1944 (see the chronology at this date) to clarify the loyalty status of all Japanese not previously investigated.

- 2 Before being able to work in military installations any worker had to pass a

loyalty and security investigation. This was true on the mainland as in Hawaii.

3 Nikkei residents had to fill in a “Personal History Declaration” (see an example at the date of 5 December 1944).

4 Moreover Japanese Americans were investigated before being drafted.

### **Incidents between troops and the population of Hawaii**

The second issue concerns incidents between the population of Hawaii and the troops. As will be explained below, the accepted truth is that there were *none*. The fact that this conclusion is not correct is shown by documents from the American National Archives. The “Daily Reports of Investigations” of the Office of Internal Security (see the reference NARA 2 for more details) reveal many incidents. Several of them are described in the chronology chapter between the dates 21 November 1944–30 December 1944. Unfortunately, the “Daily Reports of Investigations” are only available after November 1944, that is to say after martial law was lifted.

In a general way, most sources which could tell us something about incidents, e.g. Navy intelligence reports, or G-2 (i.e. Army intelligence) periodic reports or provost court reports do not seem to be available for the period of martial law.

After November 1944 there were more and more reports in newspapers about riots and disorders between servicemen and young residents of Hawaii and also about race riots between white and black servicemen (see the chronology). As a working hypothesis it can be assumed that the appearance of such news was due to a weakening of censorship after martial law was lifted rather than to the fact that such incidents did not occur before November 1944. An indication which supports such an hypothesis is the fact that hoodlumism (i.e. gangsterism) was already declared to be a problem by Hawaiian newspapers in December 1943 but without further elaboration (see the chronology at the date of 18 December 1943 and also 1 December 1942). To describe this aspect in more detail one needs an uncensored source such as for instance records from trials by military courts.

### **Provost courts trials**

For provost courts even though we cannot read the reports of the trials some fragmentary information is nevertheless available for instance about the number of trials. In this respect, the papers of Major General Thomas H. Green give some information until the dismissal of General Green in April 1943.

Of course, one would expect that a great proportion of the trials were concerned with petty violations of the rules about circulation, blackout or similar martial law regulations. However, it would not make sense to assume a priori that *all* the trials were concerned with such small offenses. A table by type of offenses for the year 1942

**Table 1.1 Number of convictions by provost courts in the 6 months from July to Dec 1942**

Island	Population (in thousands)	Convictions	Conviction rate (per 1,000 pop. and month)
Kauai	35	640	3.0
Oahu	257	12,124	7.8
Molokai	5.3	108	3.3
Lanei	3.1	65	3.5
Maui	40	539	2.2
Hawaii	73	539	2.2
Total	413	14,418	5.8

Notes: The rate figures appear to be fairly consistent with one another except for the rate in Oahu. However, this can be explained by the fact that Oahu had a large military population which was not included in the population figure. The number of convictions on Oahu include Honolulu, Schofield Barracks and Pearl City.

The rate of acquittal was comprised between 1.5% (in Lanai) and 14% (in Molokai).

Source: *Papers of Major General Thomas H. Green, reel 14, frames 520-528*

can be found in the Papers of Thomas Green<sup>9</sup>. Unfortunately it is fairly puzzling in the sense that it raises several questions.

- The table lists 6 murders and manslaughters. The very fact that such crimes were tried in provost courts where sentences were restricted to less than 5 years at hard labor is surprising. The fact that only 2 of these cases resulted in a prison sentence is even more surprising.

- There are 33 cases of aggravated assault. Why were these cases tried in provost court rather than in civilian courts? This question arises because the expected number of aggravated assault cases would be about 10 times larger<sup>10</sup>. Therefore, one must assume that the great majority of the cases were tried in civilian courts.

Also surprising is the fact that only 17 of these 33 cases resulted in jail sentences. The same observation applies to burglaries. The table lists 41 cases. Based on the rate prevailing in the rest of the United States one would expect 1,946 cases. Thus, one need to know what made these 41 cases special for being tried in provost courts

- In addition there are 13,980 cases labeled as “other offenses” (almost one third of the total) for which no information is given.

In order to get an idea of the kind of incidents that may be included in the “other offenses” category one can read General Orders No 135 of September 1942<sup>11</sup> which

<sup>9</sup>It is entitled “Provost Court dispositions for the year 1942” (reel 1, frame 484)

<sup>10</sup>In the continental United States the annual rate of aggravated assault was 0.73 per 1,000 population (Statistical Abstract of the United States 1948 p.93, the data are for 1945). For Hawaii such a rate would give 311 cases, that is to say 10 times more than the 33 tried by provost courts.

<sup>11</sup>Anthony 1955, Appendix B; War time security controls in Hawaii 1941-1945, Part 8: The administration of justice,



lists a broad class of seditious acts, e.g. enticing desertion from the Army or Navy, photographing defense installations, destruction of war material, criminal syndicalism, desecration of the flag, riots, unlawful assembly, assaults or battery of servicemen or officers.

Even though we will mainly keep focused on these two points, we will also investigate some other related aspects.

Due to martial law, only few sources are available for Hawaii itself. On the Mainland in contrast there was no martial law and despite the existence of war time censorship more information is available. That is why for some questions, e.g. sabotage and espionage, we will expand our zone of observation to the Mainland.

### **Problems with the “Orientals”**

Concern about the attitude of the Japanese immigrants (and more generally “Oriental immigrants”) did not start with the political friction between the United States and Japan in the late 1930s. As early as 1909 at a time when the relations between the United States and Japan were still fairly good we see the governor of Hawaii expressing concern with respect to the Japanese (and more broadly the “Orientals”).

In a letter dated 23 January 1909 (NARA 23) Governor Frear observed that Mr. Breckons<sup>12</sup> is not “a safe man in case difficulties should arise here out of the *Japanese situation*” because in his action before the grand jury he concluded “that the law did not go far enough and so dropped the matter which has given the leaders among those who are attempting to stir up trouble renewed confidence. It shows the feeling of uncertainty as to how far he can be depended upon in dealing with questions in which Orientals are involved”.

### **Labor disputes**

As in many other islands devoted to intensive agricultural exploitation<sup>13</sup>, there was in Hawaii a chronic shortage of labor. Of course, it would have been easy to solve that problem by raising wages to the point where the labor supply would become sufficient, but the intent of the planters was to procure enough manpower *without* raising wages to such a level. Various schemes were devised to reach this goal. Here is a brief account of some of these policies as summarized in a report published in May 1942<sup>14</sup>.

In 1941 there were 38 plantations in Hawaii, 35 of which were controlled by 5 companies which are commonly known as the “Big Five”.

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p. 41

<sup>12</sup>Robert Warren Breckons (1866-1918) was US Attorney for Hawaii from 1902 to 1913.

<sup>13</sup>Other examples are the Fiji Islands, the Mauritius island, the Reunion island, the Caribbean islands.

<sup>14</sup>Report by M.B. Keeton of the International Brotherhood of Electric Workers on a history of labor in Hawaii; included in T.H. Green’s papers.

In the late 19th century the planters organized the “Planters Labor and Supply Company” for the purpose of importing cheap alien labor. Starting around 1880 South Sea islanders and Portuguese were imported but they were reluctant to accept the social and economic condition forced upon them. After that Chinese, Japanese, Porto Ricans, Filipinos were imported. Japanese laborers would come under 3-year contracts at wages of \$9 a month and a food allowance of \$6 a month. Japanese women were included at a ratio of 30 for 100 men. It was their duty to take care of the living quarters and to raise vegetables. Nearly 200,000 Japanese migrated to Hawaii.

In April 1937, the president of the “Hawaii Industrial Association”, Lawrence M. Judd, declared that he paid as much attention to the Wagner Act [which guaranteed the workers’ rights to form and join unions] as he did to the Desha bathing suit law (the Desha Act forbade anyone to appear in any place in Honolulu in an uncovered bathing suit).

The report on the Hilo riot of 1 August 1938 which was written by Attorney-General Joseph V. Hodgson and published on 23 September 1938 showed that the Hawaii county police was on the side of the strike breakers. While they fired on union demonstrators they took no action against the provocations of men armed with clubs who had been transported to Hilo for the purpose of breaking the strike.

Between 1938 and 1941 there were several investigations by federal agencies into Hawaiian labor affairs which disturbed the status quo to some extent. One landmark event was the agreement signed in May 1941 between the “International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers” and the Navy contractors; for the first time in the island it established a standard wage schedule for construction work.

Yet, in early 1942 there were only 7,000 unionized workers in Hawaii in the private sector and employers were still discharging workers for joining unions.

The beginning of the war on 7 December brought about a considerable deterioration in wages and working conditions. After hope had been generated by New Deal policies it was really a step backward. Not only were wages frozen by General Order number 38 of 7 December 1941 but all the laws and regulations abolishing child labor (one of the great achievements of the New Deal) and limiting working time for women were abolished in late December 1941 (see the chronology for more details).

In normal conditions such decisions would not have been easily accepted. In that respect it can be recalled that on the mainland in spite of the pledge made by the unions to support the war effort, there were major strikes in the coal mines, a fairly strategic sector.

What happened in Hawaii? We are told that there were neither strikes nor distur-

bances. If that statement had been made only in US Army reports, one could be suspicious and attribute it to the censorship policy. However, one finds the same statement in books written by union leaders (see for instance Beechert 1985) who were present in Hawaii during the war. This suggests two possible scenarios.

- One scenario is that there were indeed almost no strikes or labor disturbances. If this assertion is correct, it may be explained by the fact that the workers who were of Japanese descent were already under the threat of interrogations or detention<sup>15</sup> and therefore they did not wish to attract attention by picketing or distributing leaflets. It is very likely that the few who may have tried were immediately arrested as suggested by the case of Ichiro Izuka<sup>16</sup>.

- The previous explanation applies to the Japanese workers but not to the Chinese or Filipino workers whose countries were allies of the United States, nor does it apply to the workers who were brought to Hawaii from the continental United States. It seems that despite the freezing of wages by a military order, wages nevertheless experienced substantial increases. Were these wage rises obtained without any strike? One can imagine that there were no large-scale strikes but a number of strikes (or other actions) limited to specific companies. Such strikes were not publicized because of the censorship, and did not attract the attention of union leaders perhaps because the unionization rate was so low.

It is impossible to decide which one of these scenarios is correct unless new evidence emerges.

## Hawaii after the attack on Pearl Harbor

After the Pearl Harbor attack of December 7, 1941 martial law and administration by Military Government was established and remained in effect in the Hawaiian Islands until 7 October 1944. Strict military censorship was enforced during these years, as is fairly natural for a place which was a key US position in the Pacific War. As a result very little information is available about Hawaii in documents published at that time. For instance, there is a complete blackout on Hawaii in the New York Times. True, the Islands are occasionally mentioned in relation with military operations but there are almost no news about events taking place in Hawaii. Surprisingly, this “blank spot” has remained little explored up to now.

In 1950 Gwenfread Allen published a book entitled “Hawaii’s War Years” based on the sources which were available at that time. Naturally, five years after the end

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<sup>15</sup>As was seen above, about one half of the adult male Nikkei were either arrested, tried or detained.

<sup>16</sup>Izuka was the president of the Kauai longshoremen. He was arrested in April 1942 and charged with distributing leaflets advocating a strike. Although he was not officially indicted he was kept in detention for 126 days (Beechert 1985).

of the war and at the height of the Cold War, some records were still classified. Nevertheless, in spite of being a semi-official publication, “Hawaii’s War Years” provides a picture of this period which is probably as accurate as possible on the basis of the sources which were accessible.

In 2004, almost sixty years after the end of the war, appeared a book with a very similar subtitle: “No Sword to Bury. Japanese Americans in Hawaii during World War II”. It is interesting to compare these two books because this will give us an idea of the trend of historiographical research on this topic. First, it appears that the index of the second book does not contain any of the following expressions: general orders, military government, military tribunal, military commission, provost court. As these terms describe standard features of a regime of Military Government their absence suggests that the book gives little attention to this aspect. In fact, it mainly focuses on a small group of Japanese Americans who served in the US Army, particularly during the campaign against German troops in Italy. Yet, the book’s title does not reflect this specific focus. Comparison between these books suggests that little progress has been accomplished in documenting and understanding the regime of Military Government which ruled Hawaii for four years.

In chapter 8 of “Guarding the United States and its Outposts” written by Stetson Conn (and co-authors) for the Center of Military History, one finds the following statement: “During and after the Pearl Harbor raid and for the remainder of the war period, no sabotage, espionage, or any other sort of subversive activity is known to have occurred in Hawaii”. A similar statement is made in the “Counter Intelligence Corps History”: “Unquestionably, the Counter Intelligence Corps activities in the Territory of Hawaii contributed significantly to the fact that there was no known espionage, nor a single case of enemy-inspired sabotage, there during the war”.

This is obviously not correct as shown by the well-known case of Otto Kühn who was sentenced to death by a military commission for espionage (more details can be found in the chronology chapter at the date of 15 June 1943). Among the Nikkei people who, in one way or another, served as Japanese agents or helped Japanese forces one can mention the following cases.

- Yoshio Harada, his wife Irene and their friend Ishimatsu Shintani helped a Japanese pilot after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Yoshio Harada died on 12 December 1941; both Irene Harada and Ishimatsu Shintani were taken into custody but were never tried. See the description of the so-called Niihau incident in the chronology and in Chapter 7.

- Tokue Takahashi was allegedly a spy; see the chronology at the beginning of 1943.

- Giichiro Uyeno allegedly guided a Japanese submarine; see the chronology at

the date of 25 July 1942.

- Yokichi Uyehara served as agent; see the chronology at the date of 25 February 1942.
- In the wake of the Pearl Harbor attack, reports were published in the New York Times according to which Japanese residents of Hawaii had provided help to Japanese pilots for instance by cutting arrows in sugar cane fields pointing toward military objectives or by preventing American pilots from reaching their planes (see the chronology at the date of 31 December 1941).

Perhaps it may be tempting to discard such information as war propaganda but then it is not obvious why later claims which denied such incidents should be taken more seriously.

In the same line of thought, in February 1942 the “Dies Committee on Un-American Activities” published a report on Japanese activities in the United States according to which there was a spy ring of about 150,000 members. (see the chronology at the date of 5 February 1942).

Instances of sabotage include the following.

- September 1942 on Kauai (see the chronology); the culprit was sentenced to 5 years at hard labor.
- Suspected sabotage in early December 1944 on Oahu (see the chronology at the date of 9 December 1944).
- Many cases of sabotage were investigated by the CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps) in Hawaii.

In a report published in 1982 by a commission of the Congress one finds a statement which is similar to albeit not identical with those already mentioned: “Not a single act of espionage, sabotage, or fifth column activity had been committed by Americans of Japanese ancestry on the West Coast or in Hawaii” (Report 1982 p. 3; cited in Knaefler 1991, p. 25). This statement is geographically broader because it covers the West Coast as well as Hawaii but on the other hand it is more restrictive in the sense that it concerns only American citizens of Japanese ancestry<sup>17</sup>.

Before accepting such statements, an historian would of course wish to know on what evidence they rely. In this respect the main source would be the records of the thousands of trials by military tribunals that took place in Hawaii. The Table gives a comparative view.

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<sup>17</sup>Many acts of sabotage on the west coast have been reported in newspapers. Hundreds of people of Japanese ancestry have been indicted and sentenced (see the chronology). It is rarely stated whether they were Japanese aliens or US citizens of Japanese ancestry. On the mainland 62% of the Japanese were US citizens. If one assumes a random distribution the likelihood that *all* acts of espionage and sabotage were carried out by Japanese aliens is very small; for  $n$  acts it is  $p(n) = (1 - 0.69)^n$ , for  $n = 10$  this probability is smaller than 0.001%.

**Table 1.2 Military and civilian tribunals in areas under US military rule**

Persons tried	Military or civilian court	Type and sentences <i>Serious offenses</i>	Type and sentences <i>Small offenses</i>	Historical cases (see Notes)
Military personnel	Court-martial courts	General court-martial <i>Any sentence including death</i>	Special court-martial <i>Up to 1 year</i>	(1), (2a), (2b), (3)
Local civilians	Military courts	Military commission <i>Any sentence including death</i>	Provost court <i>Up to 5 year</i>	(1), (3)
		General court <i>Any sentence including death</i>	Intermediate court <i>Up to 10 year</i>	(2a), (2b)
Local civilians (*)	Local civilian courts	<i>Overseen by</i>	<i>occupation forces</i>	(1), (2b), (3)

## Notes:

- The case numbers in the last column have the following meaning: 1: Hawaii, 1942–1944; 2a: Western Germany, 1944–1946; 2b: Western Germany, 1947–1948; 3: Japan, 1945–April 1952.
- (\*) Cases which involved offenses by civilians against occupation personnel were outside the competence of these courts. Toward the end of the occupation this rule was progressively relaxed especially for small offenses.
- The main difference between the cases of Germany and Japan is that whereas all German courts were suppressed, Japanese courts continued to function under the control of occupation authorities. This control meant that any trial could be interrupted and transferred to a military tribunal; moreover, judges could be dismissed and sentences were subject to review by occupation authorities. This was the situation in 1945-1946. Progressively Japanese courts received more autonomy.
- In subsequent years the role of civilian courts was progressively extended especially when decisions and sentences were in accordance with the expectations of the occupation authorities.
- For the sake of clarity the table does not mention summary court-martial courts whose sentences were up to 2 months in confinement. There were also similar “Summary courts” in Germany for the trial of small offenses committed by German people.
- The role of military courts in Germany did not end in 1948, but in July 1948 there was a reorganization which included a change in the names of the courts. This period was omitted in the table for the sake of simplicity.

Unfortunately, at the date of writing (May 2014) such records do not seem to be accessible to historians<sup>18</sup>. Some information is available, however. References of a

<sup>18</sup>What we mean is that the most serious cases are those which are the most shrouded in secrecy due to military censorship.



number of such records are given at the beginning of chapter 2. Unfortunately, the records which we were able to see so far do not give the circumstances under which the offenses occurred. For example, in most assault cases one ignores who was assaulted and for what reason. Was the Commission of the US Congress mentioned above able to get access to this source? According to the index of the collection of microfilms which reproduce the primary documents used by the Commission, it appears that the records of military tribunals (provost courts or military commissions) were not consulted (see the index of the Papers of the US Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians on the website of the publisher LexisNexis). In short, a cautious historian will not find such statements really convincing unless he (or she) has been able to get access to the archives of military tribunals.

What do we know about sources for provost court trials? Fred Israel (1967), one of the few scholars who considered this question says:

- “Except for Honolulu, provost transactions remained secret and proceedings most probably have been destroyed.”
- “Records of the Honolulu provost courts are in File 9/4/35, Office of the Territories, Department of the Interior, National Archives. These records list the defendant’s name, residence, nationality, age, occupation, race, names of witnesses, *charge*, findings, sentence.” With the help of NARA archivists we checked this file; it does not appear to contain the information claimed by Israel.
- In addition Israel mentions another source: “The Administration of Justice, Wartime Security Controls in Hawaii (typed copy), Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, 1945.” We ordered the microfilm of this file. It contains only few global statistical data about provost courts which will be discussed later on.

Surprisingly, Israel does not appear to have exploited any of the two sources that he mentions (at least not in his article of 1967).

All accounts of the war years in Hawaii that I have seen so far explicitly say that there have been no disturbances whatsoever. No strikes, no brawls, no riots, no assaults, no acts of arson, sabotage or vandalism. Yet, it is difficult to take such statements seriously before exploring the records of military tribunals. Due to strict military censorship, disturbances such as strikes, brawls, riots, assaults, acts of arson or vandalism. were not mentioned in newspapers (see below at the date of 10 March 1943), but that does not mean that there were none. The matter can be decided only by using sources which were not (or at least less) subject to censorship. It is the purpose of these notes to fill this gap as far as permitted by the documentation.

Over the period of a little bit more than one month in late 1944 for which we have been able to read the “Daily Report of Investigations” of the Office of Internal Security in Hawaii (NARA 2 in the reference section), 4 cases of sabotage were investi-

gated<sup>19</sup>. If one assumes a similar rate for the months for which we were not able to read the daily reports, that would lead to  $4 \times 43 = 172$  investigations of (suspected) sabotage cases over the period from 7 December 1941 to August 1945<sup>20</sup>.

What prompted our interest for this facet of the history of Hawaii? Our main motivation comes from the fact that military occupation has occurred in more or less similar forms in several historical instances and thus offers an ideal “laboratory” for comparative analysis.

From a sociological perspective there are several interesting questions.

- What are the reactions of a population to the totalitarian rule imposed by a military government?
- What are its reactions to the sudden influx of a large number of young males?
- What are the reactions of soldiers who are suddenly transplanted into a society and culture substantially different from their own?

## Loyalty investigations

By the end of December 1944 the Counter Intelligence Division in Hawaii had 928 loyalty investigations under way. They had different purposes. One was to screen people who would be employed in the harbor, on airfields or in other military installations in Hawaii. Other investigations concerned specifically Hawaiian Nikkei. Some Nisei were examined because they had raised objections against being drafted in the US Army. Some Issei or dual citizens were examined because doubts had arisen as to the reliability of their *Personal History Declaration* which they had to fill for the Central Identification Bureau<sup>21</sup>. On the basis on this declaration the person was assigned to a specific loyalty category by the Central Identification Bureau.

The procedure based on the Personal History Declaration is of interest because it appears to be the first occurrence in 20th century history<sup>22</sup> of a procedure which would be used recurrently in the following decades:

- During the occupation of Germany<sup>23</sup> and Japan
- During the period of the investigations conducted by the House Un-American

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<sup>19</sup>In one of them about 260 blocks of TNT were discovered in the hold of a US Army Transportation ship about to leave Honolulu Harbor.

<sup>20</sup>In line with the strategy adopted by the FBI, there was a strong tendency to conclude that alleged sabotage actions were either accidents or were carried out by pranks without any connection with the enemy. For a discussion of this strategy see Chapter 6 entitled “Sabotage and espionage”.

<sup>21</sup>Specific cases are discussed in the next chapter and detailed information about these cases can be found in the chronology at the dates of 7 January 1942, 29 October 1942, 8 May 1942, 5 and 27 December 1944.

<sup>22</sup>There may have been similar episodes during the War of Independence and during the Civil War but they would require further investigation.

<sup>23</sup>In Germany the Personal History Declaration questionnaire was known under the term *Fragebogen* (which means questionnaire). “Der Fragebogen” is also the title of a novel by Ernst Von Salomon which describes the questionnaire that all German people had to fill in.



Activities Committee (HUAC) and by similar committees which were created at state level such as for instance the Senate Fact-Finding Subcommittee on Un-American Activities (SUAC) established by the legislature of California. This period lasted from around 1932 right into the 1960s; it includes the era of McCarthyism (1950-1954) but is much broader.

Personal History Declarations were also required for people who wanted to get entry into the United States. A copy of the declaration made in July 1945 by a Korean priest, Soon Hyun, who requested authorization to work in the United States for the US Army can be found on the Internet. Comprised of 26 sections, it begins with the words “It is understood that the information given by me on this form will be investigated, and if found false in any detail, will constitute sufficient grounds for my prosecution”; it ends with Soon’s signature which is preceded by an oath worded as follows:

“I, Soon Hyun, do solemnly swear that the statements made by me in answer to each and all the foregoing questions are full, true and correct, SO HELP ME GOD [capitalized in the original document]”.

Apart from standard information about name, date of birth, name and profession of parents, the questions concerned successive places of residence, travels, education, addresses of employers, organizations to which the person belonged.

Loyalty investigations were not confined to Hawaii but were also carried out on a fairly large scale in the rest of the United States. By 31 December 1943, 1.5 million people had been investigated under the “Loyalty and Character Investigation Program”. After 1943 such investigations continued at a rate of about 70,000 per month. There were other similar programs focusing on specific objectives such as the “Removal of Subversive Program”, the “Japanese-American Program”, the “Industrial Employee Security Program”. (NARA 5)

A more detailed discussion for the case of Hawaii is given in the next chapter.

## What can be learned from US vital statistics?

### Fatalities

The data in the Table are excerpted from the annual volumes of the “Vital Statistics of the United States”. Were these data also subjected to military censorship or can they be trusted? The fact that the deaths provoked by the explosion that occurred in May 1944 in the military section of Pearl Harbor are not listed in the conflagration entry suggests that these statistics have undergone some form of filtering.

### Births and marriages

**Table 1.3 Fatalities by cause of death in Hawaii Territory, 1939-1946**

	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	Total (1941-1946)
Conflagration	1	4	3	2	4	2	3	5	19
Homicide	19	19	16	26	28	32	34	20	156
Legal execution	0	1	2	0	0	1	2	0	5
War (military)	0	0	2186	14	0	23	21	0	2244
War (civilians)	0	0	43	1	0	1	0	0	45

Notes: “War (military)” means “Death of military personnel during operations of war”. “War (civilians)” means “Death of civilians due to operations of war”. The fatality numbers for the attack on Pearl Harbor given by the Vital Statistics agree fairly well with the numbers generally accepted namely: 2,345 military (including the missing) and 57 civilians. In contrast the number of fatalities due to conflagration in 1944 does not seem to be correct for it does not include the 128 deaths which resulted from the explosion which occurred at Pearl Harbor on 21 May 1944 (see the chronology chapter). Two other points of interrogation concern the circumstances of the deaths of 14, 23 and 21 military personnel in 1942, 1944 and 1945 respectively.

Sources: Vital Statistics of the United States, Part I, annual volumes, 1939-1946.

In 1942 there were 4,100 persons of mixed Caucasian-Oriental blood. Births that occurred between 1943-1946 increased this number by 50%, which means that there were about 2,000 births of Caucasian-Oriental babies. The proportion (per 1,000) of illegitimate births to Japanese women doubled between 1942 and 1945 from 25 to 56 per 1,000. (Allen 1950, p. 353)

During the three years from 30 June 1943 to 30 June 1946, some 1,200 mainland servicemen married girls from Hawaii. Approximately 50% of the non-Caucasian girls were Hawaiian or part Hawaiian, 20% were of Japanese ancestry and the remaining 30% were from other communities (e.g. Filipinos, Chinese)

## Methodology of this study

This is not an isolated study. It belongs to a set of parallel investigations of various occupation episodes. In this part we wish to describe the methodological framework of this set of comparative studies.

In the first section we explain the rationale of the chronological method of exposition that we have chosen. The second section discusses the reasons for providing a comparative perspective. In the third section we emphasize that this study could not have been carried out, at least not in this form, before the advent of the Internet.

### Making historiography into a cumulative body of knowledge

The part devoted to the chronological listing of events represents some 70% of the content of this book. As this is a fairly uncommon feature for an historical account, a few words are in order to explain why, in our opinion, chronologies should be seen as a key element in historiography.

The chronology part and the chapter on quantitative evidence are the core of this report because they contain the information that comes from the sources and documents found in various archives and in primary sources such as newspapers. The other chapters contain comments on the events mentioned in the chronology. The main drawback of these comments is their subjective nature. They concern issues which at the time of writing were considered “important” but 30 years earlier or later historians would probably focus on different points. On the contrary, the chronology part can be seen as an objective list of events in the sense that it is largely (if not completely) independent of the personal interests of the historian. It becomes even more “objective” when it is a collective production of many historians (see below).

Why is the distinction between subjective and objective historical accounts essential?

One of the most basic features of a science is the fact that it is (and must be) a process of accumulation. From Bernard de Chartres to Descartes to Newton, this has been widely recognized:

“We are like dwarfs perched on the shoulders of giants” said Bernard de Chartres in 1124. “If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants” wrote Newton in a famous letter to Robert Hooke (1676).

In Britain the phrase “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants” was even included on the edge of a 2 pound coin issued in 1997.

For subjective comments one can hardly speak of a cumulative process. One set of comments that is found quite interesting at a given moment will be found outdated thirty years later and replaced by another set which will of course experience the same fate a few decades later<sup>24</sup>.

On the contrary, chronologies present facts (not opinions) which will have a lasting interest for historians<sup>25</sup>.

Moreover, it is easy to add complementary information to such files. Suppose, for instance, that in 2020 an historian discovers a record (not found or not accessible earlier) that describes a series of events. Thanks to the chronology structure it will be easy to check whether these events are already known or whether they are really “new”. In the later case they will be incorporated at the appropriate dates. In this

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<sup>24</sup>This could appear as a fairly cavalier judgment. Unfortunately, it seems to apply even to the work of historians who adopted a comparative perspective. Consider for instance the work of the renowned British historian Arnold Toynbee. Under the title “A study of history” he published a 12-volume study of the rise and fall of civilizations. Naturally, we are not going to argue that forty years after its publication the work is no longer useful. For one thing, it shows how such a synthesis can be done and sets a model for similar attempts; in that respect it is certainly a stimulating answer to the specialising tendency of modern historical research. However, precisely because of its originality and specificity, it would be difficult to link up this work with subsequent studies. Thus, it does not seem to be a step in a cumulative process. Naturally, such monumental studies have also another potential usefulness. Once digitized and made searchable by key-words, they will become valuable pools of facts and references of primary sources.

<sup>25</sup>The same observation holds for evidence which takes the form of quantitative data.

way, the chronology will grow year by year, always remaining the ultimate source of reference. In the future<sup>26</sup>, it may even be possible to make the *primary documents* available to readers. This will allow them to judge the degree of reliability of the events which are mentioned, a feature of crucial importance.

The methodology of such multi-layered chronologies has been proposed in Roehner (2002, p. 370-373) where the construction of very large chronicles (VLCs) was advocated. Such VLCs should be seen as huge computerized chronologies resulting from a process of *collective production* (somehow like the Wikipedia encyclopedia).

### **Why it is crucial to adopt a comparative perspective**

In medical research there are basically three successive phases.

1 First there is the need to describe and categorize the various illnesses. Clearly this phase is of crucial importance. If one cannot make a clear distinction between an attack of bronchitis and a lung cancer, any cure will be hazardous.

2 Then one has to identify the mechanisms (bacteria, virus, mutation and so on) which are responsible for the disorder.

3 The last step is to find a cure.

One faces the same kind of challenges for social events. Suppose for instance that one has a detailed account of 10 different riots. The first question is to see if they follow a common pattern. If they do not, a closer examination may perhaps show that there are in fact two different patterns; this opens the way to a classification of riots. As in medicine the second step is to find the mechanisms which are at the root of the different types of riots. Once these mechanisms are well understood, it may become possible to assess the likelihood of riots, may be even to prevent them.

For an isolated event the only thing one can do is to describe it. In order for a phenomenon to be studied scientifically, one needs many observations. This has been well understood by many sociologists and historians. Emile Durkheim, Vilfredo Pareto, Marc Bloch, Ernest Labrousse, Fernand Braudel and many others developed various forms of comparative analysis. Basically, the broader the phenomenon<sup>27</sup> the more cases one needs in order to study it in a meaningful way. For instance, economic growth depends upon a staggering number of parameters which explains why it is so difficult to come up with well-defined conclusions. On the contrary, for a sharply defined phenomenon, one can expect to draw clear-cut results even from a relatively small sample of less than 10 observations.

For all these reasons, the present study is not isolated but is part of a set of studies which centers around the phenomenon of military occupation. There have been vari-

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<sup>26</sup>Thanks to the possibilities of the hypertext format and to the fact that more and more archive resources will be digitized and made available online.

<sup>27</sup>By which we mean that one needs more parameters to define it.

ous occupation episodes during and after World War II; several of them are examined in the various studies which compose this project. All these studies follow the same format and focus on the same variables.

They turned out to be more time consuming than was realized when this project was started because we had to pierce the smoke screen of military censorship. As a matter of fact, comparative analysis was instrumental in suggesting which accounts are most affected by censorship. For instance, if one sees a substantial number of incidents in cases *A*, *B*, *C* and none in a case *D* which is similar in other respects, then it can be suspected that censorship was stricter in this last case. Naturally, the obstacle of censorship can be overcome only if access to previously restricted sources has been made possible. Many important files still remain closed<sup>28</sup>.

We concentrated on post-World War II episodes for in this case archive sources are much more numerous than for episodes that occurred in earlier times. In the United States there does not seem to be a 50-year rule for the opening of archives. For instance, most of the files of the “Military Advisory and Assistance Groups” (MAAG) which worked in many countries in the wake of World War II are still closed and it is likely that at least some parts of them will remain closed for ever. .

### **The crucial role of the Internet Revolution**

The Internet is not just one additional tool. For the social sciences it truly represents a Revolution. This word is justified by the fact that many investigations which were strictly impossible before the Internet have now become possible. The role of the Internet in the present study can be illustrated by three examples.

- All the studies in the present project are based on the analysis of *microsocial events*. Such events can only be found in databases of newspapers or news agencies. Selecting these events from a set of many thousands articles would have been a daunting and almost impossible task before these databases had been computerized and made searchable by keywords. For the present studies, the databases of the articles of the “New York Times” and of the “Times” have been searched extensively and this information has provided (at least sometimes) a first insight<sup>29</sup>.
- The advent of the Internet has completely changed the way we work in archives. Nowadays, the catalogs of many national archives have been computerized<sup>30</sup> and it has become possible to search them by key-words as well as by other characteristics such as “record group” or “file creator”. Once the item in which one is interested

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<sup>28</sup>Apart from keeping a file closed there are several other ways of making it inaccessible. If it is not included in the catalog (or if the title under which it is catalogued has no connection with actual content) nobody will be able to request it. Keeping apart a record and its inclosures is a way of making the inclosures inaccessible. Sometimes such problems may occur just by inadvertance but there are also cases in which one suspects that it was done by purpose.

<sup>29</sup>Of course, during wars major newspapers are also subject to censorship (pre-censorship, post-censorship or auto-censorship); in such cases one must find alternative sources of information.

<sup>30</sup>At the time of writing (2008) this process is still in progress. For the archives which are the most advanced in this respect, about 50% of the entries have been included in the electronic catalog.

has been located it is possible to get photocopies (or files of scanned images) from the archives. It is in this way that we have been able to work with archives located in various countries: Australia, Britain, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, United States without leaving Paris.

- Finally, many documents once available in only a few libraries are now directly accessible on the Internet. This observation also extends to personal testimonies which had never been available in libraries and can now be read on the websites set up by veterans or their descendants.

In the following chapter we discuss in more detail the incidents and the related question of the trials.



## Chapter 2

# Incidents, trials, loyalty investigations and internment

## Incidents

As already mentioned, the mainstream conception is that there was not a single act of espionage, sabotage or sedition in Hawaii during World War II. Is that true or is this conception the result of an absence of information due to strict wartime censorship?

The incidents reported in the “Daily reports of investigations” issued by the “Office of Internal Security” suggest that there were some incidents which were serious enough to warrant an investigation by the Counter Intelligence Corps. This source mainly lists the cases but does not provide much detail about their degree of gravity.

A number of sabotage actions that occurred in Hawaii are described in the chronology chapter (they can be easily located through a key-word search).

## Work stoppages

During the wartime years 1942-1945 there were on average 4,100 strikes annually on the mainland<sup>31</sup>. Little is known about strikes in Hawaii even after martial law was lifted in October 1944. Hawaiian workers and unions conducted many strikes before Pearl Harbor, therefore one would expect a substantial number of strikes to have occurred after October 1944. In “Martial law in Hawaii”, Green says that after March 1943, there was serious labor unrest in Hawaii (see the chronology at the date of March 1943) but he does not give more detail

The evidence that we found so far is restricted to a few isolated cases.

- According to Holmes (1994) there were two strikes of significance during the period of martial law (i) a 10-day strike against Theo H. Davies by the Teamsters Union (ii) a strike by AFL drivers of the Moanala Dairy. Holmes does not provide specific dates (nor other details) about these strikes.

- In April 1942 Ichiro Izuka, leader of the Port Allen (on Kauai island) section

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<sup>31</sup>Detailed annual data are given in the chronology at the date of 25 August 1945.

of the ILWU (International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union) was taken into custody by the Kauai Office of Civil Defense and charged with having disrupted the war effort by distributing literature advertising strikes and slowdowns (see the chronology at the date of 11 April 1942).

- In late 1942, there was a 3-week strike of prostitutes in Honolulu (see the chronology at the date of 8 February 1943).

- In March 1943 there was a labor dispute between the direction of the Hawaiian Electric Company and its employees (see the chronology).

- In July 1943 Honolulu bus drivers engaged in a slowdown over a money issue (see the chronology at the date of 3 July 1943).

Is it possible to make an educated guess for the number of work stoppages in Hawaii in 1945, that is to say after the end of martial law? One can propose the following argument. The reports on strikes published by the US Department of Labor (Strikes 1941-1945) provide the annual numbers of strikes by state. It turns out that for the western states <sup>32</sup> there is a clear relationship between the annual number of work stoppages ( $W$ ) and the population ( $P$ , expressed in millions):

$$W = 23P - 1.8 \quad \text{the coefficient of linear correlation is } 0.98$$

By applying this relation to Hawaii with a population of about 0.5 million one gets  $W = 10$ . In other words one would expect about 10 work stoppages in Hawaii in 1945. Let us for the moment take this figure as a working hypothesis; it will become possible to check it when data become available.

## Trials by military tribunals

### **Trials of civilians by military tribunals during the Civil War and Reconstruction**

Trials of civilians by military tribunals had been carried out in the United States during troubled periods of unrest and civil war, for instance during the War of the American Revolution, the Civil War, during the Reconstruction period in the South and also during periods of major social unrest, e.g. in the 1870s (Prescott and Eldridge 2003). During the Civil War (April 1861 – April 1865) there were at least 4,270 trials by Military Commissions and in the period from 1 May 1865 to 31 December 1868 some 1,435 trials by Military Commissions took place in former Confederate states<sup>33</sup>.

### **NARA sources about provost court trials**

<sup>32</sup>California, Colorado, New Mexico, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming.

<sup>33</sup>The annual data are as follows: 1866: 229; 1867: 181; 1868: 104; an undetermined number of trials took place in 1869-1870. It can be noted that trials of civilians by Military Commissions had been decreed illegal by the Supreme Court in 1866. (Neely 1991)



NARA has an online catalog called ARC (Archival Research Catalog). This catalog is mainly for the College Park location. In the years following 2010, this catalog was integrated into a broader catalog called OPA (Open Public Access) which includes also many other NARA locations. However, neither ARC nor OPA are all-inclusive which means that about 20% of the records can only be found through separate finding aids which are available in the reading rooms.

In mid-2013, Ms. Kylene Woods, an archivist at College Park, brought to my attention a number of files about provost court trials in Hawaii which are only listed on these finding aids.

Some of them are described below.

### **Provost Marshal court**

1 Entry 310 (UD-UP)<sup>34</sup>, Boxes 586-688 (103 boxes).

Title: Honolulu, Oahu, proceedings, 1941-1944.

2 Entry 326 (UD-UP), Boxes 727-745 (19 boxes). Title: Pearl Harbor, Oahu, proceedings, 1943-1944.

3 Entry 328 (UD-UP), Boxes 747-759 (13 boxes). Title: Schofield barracks, proceedings.

4 Entry 317 (UD-UP), Boxes 701-708 (8 boxes).

Title: Kauai, proceedings, 1941-1944.

5 Entry 320 (UP-UP), Boxes 711-721 (11 boxes).

Title: Maui, 1942.

6 Entry 390 (UD-UP), Boxes 569A-585B (49 boxes altogether)

Title: Card indexes to defendants.

### **Provost Marshall court-Legal section**

7 Entry 304 (UD-UP), Box 540.

Title: Miscellaneous correspondence relating to provost courts, 1942-1945.

The card indexes to defendants (item 6) give a way to estimate the number of defendants. First it must be recalled that a box holds about 1,200 pages. Thus, altogether, there are  $49 \times 1,200 = 58,800$  pages; on each page there are 2 cards. Thus, there must be of the order of 117,000 defendants. This estimate is about twice as high as the number of 55,000 that is usually given<sup>35</sup>. Which one of these two figures is closest to the truth remains an open question.

About 80% of the trials took place in Honolulu. Examination of some records sug-

<sup>34</sup>According to explanations given on the website of NARA, the code UD-UP has no meaning to researchers; it rather helps NARA staff to locate the document.

<sup>35</sup>In a small number of cases there may be several defendants in the same trial, but this seems to be fairly rare. In other words, the number of defendants should be approximately equal to the number of trials.

gests that in the proceedings there are on average some 5 pages per defendants. Thus, under the assumption that there were 117,000 defendants, one would expect  $117000 \times 5 \times 0.8 = 468,000$  pages of proceedings for Honolulu. But according to item number one there are only  $103 \times 1200 = 154,000$  pages. In other words, this file would cover 30% of the trials. If we rather use the more official figure of 55,000 trials, one would expect  $55000 \times 5 \times 0.8 = 220,000$  pages. In this case, file number one would cover 70% of the trials.

### **How many trials in Hawaii**

How many trials by military tribunals have there been in Hawaii and what information do newspapers give on this question?

Officially (see the chronology at the date of 21 November 1945), there have been “approximately 55,000 cases tried by the provost courts”.

A New York Times article (17 May 1942, p. 20) noted that in the five months since 7 December 1941 the provost courts in Honolulu have tried more than 11,000 cases, pronounced more than 1,300 jail sentences and collected approximately \$150,000 in fines. According to these data  $1300/11000 = 12\%$  of the convictions resulted in jail sentences, but this figure certainly underestimates the percentage of persons who were actually imprisoned for a reason that was already mentioned: if the fine specified by the sentence was not paid immediately, the person would be taken into custody at hard labor.

Surprisingly, in a recapitulation of the war years in Hawaii published in the New York Times of 3 March 1946 (Section: The week in review page E2) one reads that “On 7 December 1941, the governor of Hawaii suspended the writ of habeas corpus and declared martial law. During the war the provost courts tried 3,750 cases and imposed 400 jail sentences.” Obviously this article is not consistent with the previous one. The comparison suggest some caution in accepting data about provost court trials. Yet, the proportion of trials which resulted in jail sentences, namely  $400/3750 = 11\%$  is consistent with the previous figure of 12%; it may be that the 3,750 cases are just a subset of the total number of cases.

In the book published by Gwenfread Allen in 1950 and in a paper by Fred Israel (1967) one learns that 15 different provost courts were established: 3 in Honolulu and the others at Hilo (Hawaii Island), on Kauai Island, Lanai Island, Maui Island, Molokai Island, Pearl Harbor (Oahu Island), Schofield Barracks (Oahu Island). During the first six months of the war, i.e. from 7 December to 7 June 1942, the three Honolulu courts heard 19,000 cases.

During the whole year of 1942 the Honolulu provost courts heard 22,480 cases. This last figure does not comprise later years nor does it include the trials which were held

in the 12 other courts. Even with such limitations this figure is widely at odds with the 3,750 cases mentioned in the New York Times article of March 1946. Allen says that for the whole war provost courts tried 37,000 civilians. But on the website of the magazine “Legal Affairs” (<http://www.legalaffairs.org>) one reads that they conducted some 50,000 trials of civilians throughout the islands during the war. Which one of these figures is correct remains an open question.

Perhaps the most accurate estimate would come from the card indexes of defendants in Honolulu (see NARA 26c in the reference section). There are 49 boxes. With an average of 1,200 pages per box, this results in 58,800 pages. As there are 2 defendants listed on each page, one gets a total of 117,600 defendants only for Honolulu.

It is true that most of the cases are of little importance, such as curfew violations which resulted in small fines. The source NARA 30 gives an idea of the number of jail sentences meted out by the provost court at Hilo on the island of Hawaii.

Between 6 February 1942 and 16 March 1942 (5 weeks) there were at least 5 sentences terms longer than 1 year, all for charges of assault or negligent homicide<sup>36</sup>. “At least” means that these cases are cited in a correspondence but are not from an exhaustive list of cases. Thus, at Hilo there was about one sentence equal or over one year per week.

Hawaii Island had a population of 73,000 (1/5.6 of the total population of the Territory). If one accepts the assumption that the rate was more or less the same on the other islands one gets a total annual number of  $5.6 \times 52 = 292$ . This gives an order of magnitude which must be compared with other estimates.

### **Fines versus imprisonment**

The description of provost court trials given in “War time security controls in Hawaii” show that the distinction between fine and prison sentences was not as clear-cut as often presented. For instance one reads (p. 35) that “if the defendant was unable to pay his fine, it was the policy of the Military Government that it was better for the defendant to be performing actual labor for the county of Honolulu as a prisoner than to wander around the streets in an intoxicated condition”. The scarcity of labor in Hawaii was certainly a strong motivation for this policy.

This is indeed confirmed by the fact that a different attitude prevailed toward servicemen. Indeed, in the case of a sentence of fine against a civilian if he did not pay immediately he was committed to jail, while in the case of servicemen additional time was given for payment. The reason was probably that because servicemen could not be put to work there would be useless as prisoners.

There is another question regarding fines which should be mentioned. General Or-

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<sup>36</sup>More precisely: 3 assault cases (1 year and 3 years twice), 2 negligent homicide cases (3 years and 4 years).

ders No 51 limited to \$200 the currency possession that was allowed. The “War time security controls” says that in case of violation it was a practice to give a substantial fine and in addition to provide that the money in excess should be invested in defense bonds. For instance, if a person had \$1,000 and was fined \$100, the amount to be converted into war bonds was  $1000 - 100 - 200 = 700$ . This practice was discontinued after complaints by the Treasury in January 1943.

### Number and length of prison sentences

How many of the sentences were for terms equal to (or longer than) one year in prison? It will become possible to answer this question with certainty only when we find complete statistical data about these trials. However, it is possible to make an educated guess.

One of the rare sets of provost court sentences for which we have some statistical information is for the New Zealand Expeditionary force in Japan which was part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force. In this case the percentage of terms equal to (or longer than) 3 months was: 40%; terms equal to (or longer than) 6 months represented 20%; terms equal to (or longer than) 1 year represented 5%; terms equal to (or longer than) 2 years represented 2% <sup>37</sup>.

Under the assumption that the distribution was somewhat the same in Hawaii and on the basis of 37,000 trials, one is led to the following distribution of sentences:

Number of terms  $\geq$  3 months  $\sim$  15,000

Number of terms  $\geq$  6 months  $\sim$  7,400

Number of terms  $\geq$  1 year  $\sim$  1,800

Number of terms  $\geq$  2 years  $\sim$  740

How many of the terms were equal to (or longer than) 6 years? This is an interesting question because terms over five years could only be given by a Military Commission. As a rough approximation, we can model the cumulative distribution function as a power law; from the previous figures it appears that the distribution is divided by 10 when the length of the sentence is multiplied by 4; thus, one would get  $740/10 = 74$  sentences equal to (or longer than)  $2 \times 4 = 8$  years.

Therefore, based on this argument, one would expect (at least) 74 trials by Military Commission. However, in “War time security controls in Hawaii” we are told that it was the deliberate policy of the military governor to use provost courts rather than military commissions even for cases as serious as manslaughter. According to

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<sup>37</sup>This distribution is based on a total of 112 cases. A more detailed analysis of these cases can be found in another volume in the series about occupation episodes, namely “Relation between Allied Forces and the Japanese population”, Chapter on quantitative evidence).

### Some Provost Courts sentences of over one year confinement, 1941-1942

Date of trial [y/m/d]	Name	Sentence prison, fine [year; \$]	Charge	Location	Source
1942/04/27	Ababa	2	Violation of Selected Service Act	Honolulu	NARA 26c
1942/01/26	Anderson	4; \$1,000	Sale of intoxicating liquor	Honolulu	NARA 27
1942/01/05	Carvalho	1	Larceny	Honolulu	NARA 27
1941 – 1942	Furtado	> 2		Honolulu	NARA 27
1941 – 1942	Genereaux	> 3; \$2,000		Honolulu	NARA 27
1941 – 1942	Hart	> 2		Honolulu	NARA 27
1941 – 1942	Isosaki	> 3		Honolulu	NARA 27
1941 – 1942	Iverson	> 3; \$1,000		Honolulu	NARA 27
1942/02/04	Jong	1.5	Sale of drugs	Honolulu	NARA 27
1941 – 1942	Kagazu	> 3		Honolulu	NARA 27
1941 – 1942	Kawakami	> 3		Honolulu	NARA 27
1941 – 1942	Kikuda	> 3		Honolulu	NARA 27
1941 – 1942	Litz	> 1		Honolulu	NARA 27
1941 – 1942	McBean	> 3; \$2,000		Honolulu	NARA 27
1941 – 1942	Marston	> 3; \$1,000		Honolulu	NARA 27
1941 – 1942	Noguichi	> 3		Honolulu	NARA 27
1943/12/30	Norishige	1; \$150	G.O. 8 9.01	Honolulu	NARA 26
1942/04/24	Ogawa	1.5; \$100	Possessing currency	Honolulu	NARA 27
1941 – 1942	Owan	> 3		Honolulu	NARA 27
1941 – 1942	Pruit	> 1.5		Honolulu	NARA 27
1941 – 1942	Romler	> 3		Honolulu	NARA 27
1941 – 1942	Tomas	5		Honolulu	NARA 27
1941 – 1942	Tomasa	> 1.5		Honolulu	NARA 27
1941 – 1942	Wasano	5		Honolulu	NARA 27
1941 – 1942	Yamaguchi	> 3		Honolulu	NARA 27

Notes: This is a very limited list based on small samples extracted from much larger datasets.

Sources: NARA 26c is a collection of index cards of defendants. In addition to the names this source also gives dates of trial, charges and sentences.

NARA 27 gives information on sentences through orders for reduction of previous sentences. The reason for these reductions is stated as follows: "It is to the interest of the United States that xxx be released so that he may engage in work that will promote US national defense". Unfortunately, for most of the cases, this source neither gives the exact date of trial nor the charge.

official accounts there have been only 8 trials by military commission. Consequently, as surprising as it may appear, sentences for manslaughter never exceeded 5 years at hard labor. At the other end of the spectrum, persons arrested twice (or more) for drunkenness would be sentenced to a few months at hard labor.

In 1937 and 1938 there had been 23 and 24 homicides respectively in the Territory of Hawaii (NARA 24). This corresponds to a rate of 5.6 per 100,000 resident population which is in line with the rate of 7.3 observed in the rest of the United States. Several of the 8 known trials by military commission correspond to murders which have

nothing to do with national security. This leads to the following question. Why were not all homicide cases tried by military commissions?

Several of the sentences imposed by the provost courts were specifically adapted to war time. For instance, the court could sentence people to buy war bonds and to keep them until the end of the war. However, in January 1943 after objections from the US Department of Treasury the military governor prohibited provost court judges from sentencing people to buy war bonds which they could not cash.

Another war time sentence was the donation of blood to the blood bank. This practice received official approval in June 1942 when the military governor published an equivalence table according to which one pint of blood (i.e. 57 cubic centimeter) was equivalent to a fine of \$ 30 or to 15 days in jail. More details about war bonds and blood donations can be found in the chronology at the date of 18 June 1942.

Another particularity of provost court trials was that they were secret except in Honolulu. Moreover no copy of charges was furnished to the defendant.

Provost courts are the form of military tribunals destined to try fairly light offenses. Sentences are limited to terms of 5 years. More serious cases were tried before military commissions. Regarding these courts Allen (1950) says that “during the four years of war they tried only 8 cases, 3 of murder and one of each of attempted murder, manslaughter, espionage, robbery and a sex offense. The death sentence was imposed in one murder case but was later commuted to imprisonment”. This statement is repeated almost verbatim in Israel’s (1967) paper. At first sight such a small number of cases appears surprising. It is at variance with the number of military commissions during the Civil War and during Reconstruction in former Confederate states. If the number of 8 military commissions is really correct it may have been the result of a deliberate decision by the Military Governor.

For the historian who wishes to get a reliable picture, the first step would be for each island to establish how many provost court and military commission trials have taken place. The second step would consist in finding and analyzing their records and estimating the number of offenses and incidents of each type. Then, in a third step it would be possible to compare these data with similar data for other occupation episodes and to draw conclusions.

In a long article based on several original sources, Harry and Jane Scheiber (1997) write that about 55,000 persons were tried by provost courts. They write that, according to an Army source, only 200 received prison terms of one year or more. If this figure is correct it would represent the very small proportion of 0.36%. Is this figure reliable?

One must also keep in mind that administrative detention of aliens as well as American citizens of Japanese descent was common place during the war which means that



sentences by military courts (either provost courts or military commissions) were not really necessary to keep people in custody.

In a book about World War II on Kauai Island, Tim Klass gives some information about the operation of the provost court on that island. Although the information is mainly of anecdotal nature it gives some insight, in particular it suggests that imprisonment at hard labor was a fairly common sentence. In this respect one can recall that cheap labor was indeed in great demand because of manpower scarcity. Incidentally, it is during the war that the mechanization of harvesting cane sugar made great progress.

The first provost court session took place in January 1942; according to Klass provost courts have been discontinued on October 23, 1944.

- A common sentence for absenteeism from work was 30 days at hard labor and a fine of \$100. This high fine was usually suspended on condition of steady work for 4 months after release.
- Drunks were sentenced to 6 months at hard labor. In one case, a worker got 6 months at hard labor for “using profanity in addressing his boss”.
- Three individuals caught at an August 1942 cockfight (a fight between gamecocks, often fitted with metal gaffs) received 30-day sentences suspended on condition of purchasing a \$75 war bond.

## Loyalty investigations

Many Hawaii residents were called before a board of officer(s) and civilians for an investigation of their loyalty to the United States. Such hearings were preceded by the arrest of the person (a warrant of arrest is usually appended to the hearing record) and by an investigation conducted by an agent of the FBI or a special agent of the Counter Intelligence Corps. These hearings were set up and organized following the instructions given in Special Order No 251 (13 September 1942)<sup>38</sup>.

Although this board of investigation was neither a military tribunal nor a civil court, it had the capacity to recommend detention of the person under investigation. The standard sentence ran as follows:

“In view of the above findings, the Board recommends that the detainee, Kenjiro HAYASHI, be interned for the duration of the war.

The Board recessed at 3:00 pm on October 29, 1942.

In this case, it meant a detention for about 3 years. So, in a fairly paradoxical way, this board was able to impose “sentences” which were longer than the average term in provost courts or in Hawaiian civil tribunals.

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<sup>38</sup>There were loyalty hearings before this date but they were organized in a different way.

## The interment procedure

The internment process comprised the following steps.

1 First a warrant of arrest was issued by the military authorities. One of the main questions is how the persons to be arrested were picked up. Some were on the black lists established by the FBI and military intelligence even before December 1941; others were probably denounced by informants (see the examples given below).

2 In the interval between the arrest and the hearing by the loyalty investigation board a report was established either by the FBI or by military intelligence. It appears that the decision of the Board was mostly based on this report. The hearing was mostly useless and unavailing.

3 Some time after the Board had given its conclusion it was confirmed by an order signed by the Military Commander namely General Emmons. The delay between the hearing and this confirmation was variable from one week (in the case of Ms. Takahashi, see below) to almost 3 months (in the case of Mr. Hotta, see below). At this point we do not understand the reasons of these variations.

4 Some time later the internee was sent to an internment camp in the continental United States. For instance Mr. Hotta was sent to the camp near Santa Fee, New Mexico. A few internee were not sent to the mainland. We do not know why.

At one point during this procedure the internee was given an “Internment Serial Number”. For instance Mr. Hotta’s number was: ISN-HJ-1575-CI.

ISN=Internment Serial number

HJ=Hawaii+Japanese, US would be US citizen, G would be German

1575=Internee number

CI=Civilian internee

The main question concerns the internee number. We are told (see the website of the German American Internee Coalition) that these numbers were assigned *consecutively* by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), but there are several puzzling cases. Thus, Ms. Harada (see below for more detail) who was investigated by the Board on 29 January 1942 was assigned the number HUS-1801 whereas Ms. Takahashi whose hearing took place on 19 May 1942 received the number HUS-442. This suggests that the number was not given in the steps 1-3 but probably only later. Another observation which points in the same direction is that Mr. Hayashi whose hearing took place on 7 January 1942 received the number HJ-17. But we know that much more than 17 persons were arrested between 7 December 1941 and 7 January 1942.

If it was really done consecutively this numbering shows that there were at least 1,801 internees. However, it should be kept in mind that not all internees received



internment numbers. As far as we know, people sentenced to a prison term by a provost court did not get a Internment Serial Number.

## Questions

These hearings raise several questions for which we do not yet have adequate answers.

- **Dual citizens** It appears, that many dual citizen (that is to say born in Hawaii but educated in Japan) were “sentenced” to be detained until the end of the war, no matter how strongly they claimed and emphasized their loyalty. In other words, the questions asked by board members as well as the answers provided by the detainee during the hearing were of little importance; the decision of the board was mainly based on the status of the detainee and on the conclusions of the intelligence officer. This is clearly shown by the hearing of 29 October 1942 in the case of Kenjiro Hayashi (see the chronology). The internee was not a member of any Japanese organization, donated money to the Japanese War relief only once (in 1937) and strongly claimed his loyalty. Were all dual citizens who did not speak English arrested? Obviously not because there were 55,000 dual citizens in Hawaii and many of them were probably unable to speak English fluently. So, one must admit that there was another reason for Hayashi to be picked up which does not appear in the record but was probably provided by an informant.

The fact that intelligence provided by informants was not included in the written record is suggested by the hearing of Kiyoshi Hotta (8 May 1942). In his testimony the intelligence officer declared in a somewhat cryptic way: “The information was gathered over a period of several weeks and the informant, as explained there [probably refers to a written report] is unusually reliable, has no ax to grind and is one of the most well informed Japanese on this island [i.e. Maui]” (NARA 16).

- **Alien Japanese** The same question surfaces for alien Japanese. Kiyoshi Hotta (8 May 1942) is almost automatically “sentenced” to be interned in spite of the fact that he had 9 children who were (dual) US citizens and that two of them had graduated from the university of Hawaii.

There were 38,000 Japanese aliens in Hawaii; of these some 19,000 were males. All those who came to Hawaii after the age of 25 had probably served in the Japanese army before coming to Hawaii. In order to know how many were in this situation one would need to know the distribution of the ages of Japanese people coming to Hawaii. If one assumes somewhat arbitrarily that 10% came after being 25 it would mean that 1,900 alien Japanese had served in the Japanese army. Only a small fraction of them were interned. How were they picked up? Again, the only plausible answer one can think of, is “on the basis of reports provided by informants”.

- **Expected reprisals against “collaborators”**. One can go one step further. If the

reports made by informants were really so crucial one would suspect that they were hated by the other Japanese and that some of them had been assaulted, injured or even killed. So far, we did not find any account of such reprisals but they must have existed. The split between “collaborators” and “non-collaborators” is a basic feature of all situations of this kind.

- **Loyalty investigations after Midway** After the American victory at the battle of Midway in June 1942 the threat of a Japanese invasion disappeared. Therefore, there was little ground for arresting people who might have sided with the Japanese. Yet, loyalty investigations continued especially in cases in which it was suspected that the “Personal History Declaration” was not correct<sup>39</sup>. Several examples are provided in the chronology in December 1944. I must confess that at this point I fail to see what was the purpose of these investigations. Of course, such investigations are understandable for persons who are going to work in military installations or who will be drafted but except for these cases the objective is unclear.

## Prostitution

It is a common observation that armies attract prostitution. This “service” can be provided in more or less institutionalized form. In Hawaii, plantations had long made available such facilities for those of their employees who were single. The system of “supervised prostitution” which was used for armed forces followed a similar pattern (Klass 1970, p. 45). According to Anthony (1955, p. 40), after the outbreak of the war a substantial number of prostitutes were brought to Honolulu from the mainland under military priority. Instead of confining them to a red-light district they were scattered throughout the residential districts. In some instances, homes were converted to Army brothels which met with vigorous objections from the part of the neighbors.

When civil government was partially restored in February 1943, General Emmons endeavored to persuade the civil governor of Hawaii to take over the function of regulating prostitution, which he declined however. Subsequently, some houses of prostitution were closed by police. Anthony says that as a result a substantial number of prostitutes returned to the mainland. This is doubtful, however, because in 1943-1945 the number of troops (and therefore the “demand”) was on the rise. As a matter of fact a report from the Office of Internal Security (NARA 2, 23 December 1944) tells us that there were about 400 prostitutes in Hawaii before as well as after February 1943.

An account by Klass (1970) raises similar questions. According to this book the

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<sup>39</sup>As mentioned above by the end of December 1944 over 900 loyalty investigations were underway.

island of Maui was the first to shut down its brothels in late 1943. The island of Hawaii followed suit on 4 March 1944 and Kauai closed the 3 brothels located in Kapaa in April 1944. Eventually, Oahu did the same in September 1944 with the result that the long lines on North Hotel Street in Honolulu ended. One obvious question must be addressed. If brothels have filed a need until 1944, how can one explain that they could be closed so easily in mid-1944 at a time when the number of troops was larger than ever.

## Internment

Whereas our knowledge about trials is fairly limited, there is at least some partial information about the number of people who were interned. For this question it would not make sense to focus exclusively on Hawaii because residents of Hawaii who, for some reason, were suspected of disloyalty, were often sent to the mainland to be interned in relocation or detention camps. This is why we will not confine ourselves to camps in Hawaii.

### Detention centers in Hawaii Territory

There were different kinds of prisons and detention centers.

- The first kind were constituted by the city and county prisons. Such municipal and county prisons exist even in peace time in all American counties. Because the city of Honolulu and the county of Oahu were by far the most populated, they had also the largest prison. The Oahu Prison could hold about 400 prisoners. The county prisons of Hawaii, Kauai, Maui and Molokai were much smaller; they could hold about 50 prisoners (or even less for the island of Molokai which had the smallest population of all).

- Persons who were held because of their status as enemies<sup>40</sup> or suspected sympathizers with enemy countries were not held at county jails (unless temporarily) but at special detention centers.

Seven detention camps were set up in the Territory of Hawaii. (i) Two were on Oahu Island, namely one at Sand Island in Honolulu Harbor (see Fig. 2.1a) and the other at Honouliuli on the southwestern shore of Oahu which operated from 1943 to the end of 1944 (see Fig. 2.1b). (ii) Five camps were located on each of the other islands, namely on Hawaii (1942-1944), Kauai (1942-1944), Lanai (1942), Maui (1942-1943) and Molokai (1942). The years within parentheses define the operation time of the camps as reported on the website of the “Japanese American National Museum (JANM)”.

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<sup>40</sup>The standard term was “enemy aliens” but some internees (e.g. Irene Harada) were cataloged as enemy alien even though they were US citizens by birth.

- The military had their own detention facilities. The main stockade (i.e. military prison) was located at Schofield Barracks on Oahu island. It could hold several hundred prisoners. There may have been other military prisons on the other islands but we have no information about them at this point.
- The Navy had a separate disciplinary barrack (often referred to as a “brig”) on Ford Island in Pearl Harbor; it was of a size comparable to the stockade at Schofield Barracks.

To sum up, the Territory of Hawaii’s prisons and detention facilities for which some information is available could hold about<sup>41</sup>:

$$400 + 3 \times 50 + 400 + 5 \times 50 + 400 + 400 = 2,000$$

In order to put this figure in perspective, one should remember that in the last years of the war, the Territory of Hawaii had a total population of about 1 million if one takes into account the military and naval personnel and the temporary civilian workers who came from the mainland.

### **Expansion of the list of detention facilities in Hawaii (June 2014)**

The previous subsection was written in 2012. Documents were found in 2014 which show that in the Territory of Hawaii there were other detention centers for civilians. To those already mentioned one should add several facilities. The table provides a global summary.

### **How many Nikkei residents from Hawaii were interned?**

This point was already discussed; it is worthwhile to point out that (as for the number of provost court trials) fairly different figures can be found in the literature. We already mentioned the figure of 480 Hawaiian Nisei given in Stephan (1987).

- In the foreword by Dennis M. Ogawa for “Life behind Barbed Wire” (Soga, 2008, p. xi), one reads: “Soga was one of 1,466 Hawaii Japanese who were imprisoned during World War II”.
- In the Introduction written by by Tetsuden Kashima for the same book, one reads (Soga 2008, p. 10) “The total Hawaii Nikkei detained in either the Hawaii or Mainland facilities came to about 2,392”<sup>42</sup>.

Obviously none of these figures includes the persons imprisoned after being tried by provost courts.

Another question is how many internees died during internment. More specifically, one would like to know the total number of deaths from all causes as well as the

<sup>41</sup>In this count, Sand Island and Honouliuli were given a joint capacity of 400 because they mostly operated in different time intervals; we assumed (somewhat arbitrarily) that the 5 other detention centers had an average capacity of 50. Many thanks to Mr. Walter Ikeda for the precisions that he sent me regarding detention facilities.

<sup>42</sup>More detailed figures given by Kashima are as follows: 2,092 interned on the Mainland and 300 at the Honouliuli internment camp.

**Table 2.1 Detention facilities in Hawaii Territory**

Island	Military detention camp	County jail and other jails
Kauai	Kalaheo stockade	Wailua county jail Waimea jail Lilue plantation
Oahu	Honouliuli Gulch camp (> 300) Sand Island camp	Oahu prison (630) Immigration station
Molokai		Kaunakakai jail
Lanei		Lanai city jail
Maui	Olinda camp Haiku camp	Wailuku county jail
Hawaii	Waiakea Kilauea	

Notes: The table comprises 15 detention facilities. The islands are listed from north to south. When available, information about capacity is given within parenthesis. For Olinda and Waiakea taken together one knows that in January 1942 there were at least 355 prisoners (see entry for 30 January 1942). As prisoners were constantly transferred from one detention center to another it is not easy to get an overall estimate. It should be recalled that many prisoners were sent to mainland prisoner camps.

Sources: *Resolution of the "Japanese American Citizens League adopted at the National Council Meeting of 7-11 July 2011 at Los Angeles; NARA 36; Annual Report of the Governor of Hawaii to the Secretary of the Interior for fiscal year ended 30 June 1942.*

number of fatalities through illness or through violent death, e.g. being shoot dead by a guard.

Accounts by internees tell of tense situations which could well have resulted in accidental shootings. One situation of that kind is described by Yasutaro Soga (2008, p. 31) at the internment camp of Sand Island (Honolulu Bay). After 8 pm the prisoners could not leave their tents except to go to the toilets. During the night there were no lights in the camp. If internees were on their way to the toilet and a guard suddenly ordered "stop", they had to answer "prisoner"; if they failed to do that, they could be shot dead. It is clear that such situations leave the way open to all sorts of accidents.

### Mainland

On the mainland there were different kinds of detention centers

- 1 So-called "Assembly centers" which were temporary centers used in the first





**Fig. 2.1a Internment camp of Sand Island (Honolulu Bay).** One of the internees, Yasutaro Soga, writes: “We lived in tents during the first six months of 1942. I think the barracks were completed at the end of May 1942”. Sources: *Japanese Cultural Center of Hawaii*; Soga (2008, p. 38).



**Fig. 2.1b Internment camp at Honouliuli on Oahu.** Altogether there were (at least) 14 jails and prisons intended for civilians on the Territory of Hawaii. Source: *Japanese Cultural Center of Hawaii*; Resolution of 18 May 2011 of the “*Japanese American Citizen League*”;

phase of the operation. According to the JANM website there were 16 centers of that kind

2 The 10 permanent relocation camps administered by the War Relocation Authority (WRA). Although Tule Lake was one of these 10 camps, it stands somewhat apart because it held mainly detainees suspected of disloyalty.

3 So-called “Department of Justice” internment camps. These camps were administered by the “Immigration and Naturalization Service” (or INS, an organization

which belonged to the Department of Justice) because in addition to alien Japanese it also held people of Japanese ancestry from South American countries particularly from Peru. According to Wegars (2005) there were 32 camps of that kind. One of the largest of these camps was the Crystal City camp in Texas.

4 Two so-called “Citizen Isolation Camps” which held citizens which were characterized as disloyal.

5 US Army detention centers. Often these camps were located near military camps. There were several dozens camps of that kind. They held people of Japanese, German, Italian ancestry.

### Estimates for the number of detainees

Is it possible to give quantitative estimates for the populations of these camps? For this purpose we will regroup the previous categories into 3 classes.

- *Detention camps in Hawaii.* Apart from the Sand Island camp we have little information about the number of internees in these camps. Therefore it is impossible to give an estimate for the total number of internees.

- *The 10 relocation camps.* Their average population was around 11,000<sup>43</sup>, with a total population of about 110,000.

- *INS camps and US Army detention camps.* Priscilla Wegars, one of the first scholars who tried to establish a fairly exhaustive list, has identified 108 camps. Data for the number of detainees are known for only 40 of them. For this sub-sample the average population is 660 which means that these camps were on average 16 times smaller than the relocation camps. If we assume that this average also holds for the other sub-sample, namely the 68 camps for which populations are unknown, then the total number of detainees is around:  $108 \times 660 = 71,280$ .

## Repatriation to Japan

During the war some people of Japanese ancestry renounced their American citizenship and asked for repatriation to Japan. This is the story told by Minoru Kiyota (1997). He was a Kibei (born in the United States but educated in Japan) who was sent to the Tule Lake camp after refusing to sign a loyalty oath. As many others prisoners of this camp, he renounced his US citizenship. Yet, in contrast to others he was not repatriated because he came to work for the Far East US Air Intelligence.

In addition to those who renounced their citizenship a number of so-called Japanese aliens were also repatriated. The Table gives some figures about this process of

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<sup>43</sup>The data are as follows: Gila River, AZ: 13,300; Granada-Amache, CO: 7,300; Heart Mountain, WY: 10,800; Jerome, AZ: 8,500; Manzanar, CA: 10,000; Minidoka, ID: 9,400; Poston, AZ: 18,000; Rohwer, Ar: 8,500; Topaz, UT: 8,100, Tule Lake, CA: 18,800.

(<http://www.ww2pacific.com>)



**Table 2.2 Repatriation of Japanese during and after World War II**

Area of origin	Total to be evacuated (June 1946)	Evacuated during the war	Evacuated by 4 June 1946	Evacuated by 1 May 1950	Total evacuated
United States, mainland	18,639	1,259	9,907	≥ 9,907	≥ 9,907
Hawaii Territory	6,289	?	23	3,592	≥ 3,592
United States, total	24,928	≥ 1,259	≥ 9,907	≥ 13,499	≥ 13,499

Notes:

(i) The documents on which this table is based were established from the perspective of shipping capacities. For that reason the term “Area” refers to the areas from where the repatriation ships departed. Thus, the Japanese repatriated from the mainland may have been residents from Hawaii who were detained in a camp on the mainland and from there were directly shipped to Japan. (ii) The symbols “≥” (equal or greater than) in the line for “United States, mainland” are due to the fact that this area was omitted in the second report (dated 1 May 1950); if no Japanese persons were repatriated between 4 June 1946 and 1 May 1950, then the total would be 9,907, otherwise it would be larger by an unknown amount. In particular, we do not know whether the objective of 18,639 repatriations set in 1946 has been reached or not. (iii) We do not know how many of the persons repatriated were prisoners of war.

*Sources: SCAP GHQ G-3 Section Annex 1-4, Subject: Status of repatriation, Date: 14 November 1945; SCAP GHQ, Annex 1-1, Subject: Status of repatriation, Date: 4 June 1946; SCAP GHQ, Annex 1-3, Subject: Status of repatriation, Date: 1 May 1950; repatriation during the war: email from Masahiko Fujita (22 April 2008). I am most grateful to Mr. Masahiko Fujita of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) for bringing these data to my attention.*

repatriation. What made the situation of these people special by comparison with other groups of aliens (for instance German or Italian aliens) who were repatriated is the fact that people of Japanese ancestry could *not* legally ask for naturalization whether they wished it or not.

The main question raised by the table is the following: who were the 24,928 people to be repatriated as well as the (more than) 13,499 who were indeed repatriated?

The figure which is usually given (e.g. in Daniels (2002)) is that 4,724 people of Japanese ancestry were repatriated (or expatriated), a figure which includes 1,659 Issei and 3,065 Nisei (1,116 adults and 1,949 children). If this figure is correct one must admit that the others were Japanese prisoners of war. This is not impossible; there have been between 15,000 and 20,000 Japanese prisoners of war, but we do not know how many of them have been kept in camps on the mainland. Because shipping space was scarce it is probable that many were kept in Hawaii or in other places on Pacific islands.

## Chapter 3

# Censorship

### Overview

Let us first give a few examples of censorship.

In a report sent by Ingram Stainback, the Territorial Governor of Hawaii , to Hawaii's Attorney General Garner Anthony on 1 December 1942 one reads: "Murders have occurred in Honolulu. Yet the press is forbidden to publish these incidents. Any individual who refuses to report to his job is subject to a \$200 fine or imprisonment for 2 months. By the censorship of the press and all means of communication there is a blackout concerning civil affairs in Hawaii." (FDRL1, reel 3)

On 11 January the carrier *Saratoga* was hit by a torpedo from a Japanese submarine. The explosion killed 6 seamen and seriously damaged the ship (the repair work would take 5 months). Yet, due to war censorship, the information was not published in American newspapers at the time. This illustrates the fact that during the war some news, no matter how important, were not brought to the attention of the public.

A German named Bernard Julius Otto Kühn was arrested on 8 December 1941. On 21 February 1942 he was sentenced to be shot by a Military Commission for giving data on the US fleet to the Japanese. On 26 October 1942 the sentence was commuted to 50 years at hard labor. His wife, son and daughter were also arrested on December 8 and interned<sup>44</sup>.

However the name and role of Otto Kühn (the NYT spelling is Kuehn) was revealed for the first time in the NYT only on 15 June 1943 that is to say 16 months after his arrest.

On 28 December 1944 there was an explosion and fire at Pier 17 in Honolulu Harbor. (NARA 2, Daily report of investigation 30 Dec 1944)

Yet, this explosion was *not* reported in the New York Times.

According to Allen (1950) "Army and Navy censors were on the job at telephone,

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<sup>44</sup>NYT 15 June 1943, website of the FBI, Starbulletin.com 26 September 2004.

radio and cable companies within two hours after the Pearl Harbor attack”. Censors listened to all calls. No other language than English was allowed. All radio script were censored in advance. Postal censorship necessitated a polyglot staff which from an initial strength of 65 members soon grew to several hundreds. While it is clearly known when censorship began, when it ended is unclear. Officially it was terminated on 10 March 1943, but through the testimony of newspaper editors we know that it continued after this date.

In fact, it continued (at least) until October 1945. On 22 October 1945, in a letter to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, Secretary of the Interior Ickes complained about the continuation of censorship in Hawaii (NARA 21).

Army censors were stationed in newspaper offices to read every piece of copy before it appeared. It is said that after 10 March 1943, newspapers in Hawaii were put under the same voluntary post censorship as Mainland papers; however, restrictions were applied much more stringently than on the Mainland. For instance, the story of the visit to Hawaii of President Roosevelt in July 1944 was not printed until long afterward.

Explanations about how censorship was actually implemented can be found in the book by George Chaplin (1998), former editor of the military newspaper “Pacific Stars and Stripes” and editor of “The Honolulu Advertiser” during the war. Several excerpts are cited in the chronology chapter.

Antony (1955) cites an example of censorship which shows that it was not limited to military issues. In late 1942, there was a 3-week strike of prostitutes in Honolulu. They picketed the police stations and the office of the military governor. In spite of the fact that everybody in Honolulu could see their demonstrations, the press did not mention the topic (more details can be found in the chronology at the date of 8 February 1943).

The Emergency Service Committee was one of the committees appointed by the Morale Section of the Office of the Military Governor in the weeks after December 7, 1941. The Morale Section was essentially charged with keeping a lid on ethnic relations in Hawaii. The Emergency Service Committee held community meetings promoting support of the war effort and also took the lead in eradicating Japanese language and culture from Hawaii.

## Changes in censorship policy

The establishment of strict military censorship after December 7, 1941 is of course quite understandable. What is more surprising is the fact that the censorship of communications between Hawaii and the mainland and between the different islands of

Hawaii continued after the end of martial law and even after the end of the war.

The main dates are given below (based on NARA 21). More details can be found in the chronology.

- General orders No 9 (10 March 1943) and No 34 (28 September 1943) signed by the Military Governor of Hawaii amended but basically confirmed the General orders organizing censorship at the beginning of the war.

- On 26 October 1944 executive order No 9489 formally ended martial law in Hawaii. However, many of the institutions established under martial law were carried over beyond this date. Censorship is but one example.

- On January 12, 1945 in a letter to the Director of the Division of Territories in Washington, the Governor of Hawaii, Ingram Stainback, wrote: “You cannot make our objections too strong to the continuation of this censorship. In addition to other beneficial results this would free a large staff of able persons for badly needed help in other fields”. (NARA 21). In spite of this wish military censorship would continue for almost one year.

- Special orders No 12 (1 April 1945) put the office of the Postal Censor under the direction of the Military Commander of Hawaii, that is to say General Robert C. Richardson. In an article about this decision, the Hawaiian newspaper “Star-Bulletin” observes that other parts of the United States are subject to civilian censorship whereas Hawaii is the only area subject to military censorship.

- 22 October 1945. In a letter to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes observes that Hawaiian newspapers are still under military censorship. In particular, they are not permitted to publish the schedules of ship sailings. Ickes asks if this control can be expected to be lifted soon.

## Chapter 4

### Chronology

#### Some important events before Pearl Harbor

During the period between 1923 and 1941, The “Criminal Syndicalist Act”, a piece of legislation left over from the red-baiting days of 1919-1923, was in force in Hawaii. (Holmes 1994 p. 27)

**Nov 1922** The United States Supreme Court confirmed an earlier Act of Congress limiting acquired citizenship to “free white persons”, thus ruling that Chinese and Japanese immigrants could not become American citizens by naturalization. (Tuchman 1970, p. 86)

[This ruling voided the naturalization of veterans of Japanese ancestry that was granted to all alien veterans by Congress in May 1918. Through a special bill passed by Congress in 1935, their naturalization was restored. Yet, only 79 of them took advantage of this law to regain their citizenship (Kimura 1988).]

**Sep 9, 1924** Kauai Island. 16 Filipino sugarcane plantation workers and four Hanapepe police officers died as a result of a brutal suppression of an 8-month strike. The event later became known as the “Hanapepe Massacre”. (<http://www.hawaiianencyclopedia.com/1900-1950.asp>)

[In the 1920s and 1930s the repression of strikes in large agricultural estates led to massacres in various places where US companies owned plantations. One can mention the following.

- **Columbia** The workers of the banana plantations in Colombia went on strike in December 1928. The strike turned into the largest labor movement ever seen in the country until then. After US officials in Colombia, along with United Fruit representatives, portrayed the worker’s strike as “communist” with “subversive tendency” the US government threatened to send US Marines if the Colombian government did not act to protect United Fruit’s interests. Then, on 5-6 December 1928 in the town of Cinaga (close to the city of Santa Marta) the Colombian army opened fire into a dense Sunday crowd of workers and their families who had gathered to wait for

an anticipated address from the governor. According to officials of the United Fruit Company, the number of fatalities exceeded one thousand<sup>45</sup>. It became known as the “Banana Massacre”.

- **Puerto Rico** From November 1933 to February 1934 there were strikes by Puerto Rican sugar cane workers; then, on 23 February 1934, an agreement was signed through which salaries were almost doubled. In the same time, however, the strength of the “Insular Police Force” was tripled. Retaliations against workers and Nationalists would soon follow. On 24 October 1935 five Nationalist students were gunned down by police. This became known as the “Rio Piedras Massacre” (Rio Piedras is the place of one of the campuses of the University of Puerto Rico). After the subsequent assassination of the US Chief of police, Francis Riggs, on 23 February 1936, the so-called “Ponce Massacre” in the afternoon of Sunday 21 March 1937 was another act of retaliation by the police. Some 20 persons were killed by gunfire in the streets of the town of Ponce. (Denis 2015, Chapter 7)]

**Aug 1, 1938** Kauai Island. A peaceful demonstration of 200 sympathy strikers was attacked by the Hilo Police. The firing lasted about 5 minutes. Fifty unarmed unionists, men and women, were hit by shotgun fire; some were bayoneted.

(<http://www.hawaii.edu/uho/clear/Pubs/HiloMassacre.html>)

[The account does not give the number of people who died as a result of their wounds.]

**Jul 18, 1940** A strike organized by the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU) began at Ahukini on Kauai Island. The strike began after the company Ahukini Terminal Ltd informed port workers that they would have to choose between working at the port terminal and losing their housing on the plantation or working on the plantation (at reduced wage) and keeping the housing. The strike would last 10 months and ended in a serious defeat for the workers. (Klass 1970. p. 9, 12; Holmes 1994 p. 31)

## Guidelines for emergency cases

Guidelines for military emergency situations were issued in 1936 in a report by Lieutenant Colonel George S. Patton entitled: “Plan: initial seizure of orange nationals”. The plan contained the following guidelines (Okihiro 1991, p. 176)

- Proclaiming martial law.
- Arresting and interning certain persons who were most inimical to American interests.

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<sup>45</sup>A dispatch, dated 16 January 1929, from the US Embassy in Bogota to the US Secretary of State stated: “I have the honor to report that the Bogota representative of the United Fruit Company told me yesterday that the total number of strikers killed by the Colombian military exceeded 1,000.” (Wikipedia article entitled “Banana massacre”)



- Confiscating all amateur radio sending and receiving sets from the Japanese.
- Seizing all Japanese banks, companies and travel agencies
- Placing Japanese owned hotels under military custody.
- Confiscating all Japanese automobiles and taxicabs.
- Closing all Japanese language schools.
- Removing all Japanese, including servants, from military bases.
- Establishing press, mail, cable and radio censorship.
- Establishing military commissions to try persons accused of military offenses.

Patton's plan already included a list of Japanese suspects (with addresses and telephone numbers) which included 95 aliens (that is to say mainly Japanese nationals) and 33 American citizens. The main criterion had been to arrest the leaders of the community.

The plan which was actually implemented followed most of the previous guidelines.

### **Symbols**

Symbols such as ●(4) total the number of persons sentenced to 5 years at hard labor by provost courts since the beginning of martial law on 7 December 1941. It should be recalled that this term was the longest that provost courts could inflict.

Symbols such as ●(13,54) signal incidents marked by fatalities. The two numbers within parentheses total the number of fatalities among US troops on the one hand and the number of Hawaii residents who died in incidents with US forces on the other hand.

For US troops all causes of death are taken into consideration. However, it appears that deaths of troops due to illness were not mentioned (except possibly in the event of an epidemic) by news agencies or newspaper correspondents. Therefore they will escape our attention with the result that our total will grossly under-estimate the real fatality number.

## **1941**

**May, 1941:** End of the longest strike in Hawaii history. It started at Ahukini Landing on the island of Kauai on 18 July 1940 and lasted 298 days. It was a defeat for the union: 65 union jobs were lost and those who kept their jobs received an hourly pay increase of about 4 cents (representing about 10%). (Holmes 1994, p. 31)

**Oct 3, 1941:** The Hawaii Defense Act passed both territorial Houses and became law on 3 October (Okhiro 1991, p. 208).



**Nov 1, 1941:** In previous months the strength of FBI personnel in Hawaii was progressively increased. By November it consisted of 21 agents and 208 informants. During November the FBI verified the addresses of those on the internment list.

**Nov 6, 1941:** Honolulu. Five Japanese have been arrested by detectives of the FBI. Four of them were charged with attempting to enter the Pearl Harbor naval station by using false identity cards. The fifth was charged with furnishing these cards to his comrades. (Times p. 4)

**Nov 30, 1941:** ●(1,0) John K. Yeung, a custom guard of Chinese ancestry was convicted of manslaughter by a Federal court in the fatal shooting of Lieutenant Martin R. Connelly, an Army Air Corps officer during an argument over the inspection of a package of photographs after the lieutenant stepped from the liner on 22 September 1941. The prisoner asserted that his pistol discharged accidentally after he was hit three times by the officer. (NYT p. 26)

**Nov 29, 1941:** Telegrams tell of a mass reinforcement of Japanese strength in Indochina and of an alert order issued to American forces in Hawaii. (Times p. 4)

**Dec 1, 1941** On the eve of the attack on Pearl Harbor, there were 16 brothels in Honolulu employing girls from the mainland. They served about 40,000 soldiers and sailors. Pimps and street-walkers were rigidly prohibited. (Potts and Potts 1985)

**Dec 1, 1941** The Consulate General on the West Coast began to destroy its records, as did the Consulate General, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and the Japan Institute in New York City. (NAVY 1941)

**Dec 3, 1941** There was a telephone conversation between one or several Japanese citizens in Honolulu and a military or naval officer in Tokyo. A transcript of the conversation is available on the following NARA file unit:

Title: Transcript: Telephone conversation, Japanese citizens and military or naval officer in Tokyo. ARC Identifier: 4481691

[Surprisingly, the title of this file mentions several citizens but only one conversation.]

**Dec 5, 1941** Secret codes and ciphers at the Japanese Embassy were burned on the night of December 5, 1941. (NAVY 1941)

**Dec 7, 1941:** Governor Poindexter recounted how martial law was declared in Hawaii in a statement which was published in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin in 1946.

“Shortly after noon Lieutenant General Walter C. Short called at the governor’s office. During the conference that followed (which was also attended by the Secretary of the Territory) General Short stated that his call was for the purpose of requesting

that I declare martial law and suspend the writ of habeas corpus. I told him that I was reluctant to do as he requested and that I must yield to his judgment as to what measures should be taken. I thereupon directed that the Attorney General's office prepare the necessary proclamation and when this was presented to me at about 4:30 pm I signed it and promulgated it." (Honolulu Star-Bulletin 21 April 1946)

**Dec 7, 1941:** Declaration made by Ernest K. Kai who was acting Attorney General in December 1941.

"A previously prepared proclamation of martial law reached my desk on December 7 with instructions to have it copied. I do not know where it was prepared but I do know that it was not prepared in the Attorney General's office." (Honolulu Star-Bulletin 4 May 1946)

[From the two previous declarations it can be inferred that it is the Army who initiated martial law. This was confirmed by the report of the Roberts Commission sent by President Roosevelt to Hawaii to investigate on the Pearl Harbor attack. To the question "Was it at your request that martial law was declared", Governor Poindexter responded: "No. It was at the request of the Army". In spite of this very clear statement, several statements were made subsequently by US Army officers to the effect that "the Army did not initiate martial law".]

(Anthony 1955, p. 7, Pearl Harbor Report, part 23, p. 820)

**Dec 7, 1941:** Within three hours after the declaration of martial laws Army Intelligence assisted by the FBI and police started to arrest residents who were considered dangerous. Cards already prepared with the names and addresses of Japanese suspects were divided among 13 squads of officers. Similar arrests were made on the other islands. By the middle of December, hearing boards were appointed on each island in order to question the internees about their friends and relatives in Japan, whether they had visited them, donated food or clothing to them.

Although official reports have not been made public all individual stories seem to indicate that during the first few weeks the treatment of the prisoners was fairly harsh. One internee of Swedish origin reported that the camp commander periodically told the prisoners that they will be shot. Relatives of the internees were not informed for many weeks. The American Red Cross did not get information about the internees until March 1942. The detention centers were the Immigration station on Oahu, the internment camp on Sand Island, the county jail on Kauai, the internment center of Kilauea Military camp on Hawaii Island. Internees paroled before the end of the war were required to sign statements discharging the government of any liability as a result of their detention. (Allen 1950, p. 36)

[An article of 25 December 1941 in the French newspaper "Le Monde" (published in occupied Paris) says that according to the War Department 27,000 persons of

Japanese descent were arrested (see below). This is almost 20 times more than the figure of 1,450 given in Allen. These data are clearly incompatible which means that one of them must be wrong. At this point we do not know which one is correct.]

**Dec 7, 1941: General Orders No 3, (first series)** [excerpt]

By virtue of the power vested in me as Military governor:

1. A Military Commission is appointed to meet at Honolulu for the trial of such persons as may be properly brought before it. [the order then gives the names of the seven members of the commission: 3 civilian lawyers, 3 lieutenant colonels and one major.]

2. Major Henry Du Free is appointed as a Provost Court to meet at Schofield barracks for the trial of such persons as may be properly brought before it.

3. Lieutenant Colonel Earl D. Franklin is appointed as a Provost Court to meet at Honolulu for the trial of such persons as may be properly brought before it.

[signed] By order of the Military Governor. Thomas H. Green, Lt.Col. J.A.G.D. (Anthony 1955, p. 137)

[General Orders No 4 set the rules for the operations of these military tribunals. Basically, the Military Commissions will follow the rules of General Court Martials (for the trial of the most serious cases) and the Provost Court will follow the rules of Summary Court Martials. They will try offenses against US laws but also (and perhaps more importantly) against the rules, regulations, orders and policies of military authorities.

Less than one week later the composition of the Military Commission was modified. The three civilians lawyers were removed (see below at the date of 14 December 1941). Other provost courts were set up in the other Hawaiian islands (see below at the date of 10 March 1943). J.A.G.D. means “Judge Advocate General’s Department”.]

**Dec 7, 1941: Assault and provost court trial.** Honolulu. At 12:30am in the morning Mr. Henry Roque of Portugese citizenship assaulted Police Officer Daniel K. Toomey. We do not know for what reason. Tried in Provost Court on 10 December, he pleaded not guilty, was nevertheless found guilty and sentenced to 3 years at hard labor. (NARA 33a)

[In the series of the provost court trials held at Honolulu, this is case No 50. Unfortunately, the cases No 1-44 which were tried between 7th and 10th December are missing in the archives.]

**Dec 7, 1941: ●(1,1)**

**The Niihau incident** Accounts of what happened on the island of Niihau after a Japanese plane made a crash landing are fairly confusing. The following account was

published in Soga (2008, p. 47, footnote 9).

“Yoshio Harada, a Nisei caretaker on the Robinson ranch decided to guard the Japanese pilot until a boat would arrive from Kauai. While the pilot was asleep a map and some documents were stolen by a Niihau resident. Later, while searching for the material with Harada’s assistance, the pilot tried to set fire on houses. An altercation developed in which the pilot was killed and Harada shot himself. Subsequently, Harada’s wife was jailed on Kauai and then interned for the rest of the war”.

With respect to more detailed accounts (e.g. Beekman (1982), Hallstead 2000), this account is misleading in several respects.

- The island was the property of Aylmer Robinson who, after the death of his superintendent in September 1941 had appointed Harada in his place. This made Harada a much more important man on the island than being just a caretaker.

- The account does not say that the struggle in which the pilot was killed occurred on December 12, that is to say 5 days after the landing.

- The account does not say that during these 5 days three Nikkei sided with the pilot, namely Yoshio Harada, his wife (both Nisei) and Ishimatsu Shintani.

[Most of the information on this incident comes from a Navy Report<sup>46</sup>. To what extent is this report really trustworthy is difficult to decide in the absence of any other source. In December 1942 the Reader’s Digest carried an article on the Niihau incident which was entitled “Never shoot an Hawaiian more than twice” and written by Blake Clark. Clearly, the account of this incident was seen as a good war propaganda opportunity which is why it would be necessary to have it confirmed by another source. In this respect see below at the dates of 12 and 17 December 1941.]

**Dec 7, 1941:** On the morning of 7 December several Japanese fishermen in Kakaako (on the southern shores of the island of Oahu) were killed by US machine-gun fire. Among the victims were two close relatives of Mr. Tachibana, himself a fisherman from Kakaako, who had been arrested before he heard the news of their deaths. (Soda 2008, p. 37)

[This information is given by Yasutaro Soda. He was not a witness of the shooting but heard about it while interned with Mr. Tachibana. One would like a confirmation through a separate source.]

**Dec 8, 1941:** ●(1,7) On the morning of 8 December newspapers announced that all unidentified boats approaching Oahu would be fired upon. It was feared that the local fishing fleet, manned predominantly by Japanese aliens might have had

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<sup>46</sup>Reference for this report as found on the Internet is as follows: Military intelligence report filed by US Navy Lt. C.B. Baldwin, Branch Intelligence Office, Port Allen, Kauai (26 January 1942). We were not able to find this file on the electronic catalog of the American National archives (NARA). There must have been a short report prior to this one because from a NYT article of 17 December (see below) it can be seen that the main lines of the story were already formatted on that date.

rendezvous with Japanese warships. At least six fishermen were killed in several shooting incidents when their boats tried to come back to Hawaii. The Coast Guard picked up some other fishermen and took them to Sand Island for internment. A more detailed description (unfortunately without indication of sources) of one of these incidents is given in the book by Burl Burlingame (1992, p. 245-247). In this incident 4 fishing boats<sup>47</sup> were strafed by aircraft. Each of them had a crew of 4 fishermen and (at least) 4 were killed. The same book also reports similar incidents on 12 December 1942 off Kailua, Oahu and Kahala, Oahu (no information is given about fatalities). (Allen 1950, p. 41)

**Dec 8, 1941:** After the Japanese attack a number of civilian installations were requisitioned by US armed forces. Such requisitions were often carried out in an emergency. As an illustration Allen (1950, p. 230) gives the example of how the Punhou school was requisitioned. The US Engineers Corps took control of this century-old learning institution on 8 December 1941 at 5 am. As nobody had been informed in advance, the doors had to be broken. Subsequently, the trustees received a short letter informing them that “the forces of the US District Engineers have occupied the grounds for an undefined period.” In May 1942 the Engineers formally leased the campus for a monthly rental of \$ 20,000 later reduced to \$ 12,500. (Allen 1950).

**Dec 9, 1941:** By 9 December 391 Japanese (aliens as well as citizens), 93 Germans and 13 Italians had been apprehended (Okihiro 1991). Most of the people arrested were transported to Sand Island in the Bay of Honolulu where there was a quarantine station. Testimonies of prisoners show they were subject to unnecessarily harsh treatment (for instance being left standing in the rain without clothes for a long time). (Okihiro 1991)

[Of course, one cannot be sure that these figures are correct. The public relation services of armed forces have a long record of making short work of the truth, especially in time of war, see in this respect Knightley (2004); nevertheless, these figures can be accepted as minima for it is unlikely that the military would inflate the number of arrested persons.]

**Dec 9, 1941:** Telegram sent by President Roosevelt to Governor Poindexter [excerpt]

Your action in suspending the writ of habeas corpus and placing the territory of Hawaii under martial law has my approval.

[signed] Franklin D. Roosevelt

**Dec 10, 1941: German and Japanese aliens taken in custody by the FBI.**

Germans: 620, Japanese: 1,212 (437 in California, 391 in Hawaii, 251 in New

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<sup>47</sup>Their names were: Kiho Maru, Myojin Maru, Shin-ei Maru, Sumiyoshi Maru.



York).

The arrests were based on lists that had been established by the FBI before the Pearl Harbor attack. For Hawaii the list had 770 names altogether. (FDRL1, reel 1)

**Dec 11, 1941:** As of 11 December, 41 Japanese aliens were in detention at the County jail of Kauai Island located at Wailua. (Klass 1970, p. 24)

[This represents 0.1 % of the population of Kauai; from the number of arrests given above it can be seen that on Oahu Island the percentage was also of the order of 0.1%.]

**Dec 11, 1941:** *The Army and Navy took control of radio facilities.* In his capacity as Commander in Chief, President Roosevelt today authorized military control or closure of as many private radio facilities as the government deemed necessary. Action would be taken immediately, the Defense Communications Board stated. (NYT p. 3)

**Dec 12, 1941:** *Niihau incident* (continued from 8 Dec)

We give below (see 17 Dec) the US Navy version of the story as published by the NYT on 17 Dec. A different version came to light on 23 Dec 2008 when several Japanese newspapers (e.g. Yomiuri, Mainichi) published the text of an interview of Mrs. Harada conducted by the Japanese Consulate in Hawaii in September 1955. It was the first time that this text was released and made public by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. One learns that around 5 pm on 12 December the pilot and Mr. Harada escaped from Mr. Harada's house where they were confined. There was a fierce gunfight with some villagers who were armed with hunting guns. On the following day, that is to say 13 December, their bodies were found nearby<sup>48</sup>. A more detailed discussion of this interview is given in Chapter 7.

**Dec 13, 1941:** Editorial of the Honolulu Advertiser [excerpt]. "The Military Government has deemed it in the best interest of the Territory that newspapers and radio stations submit to censorship. The Advertiser, fully cognizant of the necessity of such action for the duration of military rule, is happy to comply." (Chaplin 1998, p. 205)

[The Honolulu Star-Bulletin was somewhat more reluctant to accept censorship.]

**Dec 13, 1941:** 43 persons were arrested and held in Hawaii. (NYT p. 8)

[The same article says that altogether for the whole of the United States 2,541 aliens were arrested. The number given for Hawaii appears too low.]

**Dec 14, 1941:** *General Orders No 25, (first series)* [excerpt]

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<sup>48</sup>I am grateful to Professor Yuji Arika for pointing out this source to my attention and for sending me a translation of the section of the article containing this account. The present translation is based on the Mainichi Shinbun morning edition of 22 December 2008.

1. Paragraph 1, General Orders No 3, dated 7 December 1941 is revoked. [this concerned the creation of Military Commission]

2. A Military Commission is hereby appointed.

[the following lines list the ranks and names of the 8 officers who will compose the commission. The civilian lawyers have been excluded]

(Anthony 1955, p. 140)

[What event happened between December 7 and 14 which can explain the removal of the civilian members of the Military Commission? J.G. Anthony (who would be appointed Attorney General of the Territory on 4 October 1942) took part in the first (and only) meeting of the first Military Commission. As two of the civilian members were trying to get an understanding of the judicial power they were supposed to exercise, Anthony volunteered to send an inquiry to Attorney General Francis Biddle in Washington. This proposition found no favor with Colonel Green. The proposed radiogram was drafted, delivered to Colonel Green, but never sent to Mr. Biddle. (Anthony 1955, p. 11)

**Dec 14, 1941:** Sand Island internment camp. A young preacher named Ryoshin Okano was found with a handmade knife. Instantly several guards surrounded him and stripped him completely naked. It was already nightfall but Captain Carl F. Eifler called the prisoners out of their tents and into the yard where he lined them up and had them stripped to nothing. They were kept standing at attention for a long time in the wind. Mr. Soga says that they all shivered with cold. (Soga 2008, p. 31)

**Dec 17, 1941:** It was revealed last night on the island of Kauai that a stalwart six-foot Hawaiian, Ben Kanahale, had killed a Japanese pilot who landed on the island of Niihau, 25 kilometer west of Kauai, on the day of the raid on Pearl Harbor. After being struck by 3 bullets from the Japanese flier's pistol, he seized him and dashed his brains out against a stone wall, a method of execution once used by Hawaiians against their enemies. (NYT p. 7)

[Ben Kanahale's injuries are somewhat of a puzzle. In the book by Beekman (1982, p. 83) we are told that "Ben was wounded "in the left chest, left hip and penis", with all shots being fired at close range (during a brawl from a distance of less than 3 meters) and with an army pistol. Yet, he was nevertheless able to throw the pilot, a strong man as shown by his photograph in Beekman (1982, frontispiece), against a wall and on the following day, though wounded, he was "able to walk"(Beekman 1982, p. 87) .

One may also wonder why the pilot did not fire more than 3 times. All the pistols used in the Japanese army, namely Nambu of type 1, 14, 94 or revolver of type 26 had (at least) 6 rounds. The pilot's pistol was probably a Nambu type 94 which was the one most commonly used by pilots and aircrews because of its light weight.]



**Dec 18, 1941: First War Powers Act.** This act increased Federal executive power during World War II. The act was signed by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt on December 18, 1941. A “Second War Powers Act” came into effect on March 27, 1942. It further strengthened the executive branch powers. (Wikipedia article entitled “War Powers Act of 1941”

[As an illustration one can cite the fact that before these laws were passed the Bureau of the Census could not give individual census information to the FBI or other federal organizations. The “War Powers Act” lifted this restriction.]

**Dec 19, 1941:** Excerpt of the diaries of Secretary of War H.L. Stimson. “It was decided [by President Roosevelt] that the Army was to intern all the aliens in Hawaii and to put them on other islands than Oahu. I asked Bundy to attend to the issuing of the orders to put this into effect”. (Papers of Henry Lewis Stimson, diaries, reel 7, vol. 36)

[In Hawaii many Japanese had dual American-Japanese citizenship because although born in Hawaii their parents had reported the births to the Japanese consulate in order that they be registered as Japanese citizens. Were dual citizens also to be moved? At some point the order was dropped because other requirements emerged particularly manpower needs. However, it is not clear whether the order started to be implemented and at which point it was dropped.]

**Dec 19, 1941:** Mrs. Irene Harada was interrogated by a board of officers and civilians. Several elements are given in this hearing which are not mentioned in the account by Beekman (or other accounts based on his book). Unfortunately, these elements are described very shortly by Mrs Harada which does not permit to understand their precise significance.

- On Monday and Tuesday night (8-9 Dec) the pilot and Mr Harada stayed at Kii [a small port at the north of the island] to wait for a sampan which did not appear.

- Mr. Shintani was Harada’s boss.

- The Japanese pilot was a sociable person who “tried to make everybody laugh”. He was always joking with Mr. Harada.

- On a day which is not exactly indicated (it may have been Friday, 12 Dec all the inhabitants of the islands saw planes. The question directed to Mrs Harada was: “You saw planes?”, she replied: “Yes, when some Hawaiian ladies notified us we went out and saw some planes”. We did not learn which kind of planes or whether they landed on the island or not.

- Another question was: “Did you hear any shots fired?” She replied: “No”.

- Another question was: “When did you first find out your husband committed suicide?”. She replied: “When I came to Lihue”. Lihue is the main town on the island of Kauai itself located about 15 kilometer to the east of Niihau.

(NARA 8)

[The fact that Mrs Harada did not learn about the fate of her husband until arriving at Kauai is fairly surprising; on such a small island one would expect such a news to travel very quickly.]

**Dec 19, 1941:** Special Order No 320 (paragraph 33): Creation of Alien Internment Boards in Hawaii. [extract]

Under the provisions of Presidential Proclamations of 7 and 8 December 1941, and pursuant to instructions in radiogram of the Adjutant General's Office of 10 December 1941, each of the following Boards of Officers and civilian citizens is appointed to meet on the island of Oahu for the purpose of hearing evidence and making recommendations as to the internment of *enemy aliens* designated by this Headquarters.

The Recorder of each Board will prepare proceedings for each individual hearing and submit same to this headquarters in quintuplicate without delay.

(NARA 17)

[This special order mentions the internment of enemy aliens only. However, some 5 months later in Special Order No 130 of 15 May 1942, the purpose of the board was broadened as follows: "making recommendations as to internment [of] enemy aliens, citizens and dual citizens". Nevertheless, these boards continued to be referred to as Alien Internment Boards.

By 15 May 1942 two Internment Boards were in operation in Honolulu. We do not know if there were separate boards on the other Hawaiian islands.]

**Dec 20, 1941:** A general order froze many classes of workers to their jobs and wages were frozen at their level of December 1. In addition the order set a forty-eight-hour work week with overtime provisions. The workers who had left since December 7 had to return. In particular, plantation workers could not leave their plantation. Subsequently arrangements were made between armed forces and the plantation owners through which plantation workers could be borrowed by defense agencies. Such defense jobs paid salaries of 61 cents per hour which was 50% higher than the 41 cents per hour paid on plantations. However, instead of being paid to the workers they went to the owners, a windfall of about \$ 6 million over the duration of the war. (Allen 1950, chapter 19, NYT 4 April 1942 p. 14)

**Dec 21, 1941:** All 767 Japanese residents in Cuba have been arrested and interned at Torrens Farms near Havana. (NYT p. 21)

[These arrests occurred much earlier than the arrest of the Japanese residents in California which would be completed only in early 1942.]

**Dec 23, 1941:** Some 273 persons are held in Hawaii as 5th columnists. (NYT p. 4)  
[This figure of 273 is larger than the number of 43 given in the same journal on 13

December. We do not really know if it is more reliable.]

**Dec 23, 1941:** Lieutenant-General Delos C. Emmons, Commander of the Hawaii Department issued an order freezing wage rate of civilians engaged in war work. Labor contracts restricting the nature of the work performed were suspended. (NYT p. 11)

[The freeze will remain in effect until October 1942 and there will be a new one after June 1944; see below at the date of June 7, 1944.] Apart from wages, a series of three General Orders, issued over a four month period also froze men to their jobs unless formally released, provided penalties for changing jobs without a formal release or for failing to report to jobs selected by the military, and also banned all meetings. An OMG [Office of the Military Government] section of Labor Control, headed by the personnel director of one of the leading plantations, handled all labor grievances. The general orders relating to labor control were produced by the same law firm that represented the Big 5 companies, [this term refers to the five leading plantation companies which had also many interests in other activities.] (Stern 1996, chapter 3)

**Dec 24, 1941:** After closing places of amusement on December 8, 1941, the military authorities, on December 24, 1941, ordered places of amusement to be re-opened. (US Supreme Court 1946)

**Dec 24, 1941:** ●(1) Kinjiro Matsumoto was arrested at his home in Paauilo on the island of Hawaii, on 22 December 1941 for possession of a 38 caliber revolver, 9 rounds of ammunition and one bayonet (US Army model 1898). He is a Japanese alien, 66 year old who has been in the Territory of Hawaii for 44 years and has never gone back to Japan. His wife died ten years ago and his only daughter is now working in Honolulu at the Queen's Hospital. He was not active in the local Japanese associations. Nevertheless, he donated \$3 to the Airplane Donation Fund Association and \$10.50 to the Japanese Red Cross.

Until 1932 he spent an isolated existence as a ranch hand in Kukaiiau district on Hawaii island; between 1931 and 1941 he was employed as a fenceman and laborer at Paauilo by the Hamakua Sugar Company. He has a bad reputation in the community because of his drinking. He carried a gun when he was a cowboy and everyone in the community including the police knew that he possessed it. He did not serve in the Japanese army for medical reasons.

He was tried by the Provost Court at Hilo (island of Hawaii) on 24 December 1941 and sentenced to 5 years of hard labor (i.e. the longest term a provost court can inflict). In February 1944, after 2 years in prison, he applied for clemency which was refused on 5 September 1944 by the Parole Board. In Brigadier General Morrison's

terms (letter of 14 October 1944): “clemency is not merited at this time”. Yet, on 25 November 1944 he was released on parole which means that if his conduct was judged satisfactory the unexecuted portion of the sentence would be suspended permanently. (NARA 1)

[This case illustrates the criteria which were used in loyalty assessments: participation in or donation to Japanese associations, service in the Japanese army, number of trips to Japan. In this respect see also below at the date of 1 September 1945.]

**Dec 25, 1941:** According to information released by the War Department, 27,000 persons of Japanese descent have been arrested in the Hawaiian islands. In a total population of 425,000, some 160,000 are of Japanese descent; of these only 35,000 are foreigners. The American authorities are in the possession of irrefutable proof showing that some inhabitants of Japanese origin provided critical information to Japan before the attack on Pearl Harbor. (Le Monde p. 1)

[There is an obvious discrepancy between this figure of 27,000 arrests and the figure given above by the New York Times. The internment of 27,000 persons would require detention facilities which probably did not exist in Hawaii at this time.]

**Dec 26, 1941:** Letter of C.B. Wightman, Assistant Secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association.

On Saturday 14 December 1941 a meeting of businessmen was called in by General Short. I mentioned the matter of using *child labor* on plantations. Due to the Sugar Act of 1934, the plantations could not employ children under the age of 14 nor more than 8 hours a day between the ages of 14 and 16. General Short said that it was vital to utilize all the man power and that these restrictions should be suspended. He added that he would sign the “necessary papers” if they were approved by his legal adviser. An order was drafted and approved by Judge Stainback. (Papers of T.H. Green, reel 1, frame 381)

[The General Order is given below. Curiously, it is an unnumbered General Order.]

**Dec 26-, 1941:** General Order [unnumbered and undated]

“I do hereby order that, until further notice, all federal, Territorial, county or municipal laws prohibiting the employment of minors or females or prescribing their maximum hours of employment are hereby suspended.”

[Signed:] Thomas H. Green Lt. Col. J.A.G.D. Executive.

(Papers of T.H. Green, reel 1, frame 380)

[Although the order is undated it can be said that it was issued between 26 December (date of the request made by the planters) and 2 January 1942. This last date comes from the fact that Lt. Col. Green was promoted to Colonel on 2 January 1942 (see frame 631).

So, in one stroke, the Military Government abolished a major law for the protection of children which had been passed early in the New Deal.]

**Dec 30, 1941:** Before a Provost Court which convened at Wailuku on Maui Island, was tried Santiago Alvarado on the charge of assaulting a member of the US armed forces. He was sentenced to two years imprisonment at hard labor. (NARA 36)

**Dec 31, 1941:** Japanese spies showed the way for the raid on vital areas in Hawaii.

- Big arrows pointing to military objectives were reported to have been cut in sugar cane fields a few hours before the Japanese struck.

- Bombs fell in hangars crowded with planes whereas empty hangars were ignored.

- Japanese amateur radio operators were caught apparently communicating with aircraft carriers or planes.

- Japanese truck drivers drove side to side of the road from Honolulu to Hickam Airfield to delay American pilots who were frantically trying to reach their planes.

- The Japanese pilots knew that the airmen at Wheeler Airfield had to live at the station. So when they had bombed the hangars they attacked the dwellings with machine guns.

(NYT p. 3)

## 1942

**Jan 1942:** ● (2) In November 1941, Fred Spurlock was ejected from a bar in Honolulu and while hurrying away he collided with two military policemen. In January 1942 he was summoned before a provost court. Found guilty, he was sentenced to 5 years at hard labor. (Anthony 1955, p. 18)

**Jan 2, 1942:** The islands of Kauai, Maui and Hawaii were shelled early by enemy vessels, believed to be Japanese submarine. It was said the shelling was apparently aimless, did little damage and caused no casualties. (NYT p. 1)

**Jan 7, 1942: Loyalty investigation of a Japanese alien in Honolulu**

Meeting of the Board for loyalty investigations at Honolulu.[Excerpts]

The Board consists of 4 members: three civilians and a First Lieutenant. The internee who appears before the Board was arrested on 7 December 1942. His name is Tomoichi HAYASHI. He is a 30-year old Japanese alien.

The hearing begins with a statement made by a special agent of the FBI.

Tomoichi Hayashi is an alien who came to Hawaii at the age of 13. He speaks little

English; the interrogation will be conducted through an interpreter. He is married and has one 5-year old son who has been registered with the Japanese Consulate [which made him a dual citizen]. His wife is a US citizen of Japanese ancestry. He visited Japan for 3 months in 1939 for the purpose of seeing his parents.

[During his interrogation he is first asked some practical questions about his job; he is a truck driver for fishermen. Then comes the questioning about his loyalty.]

Q Did you ever give Imonbukuro [a gift of soap, towels, cigarettes, and so on for Japanese soldiers]?

A Once I gave, two or three years ago.

Q Did you ever give money for sick Japanese soldiers?

A No

Q Who would you like to see win, America or Japan?

A America

Q Why?

A I have been living here longer than in Japan.

Q Do you think it is all right if we destroy Japan, make it a fifth rate power?

A I am not worried about that

Q Would you fight for Japan against America?

A No, I don't think I would do that.

Q If you were in Japan today would you like to fight for Japan?

A As I would probably be drafted there would be no help for that.

Q If Japan should take Hawaii and the Japanese government gave you a good job would you take it?

A How that would make out, I don't know.

At the end of the hearing the Board makes the following recommendations.

**Findings** The Board finds that the internee is loyal to Japan but is not engaged in any subversive activity. Therefore the Board recommends that the internee, Tomoichi Hayashi, **be interned**.

(Source: NARA 15)

[**Comment:** Tomoichi Hayashi is probably a fairly standard case of Japanese alien. He is not engaged in any kind of Japanese organization; moreover, he claims he is loyal to the United States. One wonders for what specific reason he was singled out, arrested and interned for the duration of the war. How will his wife and his 5-year old son be able to make it during his detention?]

**Jan 7, 1942:** Before a Provost Court which convened at Wailuku on Maui Island, Daniel Maalea was charged with forgery on a check payable at the Bank of Hawaii. Maalea was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment at hard labor. (NARA 36)



[This entry shows that provost courts delivered sentences not only in matters connected to military security but also in purely civilian offences.]

**Jan 8, 1942:** Whites in Hawaii armed for defense in fear of Japanese residents. Colonel P.M. Smoot, Hawaiian Adjutant General, authorized the formation of a reserve infantry company of the Hawaiian Territorial Guard. (NYT p. 5)

**Jan 11, 1942** At 7:15 pm, 420 miles southwest of Pearl Harbor the US carrier Saratoga was hit amidship by a torpedo from the Japanese submarine I-6. The carrier took on 1,100 tons of seawater and (at least) 6 seamen were killed. The damaged ship was repaired on the west coast and came back to Pearl Harbor on 6 June, too late to play an active role in the battle of Midway (4 June 1942). (Burlingame 1992, p. 268)

[The damage suffered by the carrier was *not* reported in the New York Times over the period January-March 1942.]

**Jan 12, 1942:** Military Government forbade holding more than \$200 in currency. Moreover, no business is allowed to hold more than \$500 except to meet payrolls. (Allen 1950, Chronology)

[The replacement of regular dollars by a new currency bearing the imprint “Hawaii” which would be decided in June 1942 concurred to the same objective.]

**Jan 19, 1942:** All the members of the Hawaii Territorial Guard of Japanese ancestry were discharged on orders of Washington. (Kimura 1988 p. 232)

**Jan 26, 1942:** Japanese language schools which had been very active before the war were closed. A “Speak English” campaign was organized and brought a flood of registration of middle class Japanese for classes in English. Japanese societies and associations were liquidated and their assets were given to the Hawaii Veterans Memorial Fund of Oahu, to the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) or to the United Service Organization (USO) which organized recreational activities for the soldiers. (Allen 1950).

[The five Chinese language schools existing in Hawaii were also closed in spite of the fact that China was a close ally of the United States in the war against Japan (Papers of Major-General Thomas H. Green, reel 2).]

**Jan 26, 1942:** District of the Island of Hawaii, Hilo provost court. Joseph Pavao was sentenced to 6 months imprisonment at hard labor for obtaining gasoline fraudulently. On the same day the same person was sentenced to an additional 6 month term for assault and battery. (NARA 30)

[The source does not say against whom the assault was directed.]

**Jan 28, 1942:** ● (25,7) Army authorities revealed that 24 persons were missing



from the United States Army transport Royal T. Frank which was sunk between Hawaii and Maui on January 28 by a torpedo from an Japanese submarine. It is said that depth charges disposed of the submarine.

(NYT 11 February 1942 p. 4; <http://starbulletin.com>)

**Jan 30, 1942:** Inmates of Oahu Prison numbered 631, an increase of 29 over the 602 of the previous year. Admitted to the prison and the Waiakea and Olinda Prison Camps were 355, of whom 227 Provost Court prisoners sentenced since the declaration of martial law. (Annual Report of the Governor of Hawaii to the Secretary of the Interior for fiscal year ended 30 June 1942)

[The Waiakea prison camp was on Hawaii Island while the Olinda prison camp was on Maui Island.]

**Feb 3, 1942: Spying by Japanese Americans on the West Coast.** “General De Witt, the Commander of the West Coast, has evidence that regular communications are going out from Japanese spies in the areas of San Diego, Los Angeles and San Francisco to Japanese submarines off the coast assisting in attacks by the latter which have been made upon practically every ship that has gone out. If we base our evacuation upon removing enemy aliens it will still not get rid of the nisei who are the second generation naturalized Japanese and who are the most dangerous. But on the other hand we cannot discriminate among our citizens on the ground of racial origin. (Henri Lewis Stimson papers, Diaries, vol. 37, p. 85)

[It would be of interest to have more detailed information about the evidence in the hands of General De Witt. The papers of Secretary of War Stimson comprise 169 reels (125 reels of correspondence, 9 reels of diaries); unfortunately, they give mostly broad observations but very little specific details. How many ships were the Japanese able to sink on the West Coast prior to 3 February 1942? Altogether Japanese submarines are credited with the sinking of 184 merchant ships, which is far less than the 2,840 ships sunk by German submarines.

(<http://www.combinedfleet.com/ss.htm>)]

**Feb 4, 1942:** On February 4, 1942, the military authorities authorized the sale of liquor at bars.

[It seems that a large number of intoxicated people could be found in the streets during the opening hours of the bars (Allen 1950).]

**Feb 4, 1942:** Lee Qan Jong was sentenced to one and a half year at hard labor by the Oahu provost court for buying and selling narcotic drugs. with knowledge of unlawful importation. He will be confined at the City and County Jail. (NARA 27)

**Feb 5, 1942:** The Dies Committee on Un-American Activities soon will make public a “Yellow Paper” on Japanese activities in the United States, disclosing a wide-

spread spy ring of about 150,000 members. (NYT p. 7)

**Feb 6, 1942:** District of the Island of Hawaii, Hilo provost court. Joseph Kaholo was sentenced to be imprisoned at hard labor for a term of 3 years for negligent homicide. (NARA 30)

[The source does not say who was killed or what were the circumstances.]

**Feb 12, 1942:** Honolulu. Mr. J. Swope, administrative director of the Territory of Hawaii, invited women with children to evacuate Hawaii. (Le Monde p. 4)

[It does not seem that this advice was taken very seriously by the population because (according to another article published in the same newspaper) it was reiterated on 24 June. On this date the advice to leave Hawaii was even extended to all civilians not involved in war production.]

**Feb 16, 1942:** Mr. D.C. Brownell was convicted by the Provost Court at Schofield Barracks (Oahu) on a charge of assault and battery. He was sentenced to 6 months at hard labor. (NARA 28)

[Unfortunately, the source does not say who Mr. Brownell assaulted and for what reason he did that.]

**Feb 20, 1942:** District of the Island of Hawaii, Hilo provost court. Doroteo Rosalan was sentenced to 3 years at hard labor for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon. (NARA 30)

[The source does not say who was assaulted and for what reason.]

**Feb 25, 1942** Dr. Yokichi Uyehara, a graduate of Tokyo University Medical School, came to Hawaii in 1917. In 1930 he purchased a waterfront home looking directly onto Pearl Harbor and Ford Island. His home became a meeting place for visiting Imperial Navy officers. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, with his adopted daughter Nancy, Uyehara fled to the basement of his Waipahu hospital where he was arrested by FBI agents on 25 February 1942.

Letters were found at his home in which Japanese officers reminded him of his duties to his “mother country”. According to intelligence reports his name also appeared on a map found in a Japanese midget submarine which was wrecked ashore the day after Pearl Harbor. (Burlingame 2002, p. 122-123)

[The book does not say what Uyehara became after his arrest.]

**Feb 26, 1942: Memorandum sent by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of the Navy.** Like you, I have long felt that most of the Japanese should be removed from Oahu to one of the other islands. I think you and Stimson [Secretary of War] can agree and then go ahead and do it as a military project. Ask the director of the budget how we can finance it.

[Signed] F.D.R.

(FDRL1, reel 1)

On 9 March 1942 a directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff followed which considered two possible solutions.

Title: Situation in Hawaiian Islands regarding Japanese population.

It is essential that the most dangerous group, approximately 20,000 persons, be evacuated as soon as possible. This can be effected either by:

- Instituting a concentration camp on one of the Islands such as Molokai.
- Transferring them to a concentration camp on the mainland.

Because the first solution would raise tremendous logistic problems, the JCS recommended the second solution.

(FDRL1 reel 3)

Actually, a mixed solution was used which involved setting up some (fairly small) camps on other islands and at the same time transferring many Japanese to the mainland.

This is confirmed by a message of 28 October 1942 from the War Department to the President which says that in the following 6 months (i.e. November 1942 – April 1943) some 5,000 Japanese will be moved to the mainland. This was in line with the wish expressed by General Emmons. The message does not say what motivated Emmons' wish. It says only that "this will greatly simplify his problem".]

**Feb 26, 1942:** District of the Island of Hawaii, Hilo provost court. Ernest Kailiawa was sentenced to one year at hard labor for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon. (NARA 30)

[The source does not say who was assaulted and for what reason.]

**Feb 26, 1942:** Five women and 17 men convicted of drunkenness were sentenced in provost court to jail terms ranging from 1 to 6 months and fines from \$100 to \$500 (NYT p. 9).

**Feb 27, 1942:** "The President is in favor of placing the Japanese aliens of Hawaii on the island of Malakou [i.e. Molokai located east of Oahu] in a big cantonment guarded by the Army. This was the plan urged by Knox. I pointed out the difficulties as far as I could". (Papers of Henry Lewis Stimson, reel 127, frame 263)

**Feb 27, 1942:** [Testimony of Mr. Carl Onfelt about his arrest and internment.](#)

The mother of Carl Onfelt was Finnish and his father Swedish but being born in the United States he was a native citizen. Arrested in Hawaii in late February, he was transported by ship to the West Coast. On the ship there were 20 prison cells, each of them holding 10 prisoners. Onfelt says that they were never taken on the deck. From the West Coast Onfelt was sent to San Antonio but within a short time

he was sent back to Honolulu and imprisoned at Sand Island. No specific charges were brought against him. In early 1943 he was told that he would be released but was first requested to sign a document which was a pledge that he had received good treatment and that his rights had not been violated. He says that he did not want to sign it "because it was absolutely not the truth". Yet, as his release was dependent upon signing the document he signed it "under duress". (NDL, Green, Reel 5)

[The purpose of the transfers to the continental United States and back is unclear, especially in a time when ship tonnage was limited. However, it seems that it was a fairly general pattern as shown also by the case of another American citizen, Hans Zimmerman. Arrested on 20 December 1941, he was transferred to the mainland in February 1942. Returned to Hawaii in May 1942 and detained at Sand Island, he was again transferred to the mainland in March 1943.]

**Mar 3, 1942:** A night bombing raid was conducted on Honolulu by two Japanese flying boats, each of which dropped four 270-kilogramme bombs. Poorly aimed, the bombs caused little damage. Nevertheless, as for the Doolittle raid, the raid raised the question "where did they come from?". The plane had a 3,000 mile range and started on their mission from the Marshall Islands with one refueling rendez-vous with a submarine. The New York Times reported the bombing in the following terms. "Three medium-sized bombs were dropped on the outskirts of Honolulu early today by what the Army believed was an enemy plane flying at a high altitude. One air raid siren was heard." (Burlingame (2002, p. 363-364); NYT 5 March 1942 p. 3; NYT 6 March 1942 p. 4)

**Mar 4, 1942:** District of the Island of Hawaii, Hilo provost court. Augustin Galpon was sentenced to 3 years at hard labor for assault with a knife. (NARA 30)  
[The source does not say who was assaulted and for what reason. The date of 4 March is the start date of confinement.]

**Mar 8, 1942:** Recruitment was started among the population of Kauai for three battalions (about 2,200) of Kauai Volunteers. The Army supplied Springfield rifles and assigned officers for training. As the unit was not open to Japanese which formed 43% of the population of Kauai the Filipinos which were the second largest group (28 %) constituted the largest part of the Kauai Volunteers.

The Japanese were admitted in the Kiawe Corps which carry out work on Army construction projects each Sunday. They cleared areas for military camps and built roads. (Klass 1970, p. 28-31)

**Mar 11, 1942:** Executive Order 9095 created the Office of the Alien Property Custodian, and gave it discretionary authority over all alien property interests. (FDRL1, reel 1)

[The order of 11 march was fairly short (1 page); it was amended by a more detailed order (5 pages) on 7 July 1942. However, both orders are very opaque.]

[A subsequent report of the House of Representatives of 19 March 1942 describes ways which resulted in the dispossession of Japanese Americans. They were first visited and scared by persons claiming that they belonged to the FBI. Then, they received the visit of a second team who bought their belongings for almost nothing. An article published in the “Los Angeles Herald Express” (3 April 1942) says: “The land holdings of American born Japanese along our coast are now operated by American farmers”. What happened with these farms after the war?]

**Mar 16, 1942:** District of the Island of Hawaii, Hilo provost court. Juan Fuentes was sentenced to 4 years at hard labor for negligent homicide. (NARA 30)

[The source does not say who was killed and under what circumstances.]

**Mar 16, 1942:** District of the Island of Hawaii, Hilo provost court. Cristoto Larita was sentenced to one year at hard labor for indecent assault upon a female under the age of 12. (NARA 30)

**Mar 18, 1942:** ●(3) An alien Japanese photographer, Achiro Deki, 48 years old was sentenced to prison at hard labor for 5 years in provost court on a charge of failing to turn in to the police his three cameras. A general order by the Military Government of Hawaii required enemy aliens to turn in to the police all cameras in their possession. Lieutenant Colonel Neal D. Franklin, provost judge, in passing sentence told Deki that he was very fortunate in not being put before a military commission and getting shot. (NYT p. 5)

**Apr 1, 1942:** District of the Island of Hawaii, Hilo provost court. Julio Rivera was sentenced to 2 years at hard labor for sexual intercourse with a female under the age of 16. (NARA 30)

**Apr 9, 1942:** ●(25,8) Fort Sill, Oklahoma. A group of Hawaii Nikkei internees departed from Sand Island on 17 March 1942 and arrived to Fort Sill on 9 April 1942. Shortly after his arrival, Mr. Kisaburo Oshimo allegedly tried to escape and was shot dead. During the following night an internee from the Mainland died from a shock possibly caused by the first death. (These two fatalities are reported in the biography of Yasutaro Soga (2008, p. 57) but he was not a witness because he came to the mainland with a later group.)

**Apr 11, 1942:** Ichiro Izuka, leader of the Port Allen (on Kauai island) section of the ILWU (International Longshoremen and Warehousemen’s Union) was taken into custody by the Kauai Office of Civil Defense and charged with having disrupted the war effort by distributing literature advertising strikes and slowdowns. He was found



guilty and held for 123 days. (Holmes 1994, p. 33)

A slightly different version is given in Klass (1970, p. 47). After being arrested, his case was heard on two occasions by a panel of 3 plantation managers and an Army officer. On each occasion he was sent back to prison but was finally released after spending 120 days in jail. One may wonder by what kind of court he was tried and why, apparently, he was tried twice.

[In 1947 Izuka published a kind of autobiographical pamphlet entitled “The truth about Communism in Hawaii” (32 pages) which through his attack against Communists was a move to separate out various ILWU groupings so they would become independent unions. The text of this pamphlet (which is available on the Internet) is written in excellent English whereas Izuka was hardly fluent in that language. (Holmes 1994)]

**Apr 24, 1942:** Honolulu. For unlawful possession of currency in violation of General Orders No 51, Ogawa (Nihachi) received the following sentence in a provost court trial: (i) to be confined for 18 months at hard labor in Oahu prison (ii) to pay a fine of \$100 (iii) to buy defense bonds in the principal sum of \$334.50. (NARA 27) [It is the last item in this sentence which is of interest; we did not see it very often even in cases in which the fine was much higher.]

**Apr 27, 1942:** Honolulu. Ababa, Suila was sentenced to 2 years at hard labor by a provost court for violation of the “Selective Service Act”. (NARA 26c) [The Selective Service Act was enacted on 16 September 1940. Incidentally, it went through the House, the Senate and the signature of the President in about 2 weeks. It required that men between the age of 21 and 35 register with local draft boards. After the United States entered the war, these age limits were extended from 18 to 45.]

**May 8, 1942: Loyalty investigation of a 59-year old Japanese alien in Maui.**

*This is a fairly dramatic case because the internee, Kiyoji HOTTA, has been living in Hawaii for 36 years. He developed a successful business and has 9 children, all of whom are dual citizens born in Hawaii. After the hearing he was ordered to be interned and moved to the Santa Fee, New Mexico detention center. In 1944 two of his sons were drafted in the US Army. One of them was killed in Italy in July 1944. Although seemingly paroled in May 1944, the father was prohibited from returning to Hawaii and in January 1945 he was still in the Santa Fee detention center.*

Meeting of the Board for loyalty investigation at Wailuku, Maui Island, [excerpts]  
The board has 5 members: four civilians and a US Army captain. There are also two interpreters: Jiro Ikemori and James R. Love. The first part of the interrogation is devoted to the internee’s personal and business situation.



Hotta served in the Japanese Army as a corporal during two years in 1904-1905. He has a house in Hiroshima that he rents to his brother-in-law. He returned to Japan in 1919, 1934 and 1936. His 3 youngest children are 7-, 9- and 12- year old.

Then comes the questioning about Hotta's loyalty.

Q If the Japanese army came here would you fight for America or fight against America?

A Probably they may not ask me about that because of my poor hearing.

Q Do you want to go back to Japan?

A As I was born in Japan, naturally I want to go back.

Q Were you surprised that you were picked up by the military people?

A People were saying that persons who served in the military of foreign countries would be picked up sooner or later, but as I have a business and young children, I was a bit surprised.

**Findings** The Board finds that the subject is loyal to the Empire of Japan. While there is no evidence of any subversive activity at the present time his previous service with the Japanese Army indicate that he is so pro-Japanese as to be dangerous to the internal security of the United States. In view of these findings, the Board recommends that the subject, Kiyoji Hotta be interned.

[An obvious question is the following. If the subject was really dangerous why was he arrested only on 2 April that is to say 4 months after Pearl Harbor?

The rest of the record is devoted to the attempts made by Hotta's drafted son to obtain that his father be released and authorized to return to Hawaii to run his business and support his large family.]

**Affidavit dated 17 January 1945** Kiyoshi Hotta was inducted on 14 August 1944. His brother, Kihachiro Hotta, of the 100th Infantry Battalion was killed in action on 10 July 1944 while serving in Italy. His father, Kiyoji Hotta, age 62, is presently interned at Barracks 66, Santa Fee Detention Station in New Mexico. When Kiyoshi Hotta was informed of the death of his son he said: "May he rest in peace. He gave his life for our country".

Kiyoshi Hotta prays that his father be paroled to his home in Maui so as to resume the operation of his retail dry goods store and join his remaining son and 6 daughters (his wife died in 1939). (NARA 16)

**May 15, 1942: Special Order No 130 (paragraph 15): Creation of a board of claims.**  
[excerpt]

Under provision of paragraph 7b of AR 35-7020 a board is appointed to investigate and make recommendations for claims involving damage to private property against Government; these claims will be referred to the board by the Headquarters of the

Hawaiian Department.

Detail for Board: (i) Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. Pixton, (ii) Captain William W. Scripps (iii) First Lieutenant August L. Boyd.

The report of the Board will be submitted to this Headquarters in quadruplicate.

(NARA 17)

[AR 35-7020 refers to regulation ruling payments by the American government for damages done by US forces abroad. The US occupation of Iceland in June 1941 was one of the first occasions which led to the constitution of such a board. In Iceland there was a two-level procedure. The first step involved a decision made by an American officer. It is only in cases when there was a disagreement between Icelandic and US authorities that the case was put before a Joint Claims Board which comprised US as well as Icelandic members. In Hawaii, the board comprised only American officers which means that it was completely under the control of the Military Government.

The records of the proceedings of these boards, either in Iceland or in Hawaii, would be a useful source of information for historians, but unfortunately they do not seem to be available.]

**May 19, 1942: Hearing in the case of Yasue Takahashi by a board of officers and civilians for the purpose of making recommendations as to internment [excerpts].**

Q: Are you a dual citizen.

A: Yes I am.

Ms. Takahashi was born on the island of Maui (Hawaii) on 29 April 1919. She was therefore a US citizen. However, she attended a Japanese language school on Maui and after graduating from high school she spent several years in Japan. Because she was able to speak and read Japanese she was considered a dual citizen in spite of the fact that she was not educated in Japan. Her occupation was to be a barmaid and a singer.

Q: You are further advised that you may be represented by an attorney of your own choosing, at your own expense. Do you desire an attorney?

A: I can't pay for an attorney.

Q: You do not desire an attorney then?

A: No.

Ms. Takahashi was arrested on Maui after it had been reported that she was an agent for the Japanese government. This she did not deny. She even provided details about her mission, namely taking photographs of the harbor. However, these details were unrealistic to the point of making the whole story unreliable. For instance she had never been in possession of a camera and did not really know how to use one.

A: I was investigated through the Maui Military Headquarters by Lieutenant Crane.

There I was supposed to say the truth, to be loyal to the United States, but I told a lie just afraid of myself and from there I was sent to Queen's Hospital where I stayed for two weeks.

Subsequently, for some reason which is not expressed clearly, she changed side as attested by the following answers.

Q: Would you like to see America and China win the war?

A: I do.

Q: If the Japanese Army and Navy succeeded in coming to Hawaii, would you give them any help if they asked you to?

A: No, I won't.

She was also a member of a Buddhist sect called "Nichiren". A notable part of the hearing concerns the activities of this sect.

Q: The Nichiren is a warlike sect, is it not? The following answer was provided by a Buddhist minister who served as a witness:

A: The main doctrine of this sect is to protect the country.

In its conclusion the Board recommended that Ms. Takahashi be interned for the duration of the war. Actually, she was paroled on 30 September 1943 after about one year and a half in detention.

(Source: NARA 13)

Perhaps the most interesting part of this record is the eagerness of Ms. Takahashi to name other people of Japanese ancestry who (according to her) are not loyal to the United States and the equal eagerness of the investigation board to extract such names from her. The following questions and answers give an idea of this procedure.

Q: How about these men? Which ones would you say are not loyal to the United States?

A: Mr. Hirano

Q: Who else would you say is disloyal?

A: Mr. Kauai Taiyo because in 1940 he was in a group called Suboru and in that group there was a boy called Harry Hata who had been a Japanese soldier.

Q: Is there anybody else you feel is not loyal to the United States? A: Well, I think that is all I know.

Q: What do you think of Mr. Hamada?

A: Oh, he cares for Japan.

Q: Anybody else?

A: Mr. Yoshimasu, a school teacher.

Q: What is his first name?

A: Masayuki

Q: Where does he live?

A: I think he is in a concentration camp now, I don't know.

Q: He is not loyal to the United States?

A: No, I know him well. He used to tell us that people who are born in Hawaii have to go back to Japan and learn the manners, not like in the United States.

Q: Do you think Mr. Ito from Paia School [A Japanese language school] is loyal to Japan?

A: Yes, because he brought pictures of the Emperor to the school.

Q: What is Ito's first name?

A: I don't know but there is just one Ito at Paia School.

Q: You would suspect all school teachers [in Japanese language schools] are disloyal?

A: I think I suspect all of them because they bring pictures of the Emperor instead of bringing Washington's picture or Roosevelt's picture.

Q: What do teachers teach you?

A: Loyalty to Japan. In Japanese that is called *chuko*.

Q: Did you see anybody bow to those characters?

A: I just saw that Japanese girl, Fujimura [who was examined by the Board yesterday]. She had tears in her eyes.

[This dialogue is quite interesting because the stories told by this 23-year old girl are probably 90% fantasy and fabrication. Indeed, in presenting his report at the beginning of the hearing, an Intelligence Captain of the Counter Intelligence Corps declared:

“She is a wonderful, pathological liar. I could tell you her stories for an hour and I am sure they would interest you as much as they did me but I do not believe that there is anything to them. The doctors believe the same. For instance ,she tells about making an airplane trip from Tokyo to Berlin that took 2 days and 2 nights without a single stop”<sup>49</sup>.

And yet this Board was obviously willing to question her, to listen to her stories and to take them seriously. Why? Probably because (i) she spoke fairly good English (ii) she was quite pleased to talk (iii) some fragments of what she said had the appearance of truth.

During her examination the Board was able to get from her the names of (at least) 10 persons allegedly disloyal to the United States. This procedure prefigures the “hunt for names” by various committees investigating un-American (i.e. mainly communist) activities after World War II. Thousands of persons were pressured to

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<sup>49</sup>She also talked about meeting Mussolini in Berlin. Moreover, according to a G-2 interpreter which was summoned by the Board, her translation into English of Japanese songs sung in internment camps appeared patently wrong. It was just a fabrication to suit her objective of incrimination.

give the names of Communists they knew in exchange of a reduction of their own “sentence”. The average number of denunciations was around 8 per person but some denounced more than 100 (Wieder 2006). In the case of Ms. Takahashi it can be observed that she was paroled in September 1943 (that is to say 16 months after arrest) and allowed to return to Maui. This appears as a much lighter sentence than many others; for instance Mr. Hotta who had done nothing disloyal (his case is discussed below) was still in internment in January 1945.

[The whole hearing which extended over three days (19-22 May 1942) appears somewhat weird. It must be remembered that Japanese warships were visiting Hawaii until a few months before Pearl Harbor. What then would have been the point of giving a photographic mission to an American citizen who even did not possess a camera.

The fact that Ms. Takahashi made several visits to Japan does not prove much. The fare must have been fairly low because one sees many middle-class persons making such trips repeatedly.

One can also observe that at the time of this hearing, Ms. Takahashi was only 23, yet the board does not ask a single question about the occupation of her parents. Moreover, one may wonder what was the point of holding this hearing when the subject had already been extensively interrogated by Military Intelligence. As a matter of fact, the hearing began with the testimony of Mr. Frank O. Blake, special agent of the counter intelligence corps.]

**May 17, 1942:** Since December 7, 1941 the provost courts in Honolulu have tried more than 11,000 cases, pronounced more than 1,300 (i.e. 12%) jail sentences ranging from a few days to 5 years and collected approximately \$150,000 in fines. Cases of high treason and espionage are tried by military commissions in secret sessions. Since December 7, almost 100 military orders have been issued covering nearly every phase of civilian life. (NYT p. 20)

[Curiously, apart from the case of Otto Kühn (described below) none of the known trials by a Military Commission has anything to do with high treason or espionage. This opens the possibility that there may have been trials by Military Commission which have been kept apart from the known records.]

**Jun 6, 1942:** Mr. Arthur Knittle was convicted by a Provost Court sitting at Schofield Barracks (Oahu) on a charge of taking part in an affray and sentenced to one month at hard labor and a fine of \$ 100. (NARA 27)

**Jun 6, 1942:** Seven months after the attack against Pearl Harbor the American victory in the **naval battle of Midway** marked a turning point in the war. After that date, the Japanese threat against Hawaii and the likelihood that it may ever be invaded were greatly reduced.

**Jun 18, 1942:** General Green issued the following memorandum to the provost courts [excerpt].

Any prisoner sentenced by a provost court who voluntarily donates his blood to a blood bank shall be credited on his sentence as follows: for each pint (i.e. 0.57 liter) of the blood, 15 days of confinement or \$30 in case of a fine. (Antony 1955, p. 55) [It can be noted that this rule refers to prisoners who have already been sentenced. On 3 September 1942 it was ruled that “no provost court shall, as a sentence, order a person to donate his blood”. This regulation refers to sentencing but does not seem to forbid the voluntary donation of blood by prisoners who have already been sentenced.]

Provost judges also adopted the practice of sentencing violators of martial law orders to purchase war bonds in lieu of fines or jail sentences. These bonds could not be sold before the end of the war. This raised a legal difficulty however. War bonds, as all government bonds, were transferable at the will of the holder. The Bank of Hawaii wrote to the Secretary of the Treasury for his views on whether it should assume that bonds could be transferred or accept the rules set by the provost courts. After some delay, the Secretary replied that provost court rules should be discarded. (Antony 1955, p. 57-58)

**Jun 25, 1942:** Plans were announced for the withdrawal of regular US currency in the territory of Hawaii and its replacement by currency bearing “Hawaii”. Moreover, bond certificates were perforated with the letter H.

[This move prefigured the introduction of B-yens in Japan; the motivation may have been different however. The conversion only became effective two months after the battle of Midway that is to say at a time when there was no longer any real threat of invasion. The new currency was the sole legal tender between July 1942 and October 1944; it remained legal tender even after the reintroduction of the dollar. Until January 1944, US servicemen could use regular dollars in Hawaii but after this date and until October 1944 they had to change their dollars upon arrival (Allen 1950).]

**Jul 7, 1942:** Governor Olson of California has discovered that the harvesting season is coming for some fruits and that it may be profitable for Californians to keep these Japanese huddled up [i.e. to be crowded together] in these assembly camps to be used cheaply in this harvesting.

[Signed] The Secretary of War, Stimson  
(FDRL1, reel 1)

[The assembly camps were provisional camps before the transfer to permanent camps.]

**Jul 25, 1942:** ● (25,9) A Japanese alien, Giichiro Uyeno, was fatally shot by a





**Fig. 4.1 Hawaii one dollar bill.** Note the vertical inscriptions “Hawaii” on the upper figure and the large horizontal mark on the other side of the bill. The government set August 15, 1942 as the deadline for conversion from regular dollars to Hawaii dollars. This was more than two months after the battle of Midway (4 June 1942) which means that there was no longer any real invasion threat.

sentry near Waimanalo on Oahu shortly after midnight. Because he was carrying a flash-light it was assumed that he had been (or had the intention of) signaling to a submarine. (Burlingame 2002 p. 369; NYT 28 July 1942 p. 6)

[If this interpretation is correct it would be yet another case of spying at Hawaii.]

**Jul 27, 1942:** At 1:40 pm 147 internees from the Bismark Temporary Camp in North Dakota arrived at Lordsburg in Southern New Mexico. Among them were H. Isomura and T. Kobata. As both were ill they were left behind at the station to wait for a car to take them to the camp which was 4 kilometers from the station. After the new internees arrived at the camp they learned that Isomura and Kobata had been shot dead. This triggered an uproar. It was explained that the two men had been shot after trying to escape. All internees agreed that the two men had been sick for a long time and would never have tried to escape. They asked for an autopsy to be conducted but the request was denied. A subsequent court-martial acquitted the soldiers who had committed the homicide. (Soga 2008, p. 78)

**Aug 1942:** ●(4) A sedition case occurred on Kauai Island. After allegedly becoming intoxicated a Nisei from the town of Kapaa told his companions that “The US Army is no good”. He was sentenced to a 5-year sentence by a provost court.

(Klass 1970, p. 26)

**Aug 1942:** Troop strength on the island of Kauai reached about 15,000.

Until April 1942 there had been only 750 troops on Kauai which consisted in elements from the 298th and 299th Infantry Regiments. Then after the arrival of elements of the 27th Infantry Division under Brigadier General Alexander E. Anderson and of troops from the 40th Division under the command of Major General Rapp Brush the total jumped to 15,000. In October 1942 they were replaced by elements of the 33rd Division under Major General John Milliken. The last big influx of Army troops came with the arrival of two regiments from the draftee 98th Division in April 1944. It left in October 1944 and after there remained only a token garrison force.

(Klass 1970, p. 23, 26-28)

[At the census of 1940 the population of Kauai numbered 36,000, but a more important parameter is the size of the fraction of the female population which is not married (i.e. single plus widowed plus divorced). For the whole Territory of Hawaii this group represented 11% of the total population. Under the assumption that the proportion was about the same on Kauai one gets a figure of:  $0.11 \times 36000 \sim 4,000$ . Thus, there were 3.75 times more troops than unmarried females. From other similar cases (e.g. the occupation of Iceland) it is known that such situations are bound to bring about great tension between the troops and the civilian population. On Kauai, illegitimate births doubled in the year from 30 June 1943 to 30 June 1944 (Klass 1970, p. 23).]

**Aug 4, 1942:** A Hawaiian Territorial Senator, Sanji Abe, was arrested and charged with illegal possession of a Japanese flag. Mr. Abe was elected in the Hawaiian Senate in November 1940 and gave up his dual citizenship the same month. He served in the US Army in World War I. (NYT p. 6)

**Aug 10, 1942:** Guides for enemy bombers to US Air bases or airplane factories were exposed by Colonel Dache of the "First Ground Air Support Command".

A huge field had been plowed from one end to the other except a section in the middle that was left fallow. This untouched land remained dark and clearly visible from the sky against the lighter plowed part of the field so that it formed an arrow aiming right at a near-by airplane factory. Similar patterns were discovered elsewhere. The names of the guilty persons, the places where their subversive acts were done, the time when they were discovered and the punishment meted out were all withheld as military secrets. However, it is known that proper action had been taken after investigation by the FBI and intelligence officers of the First Air Force which means that the markers have been completely eradicated. (NYT p. 1,3)

[This article is of interest in two respects. (i) It shows that apart from the FBI,

army intelligence units were also active in fighting spies and saboteurs. These markers were detected through air inspection and required technical capabilities which the FBI probably did not have. (ii) The activities of these intelligence units were shrouded in secrecy. We are not even told before which kind of court the spies have been tried. Therefore, by focusing only on cases investigated by the FBI one will miss a part of the cases.

Curiously, the article does not say for which bombers these markers were intended. Neither German nor Japanese bombers had a sufficiently long range to bomb targets in the United States.]

**Aug 19, 1942:** Hilo. The case against Mr. Sanji Abe, was dismissed on the ground that holding a Japanese flag was defined as an offense only in August 8 that is to say about one week after the arrest of Mr. Abe on August 2. (NYT p. 6)

**Aug 25, 1942:** ●(5) V.S. White, a civilian stockbroker was tried before a provost court of the crime of embezzlement. He was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment. (Antony 1955, p. 79)

**Aug 31, 1942:** Ms. Helen Harue Nakamura presented an application for clemency for her husband James Seichi Nakamura (case No 8823-F) who had been taken in custody. (NARA 20)

**Sep 1942:** ●(6) A case of sabotage occurred on Kauai Island when a man from the town of Lihue was convicted of tossing a cable over a transformer which shut off power for half an hour and interrupted inter-island radiotelephone communication. The man was sentenced to 5 years at hard labor by a provost court. (Klass 1970, p. 26)

**Sep 1942:** **Detention camps** The Red Cross was able to get access to the following detention camps: (i) Hilo, Hawaii (ii) Kaleo, Kauai (iii) Makaweli, Maui (iv) Sand Island in Honolulu Bay. (NDL, Papers of Maj.-Gen. Thomas H. Green, reel 20, frame 222)

**Sep 4, 1942:** General Order No 135 enumerated the criminal offenses involving crimes against the war effort, in respect to which the civil courts were not authorized to exercise jurisdiction (US Supreme Court 1946).

**Sep 19, 1942:** A Hawaiian Nikkei, MAKIHIRA Tamehachi (ISN-HJ-1612-CI) was taken into custody on 19 September and evacuated to an internment camp on the mainland on 2 March 1943. The evidence which was used against him at his hearing before an Internment Board consisted of the following items: (i) A receipt for a \$2.50 donation to the Japanese War Relief Fund made on 15 October 1937. Another donation of the same amount was made on 17 October 1937. (ii) A deferment de-

mand from Japanese Army which was made by the subject for his son, Tadahara, on 15 May 1940. (NARA 18)

[According to many testimonies, donations to Japanese organizations were made by almost all Nikkei born in Japan. The second item means that the subject's son was either born in Japan or a dual citizen born in Hawaii.

As such features were shared by many of the Japanese people of Hawaii, it is difficult to understand why some were interned while others were not.]

**Sep 22, 1942:** The War Department is seeking hundreds of men for jobs in Hawaii (NYT p. 22).

**Sep 30, 1942:** New York City. The government employment service is recruiting laborers in New York City for Hawaii projects, offering transportation, a one-year contract, for a forty-eight-hour week at \$ 35 weekly pay, which is said to be equal in purchasing power to about \$ 52 in New York. Referring to this offer the Honolulu Advertiser would print an editorial on the day after which was entitled "Somebody's being kidded." (NYT p. 5)

**Oct 3, 1942:** In the primary elections of the democratic party held in Hawaii, 5 Japanese candidates (3 of them incumbents) were nominated. The American media expressed the opinion that they should not run. Reluctantly, between October 19 and 21 they withdrew one after another. As a result, the Republican candidates run unopposed. In 1946 Democrats won all 4 Kauai seats in the House of the Territory. (NYT 5 October 1942 p. 3; NYT 7 October 1942 p. 24)

**Oct 5, 1942:** ● (25,10) Death of an internee, Yoichi Kagimoto, in Hawaii. (NARA 19)

**Oct 8, 1942:** New York City. Hawaii jobs fail to draw workers despite good pay. Robert Merrimer, recruiting representative of the Hawaiian Department of the Army, reported that ship accommodation for 250 men had been reserved for a contingent scheduled to leave the West Coast but that only 81 men had been signed to go. A recent editorial of the "Honolulu Advertiser" wrote that the men would face disillusionment with respect to living costs. However, Merrimer pointed out that as the men would be furnished with free room and board they will not have occasion to visit the butcher, the grocer or the landlord. He added that there is no closed shop in Hawaii which means that the workers do not have to join a union. The men will travel to a West Coast embarkation point in train and Pullman cars. (NYT p. 7)

[This article shows that labor was in short supply both in New York and in Hawaii; moreover, it suggests that people in New York were aware of the inflation in living cost in Hawaii.]



**Oct 8, 1942:** New York. A special train scheduled to leave today with 250 men en route to the West Coast, where they would embark for Hawaii, was canceled yesterday by Robert Merrimer, recruiting representative of the Army, as a result of the failure of men to respond to the call for war construction workers (NYT p. 9).

**Oct 28, 1942: Removal of 5,000 Japanese from Hawaii.**

War Department (Stimson) to the President (excerpt).

There is a wide divergence of views in both services [Army and Navy] as to the question of evacuating the Japanese from Hawaii. After consulting with the naval authorities it has been determined to move approximately 5,000 during the next 6 months as shipping facilities become available. This, general Emmons believes, will greatly simplify his problem [what problem?]. Considering the labor needs on the islands, this is about all that he has indicated any desire to move although he has been given the authority to move up to 15,000.

The evacuees from Hawaii will be received on the West Coast by the Army and sent to relocation centers. Facilities already exist to handle them.

(FDRL1, reel 3)

[Historians usually consider that after the battle of Midway (4-7 June 1942) the threat of an invasion of Hawaii receded (if there was ever one). Therefore one wonders what was the motivation for removing 5,000 Japanese from Hawaii to the continent. Was this evacuation planned for the period from Oct 1942 to May 1943 really carried out?]

**Oct 29, 1942: Loyalty investigation of a dual citizen in Maui**

Meeting of the Board for loyalty investigations at Wailulu, Maui Island.[Excerpts]

The Board consists of the same four members as those which convened on 8 May 1942 (see above). The internee who appears before the Board was arrested on 24 October 1942. His name is Kenjiro HAYASHI<sup>50</sup>. He is a 25-year old dual citizen.

The arrest warrant which is appended to the record says:

“It appears from confidential information in the possession of the Military Governor of the Territory of Hawaii that there is good evidence that Kenjiro Hayashi has acted or now threatens to act against the dignity, safety and interest of the United States.

[It can be noted that the same kind of language was used during the campaign against American leftists in the decades after World War II or against suspected terrorists after 11 September 2001. It is characterized by two features (i) the indictment relies on confidential information (ii) it is the *intend* to commit offenses which is sanctioned.]

The hearing begins with a statement made by a special agent of the Military Intelligence Division of the Counter Intelligence Corps. At the age of 4, Hayashi was taken to Japan by his parents and he remained there until 1937 when he returned to Hawaii

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<sup>50</sup>Kenjiro Hayashi apparently is not related to Tomoichi Hayashi who was “tried” on 7 January 1942.

at the age of 19. As a result he speaks little English. He donated \$12 to the Japanese War Relief in 1937. In October 1942 [that is to say shortly before being arrested] he purchased a \$50 US Defense Bond. He is not a member of any organization. His father died in Japan in 1938 and his mother currently lives in Yamaguchi prefecture, Japan. He stated that his reason for coming to Hawaii was to avoid being drafted into the Japanese Army [however, Hayashi does not repeat this statement during the hearing]. He went back to Japan in 1940 to visit his father's tomb.

Then the military member of the Board states the griefs that the Military Government holds against the internee.

- You speak little English and have made no effort to learn it. You are Japanese in your attitude and have failed to Americanize yourself.

- You have contributed nothing to the war effort of the United States [this is not really true on account of his purchase of a Defense Bond] and have contributed to the Japanese War Relief.

- You returned to Hawaii for purely financial reasons [not really true]

- You are pro-Japanese and not loyal to the United States. Do you understand that?

[After such a severe indictment the fate of Hayashi seems already sealed. During his interrogation he is first asked some practical questions about his job (he works in a bakery). Then comes the questioning about his loyalty.]

Q If the Japanese army should land here and ask you to help them what would you do?

A I cannot forget the gratitude of the American Government [sic] treating us equal so, in case they land here, I can't help them.

Q Do you feel you would be absolutely loyal to America?

A Yes.

Q Do you like Hawaii better than Japan?

A I like Hawaii.

Q Do you have any other statement you wish to make?

A I am a Block Warden where I live. I came back to Hawaii because I wanted to be an American soldier.

**Final remark** I wanted to remind you that this a confidential Government hearing and you are not to reveal to anyone what transpired here.

At the end of the meeting the Board makes the following recommendations.

**Findings** In spite of the detainee's statements of loyalty to the United States, the Board feels that because of his long residence and education in Japan he is loyal to that country. In the event of a concentrated effort to take Hawaii the detainee might be dangerous to the security of the United States.



Therefore the Board recommends the the Detainee, Kenjiro Hayashi, **be interned for the duration of the war.**

(Source: NARA 14)

[**Comment:** The detainee made his utmost in terms of loyalty claims. To no avail. Since the death of his father he was sending \$10 a month to his mother. Once in detention, he will no longer be able to do that (assuming that the war would not have made this impossible anyway).]

**Nov 25, 1942:** Three doomed to die in chair for helping spy. Federal judge William J. Campbell sentenced to death three German Americans who sheltered a saboteur. One of them, Mr. Haupt, is the father of a saboteur. The wives were sentenced to 25 years. (Chicago Tribune p. 3-4)

[The 6 saboteurs were also sentenced to death by an army court on 13 November 1942 in spite of the fact that on 30 October the Supreme Court said that the Army cannot try civilians. It can be recalled that these saboteurs were arrested almost immediately after arriving in the United States.]

**Dec 1, 1942:** Report of Attorney General J. Garner Anthony to Governor of Hawaii Ingram M. Stainback [excerpt].

Murders and rapes have occurred in Honolulu, yet the press is forbidden to publish these incidents. The press is denied access to police files.

For many months the local press carried not a word about the flourishing brothels, some 25 (primarily around River Street) in which some 350 women work. (Chaplin 1998, p. 208)

**Dec 2, 1942: Provost court trials.** As of 2 December 1942 there have been 34,513 provost court trials, that is to say a monthly average of 2,900 per month.

Between January and March 1943 there were 3,593 trials, that is to say 1,200 per month.

Moreover, between 7 December 1941 and 1 November 1942 the provost courts collected \$600,000 in fines, bails and forfeitures (i.e. when the bail money is not returned for instance because the person did not come to the trial) (NDL, Papers of Maj.-Gen. Thomas H. Green: reel 20, frames 628, 635; reel 14, frame 244)

**Dec 10, 1942:** Memorandum dated December 10, 1942 sent to Secretary of the Interior Ickes by Warner Gardner, Solicitor of the Interior Department, [excerpts]

- It is ordinarily understood that a plea of “not guilty” draws a heavier sentence.
- While the civil courts are open for civil actions, the 50,000 employees of the military establishments and public utilities are tried only by provost courts.

(Antony 1955, p. 26)

[Obviously the first instruction was a strong incentive to plead guilty especially if

one recalls that 98% of the defendants were found guilty.]

**Dec 15, 1942:** San Francisco. Describing the Hawaiian Islands as “peculiarly exposed to fifth column activities”, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in a majority opinion upheld a lower court decision denying a writ of habeas corpus to an American citizen, Hans Zimmerman, arrested there by a military board. (NYT p. 14)

**Dec 17, 1942:** *Opinion of the Department of Justice about General Greene*

Attorney General (Francis Biddle). Memorandum for the President (excerpt).

General Green [Executive officer to the Military Governor of Hawaii] impresses me as being a stuffy [i.e. old-fashioned], over-zealous, unyielding J.A.G. [Judge Advocate General] type. McCloy [John J. McCloy was Assistant Secretary of War] agrees he should be replaced. There is a deep resentment much of which does not come to the surface as criticism is suppressed.

Emmons [Lieutenant-General D.C. Emmons was the military governor of Hawaii] gets most of his understanding of conditions from the “Big Five” [i.e. the 5 major land owners]

(FDRL1 reel 3)

[It is not clear where Green’s attitude generated “deep resentment”. However, with the Department of Justice and the State Department wanting his departure it was fairly clear that General Green would be soon replaced. That happened indeed 4 months later.]

**Dec 19, 1942:** Honolulu. Mr. Charles Vierra was convicted by a Provost Court on a charge of failing to report for work in violation of General Orders No. 91. He was sentenced to be confined at hard labor for 2 months. (NARA 27)

[It would be interesting to know for what reason Mr. Vierra did not report for work.]

**Dec 27, 1942:** The Honolulu Chamber of Commerce sent a wire to President Roosevelt, Attorney General Biddle and Secretary of the Interior Ickes. One key-sentence reads:

“We do not believe that martial law should be suspended at this time”. (Antony 1955, p. 29)

[This wire was motivated by the fact that a delegation from Hawaii was in Washington to discuss a possible suspension of martial law. As shown by the announcement made by President Roosevelt on 30 December 1942, some restrictions were indeed lifted but the changes were more apparent than real. Regarding trials by military tribunals there were only marginal changes.]

**Dec 30, 1942:** President Roosevelt announced that some of the heavy restrictions laid on the Territory of Hawaii when martial law was invoked soon after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor will be relaxed. For instance, civil courts were given back

jurisdiction over all violation of civil laws; violation of general orders will continue to be tried by military courts. (NYT p. 3, Allen 1950)

**Dec 31, 1942:** Records compiled by the Bureau of Crime Statistics and Identification revealed that there were 22,480 persons arrested and tried during 1942; 22,121 (i.e. 98.4%) were found guilty. The warden of Oahu prison had been accustomed to receive prisoners in an orderly fashion, each prisoner being delivered with a copy of the judgment. For several months after December 7, 1941 when the Army took over criminal law, prisoners were delivered without any documents whatsoever. The warden was supposed to keep track of the sentence by either oral instructions or informal memoranda. By mid-1942, the warden became concerned about his responsibilities and forms adapted to provost court sentences were printed. (Antony 1955, p. 54)

**Dec 31, 1942:** During 1942 3 of the 6 Honolulu provost courts heard 22,480 cases. In all but 359 cases [1.6%] the defendants were found guilty. During the first six months of the war the three courts disposed of nearly 19,000 cases. Of the 1,454 people appearing before the courts in November not one was acquitted. (Allen 1950, p. 148)

From a table given in the papers of Major General Thomas Green (reel 1, frame 484) one learns that altogether for the 15 provost courts there were 37,162 trials in 1942. The data suggest that the activity of provost courts decreased in the course of time. During the first six months, the average monthly number of trials reached 3,200 whereas the monthly average for the whole year 1942 was 1,900. This trend is indeed confirmed by monthly data given in the Green papers. From December 1941 to April 1943 the monthly numbers of trials were as given in the table below.

**Monthly numbers of provost court trials in Honolulu, Dec 1941-Apr 1943**

Year	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
<b>1941</b>												1,409
<b>1942</b>	3,042	3,543	3,975	4,021	3,777	3,213	4,150	3,831	2,259	1,703	1,746	1,902
<b>1943</b>	1,943	1,953	1,999	1,334								

Notes: The series ends after April 1943 because Thomas Green was replaced.

Source: *Thomas Green's papers (reel 1, frame 484)*.

It can be seen that March–April 1942 and July–August 1942 were marked by surges of provost court activity. Did they correspond to some specific events? At this point, we do not know.

**Dec 31, 1942:** During 1942 provost courts collected \$733,000 in fines and forfeited bail. 91% of this amount came from the provost courts set up on the island of Oahu.

(NDL, Green papers, reel 14, frame 143)

[In 1942 there were some 35,723 provost court trials of which 84% took place on Oahu. The two percentages are consistent with one another.]

## 1943

**1943:** Dr. Tokue Takahashi was a cancer specialist well-known in the medical community of Hawaii. A Japanese alien, he entertained Imperial Naval officers during their visits to Hawaii <sup>51</sup> in his home which commanded a view of Honolulu harbor. After the Pearl Harbor attack he was promptly arrested. He returned to Japan in an exchange ship in 1943. For the benefit of the Japanese radio he gave very patriotic accounts of the attack of Pearl Harbor. He had two brothers who served in the Japanese Army. (Burlingame 2002 p. 121, 443)

**Feb 1943:** Plans to induct Hawaiian Japanese on a voluntary basis were announced in February 1943. For the whole Territory applications numbered 9,507 i.e.30% of the men between 18 and 38 who could be drafted. On Kauai Island there were 760 applicants which is about the same proportion.

Induction continued until the end of the war. All told, 1,300 men of Kauai were inducted. 48 died which represents a death rate of 3.7%. (Kimura 1988)

[If we consider that on average they spent one year in the army 3.7% represent an annual death rate. Such a rate is of the same order of magnitude as the death rate of US troops in Vietnam in 1968.]

### **Feb 8, 1943: Handling of the prostitution problem by the army in 1942**

For years before the war the evil of prostitution was handled by the local police who segregated the unfortunates in certain areas of the city. After the outbreak of the war, a substantial number of prostitutes were brought to Honolulu from the mainland under military priorities. Homes in residential areas were converted to army brothels which met with vigorous objections on the part of the neighbors. The subject assumed such proportions that the army decided to return the control of prostitution to local police.

At this point [the exact date is not given in the source] the city of Honolulu experienced a three week strike by prostitutes who picketed the police station and the office of the military governor. Nothing about this strike appeared in the press.

When civil government was partially restored on 8 February 1943, General Emmons endeavored to persuade the governor of Hawaii to take over the function of regulating prostitution, but the governor declined. As a result the police were ordered to

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<sup>51</sup>Visits of Japanese Navy ships in Hawaii were fairly frequent. One of the last seems to have been the visit of the training ships Iwate and Yakumo in October 1940.

close the houses of prostitution and substantial numbers returned to the mainland. (Antony 1955, p. 40)

[It seems surprising that the number of prostitutes experienced a decline at a moment when troops in Hawaii were more numerous than ever before.]

**Feb 10, 1943: Looting of Japanese fishing vessels.**

Report from Alfred E. Tree, Military property controller.

Owners of fishing vessels were prohibited under order issued by the Navy from using them. But no agency was made responsible for the safeguarding of such vessels. Savage vandalism on many of them occurred already in December 1941. The US Engineers Department advised orally that it had taken valuable fishing nets found aboard for camouflage purpose. Subsequently the vessels were subjected to further looting. To the knowledge of the undersigned, the owners had not been compensated. (NDL, Papers of Maj.-Gen. Thomas H. Green, reel 14, frame 271)

**Mar 1943:** There was a labor dispute between the Hawaiian Electric Company and its employees. That case was merely the beginning of continual and serious labor unrest in Hawaii. (Green n.d. p. 400)

[Unfortunately, Green gives no details neither about the conflict at the Hawaiian Electric Company nor about subsequent labor unrest. It can be noted that Green left his position as Executive of the Military Governor in March 1943 and seems willing to suggest that the situation deteriorated after this date.]

**Mar 10, 1943: General Orders No 2, (second series)** [excerpt]

[This general order gives the ranks and names of the officers who held provost courts in the islands of the archipelago. These courts were established in the following locations (the first name corresponds to the city or town, the second to the island):

(1): Hilo, Hawaii (2,3): Honolulu and Kancoke, Oahu (4,5): Schofield Barracks and Pearl City, Oahu (6): Lihue, Kauai (7): Lana City, Lanai (8): Waikuku, Maui (9): Kaunakai, Molokai (10): Palmyra Island.

(Antony 1955, Appendix B, p. 168)

**Mar 10, 1943:** Press licensing and censorship were officially ended by the Army on March 10, 1943. Yet, the editor of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Riley Allen, observed that there was still “definite and extensive restrictions as to publication of certain classes and items of news, this through direct requests which in some cases amount to directives of the Army and Navy Commands.” (Chaplin 1998, p. 208, Allen June, 1944)

[Did this kind of control come to an end after martial law was eventually lifted on 24 October 1944? As Allen’s observations were made in June 1944, we do not really know.]

**Jun 5, 1943:** About 1,700 residents of Japanese ancestry (i.e. about 1%) sent checks to the US government with the request that the money be used for “bombs on Tokyo” as an expression of condemnation of Japan’s execution of American fliers. (Allen 1950, Chronology)

**Jun 15, 1943:** A German named Bernard Julius Otto Kühn was arrested on December 8, 1941. On 21 February 1942 he was sentenced to be shot by a Military Commission for giving data on the US fleet to the Japanese. On 26 October 1942 the sentence was commuted to 50 years at hard labor. Kühn’s properties, including his Kailua home, were seized by the military and eventually sold. The other members of the Kühn family, his wife, son and daughter were also arrested on December 8 and interned. (NYT 15 June 1943, website of the FBI, Starbulletin.com 26 September 2004)

[It can be noted that the name and role of Otto Kühn (the NYT spelling is Kuehn) was revealed in the NYT only on 15 June 1943 that is to say 14 months after his trial by a Military Commission.]

**Takeo Yoshikawa** Very different is the story reported on the website History-Net.com (<http://www.historynet.com>) of an alleged Japanese spy, Takeo Yoshikawa. A naval reserve ensign, Yoshikawa came to Hawaii on 27 March 1941. To familiarize himself with the military installations which were mainly concentrated on Oahu, he relied on a hired cab driver named John Mikami, a Japanese-Hawaiian who often performed chores for the consulate. Other times, he used a 1937 Ford chauffeured by Richard Kotoshirodo, a Nisei consular clerk. At mid-afternoon on December 6, Yoshikawa climbed into Mikami’s taxi for what turned out to be his final reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor. Back at the Japanese consulate, he saw that the encoded message be transmitted to Tokyo through the standard RCA commercial communication system. After receiving it, the Japanese foreign ministry forwarded it to the navy general staff and the attack force.

Yet, and in spite of the gravity of these accusations, Yoshikawa after being arrested was transported to San Diego and in March 1942 he was placed in an Arizona camp holding numerous interned Nisei. Eventually, he was exchanged for American diplomats being held in Japan. Back in his homeland, he married and continued working for naval intelligence until the end of the war. Fearful of arrest when US troops occupied Japan in 1945, he fled into the countryside and posed as a Buddhist monk. He was not arrested and told his story in 1960.

[The comparison between these stories which are both based on American intelligence sources raises several questions. (i) Otto Kühn was on the suspect list of American counterintelligence as attested by his arrest a few hours after the attack of Pearl Harbor; why then was he not arrested earlier? (ii) Why, in spite of the gravity



of the accusations, was Yoshikawa not tried and sentenced like Kühn? Is it because as a member of the consulate he was protected by diplomatic immunity? But then, if spying could be done almost without risk by members of the consulate one must wonder why Kühn should have taken such great risks for the same purpose. (iii) What was the fate of Mikami and Kotoshirodo, Yoshikawa's drivers? Once arrested, Kotoshirodo proved exceedingly cooperative with investigators. Within a short time of his arrest, he told investigators everything he knew not just about his own trips around Hawaii but more generally about "the espionage activities carried on by the consulate". Perhaps did such a positive attitude justify leniency, anyway the fact is that Kotoshirodo was not prosecuted. Mikami was allowed to repatriate to Japan in August 1943 as part of a swap of nationals.]

**Jul 3, 1943:** Honolulu bus drivers engaged in a slowdown over a money issue. Young American-born Japanese are preponderant among those bus drivers. (Honolulu Advertiser 3 July 1943, cited in Chaplin 1998, p. 211)

[The "Honolulu Advertiser" comments that this can be regarded "in no other light than an indirect aid to Hirohito and his Tokyo butchers". It can also be noted that this is one the few mentions of social unrest during wartime.]

**Jul 15, 1943:** The relocation camp of Tule Lake in northern California became a Segregation Center where persons of Japanese ancestry deemed to be "disloyal" were concentrated. An undetermined number of Japanese Hawaiians were transported to Tule Lake (see below December 30 1944). In December 1944 the population of the Tule Lake Center reached a peak level of about 19,000 within a space designated to hold 15,000.

There were numerous disturbances. On 4 November 1943 martial law was established and the Military Police took control of the center from the War Relocation Authority (see below at this date). In 1944 some 350 dissident leaders were held in an Army stockade at Tule Lake and 1,200 Issei had been transferred to camps run by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) then a branch of the Justice Department. These camps were destined to held so-called "enemy aliens". Of the 32 INS camps the most important were at Bismark (ND), Crystal City (TX), Kooskia (ID), Missoula (MT), Santa Fe (NM), Seagoville (TX). The Tule Lake center remained open until 20 March 1946.

(<http://www.ww2pacific.com/relocatime.html>

[http://www.javadc.org/tule\\_lake.htm](http://www.javadc.org/tule_lake.htm),

<http://www.geocities.com/Athens/8420/camps.html>, Wegars 2005)

**Jul 30, 1943:** Two naturalized German Americans, Glockner and Seifert, filed petitions for writ of habeas corpus. They alleged they were held confined in a military

internment camp on the island of Oahu since December 1941 for Glockner, and since December 1942 for Seifert; that no charges had been made against them; that they had violated no law. Their petition was dismissed. (Antony 1955, p. 64)

**Aug 15, 1943:** Epidemic of fever spreads in Hawaii. Dengue invaded Honolulu and army multiplied out-of-bounds districts. (NYT p. 27)

[It is remarkable that this news was published despite war time censorship. It might have started a panic and dissuade workers from going to Hawaii where so much manpower was needed,]

**Aug 19, 1943: General order No 31.** It is directed against Judge Metzger who is fined \$5,000 and given a sentence of 5 years at hard labor. (Green papers, reel 5)

**Aug 21, 1943:** The Military Governor of Hawaii, Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson Jr, accepted writs of habeas corpus ordering him to produce two German Americans in Federal Court. Walter Glockner and Edwin R. Seifert had been interned without charges for several months. The writs were issued by Federal Judge Delbert Metzger in Hawaii on the argument that martial law had been partially relaxed. But on August 27, backed by the War Department, General Richardson refused to surrender the two men on the writs of habeas corpus. Furthermore Judge Metzger was prohibited by Army restrictions from enforcing a \$ 5,000 fine which he imposed for contempt of court on General Richardson. An agreement was reached between General Richardson and Judge Metzger on 22 October 1943. (NYT p. 3; NYT 27 August p. 6; NYT 22 October 1953 p. 4).

[This episode shows that, apart from American Japanese (see above at the date of 7 December 1941) some citizens were held in administrative internment that is to say without trial. Under martial law the suspension of constitutional guarantees makes such detention possible. Apart from Glockner and Seifert one can also recall the case of another American citizen Hans Zimmerman (see above 15 December 1942). (Allen 1950, p. 177)

**Sep 28, 1943: General Orders No 34, excerpt.** All communications by cable, radio, telephone entering or leaving the Territory of Hawaii or passing between any of the islands of the Territory or between the Territory and any vessel or aircraft, shall be censored under "US censorship regulations" or under such other rules as specified by the Military Governor.

No person or corporation shall use any code for the purpose of concealing information.

(NARA 21) [These directives are an amendment to the general orders organizing censorship; they extended it by adding new provisions.]

**Oct 15, 1943:** An epidemic of dengue fever reached its peak in mid-October. It had

started in late July 1943 on Honolulu and remained confined to this city. Between July 1943 and June 1944 1,498 infections were reported which lead to only 3 deaths. In the two years between July 1944 and June 1946 there were 83 cases. For these 83 cases there are separate figures for civilians and military. It turns out that the military represented 52% of the cases<sup>52</sup>. If one assumes the same percentage of 52% this would imply  $1498 \times 0.52 = 776$  cases among the military, a figure which would explain why the Military Government felt concerned and devoted important means to eliminating the mosquitoes which transmit this disease. Considerable amounts of pyrethrum and DDT were spread in order to kill the mosquito larvae. (Gilbertson 1945, Wilbar 1947)

[Dengue has a low mortality rate. However, considerable loss of working time can result. The mean duration of the illness during which individuals were absent from work was around 10 days.

Following the battle of Saipan in mid-July 1944, the 5th Marine Division was sent to Hawaii for a rest period. Upon arrival on Hawaii there were 26 marines ill with dengue. Incidentally, it can be noted that despite war time censorship this epidemic was described in the New York Times, see above the date of 15 August 1943.]

**Nov 4, 1943:** Martial law was declared at the Tule Lake Segregation Center. The taking over of the camp by the military involved 900 troops, 6 tanks, several armored vehicles and dozens of jeeps with mounted machine guns. These guns were used to fire warning shots in every direction when the army vehicles entered the camp. The internees who were members of nationalist organizations such as Hoshi Dan and Hokoku Dan were thrown into the stockade where many were beaten. (<http://www.tulelake.org/history.html>; Kiyota (1997, p. 105))

**Dec 1943:** After fighting in Guadalcanal and Tarawa the 2nd Marine Division reached Hawaii Island for a recuperation period and further training in preparation for the Marianas campaign. Its home base, renamed Camp Tarawa, was located near the village of Waimea (about 500 inhabitants). The total population of the Island of Hawaii was 74,000. Hilo, the main town had a population of about 30,000. (Census of 1940, Allen 1950)

**Dec 18, 1943:** Hoodlumism [i.e. gangsterism] was declared a problem by Hawaiian newspapers. This occurred in particular during sports events, on buses, on the streets, on beaches. (Honolulu Star Bulletin 11,13 October 1943 and 18 December 1943, cited in Allen (1950))

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<sup>52</sup>Although there were more men than women on Oahu, 58% of the 1,498 cases were among females which means that the disease had a higher incidence in females than in males. As a consequence the percentage of 52% among the military suggests a higher incidence among soldiers than among civilians.

**Dec 31, 1943:** In the two years between 7 December 1941 and the end of 1943, union membership dropped from 10,000 to 4,000. It is asserted that the military forbade collection of union dues for 10 months which brought about the collapse of the ACAPAWA (United Cannery, Agriculture, Packing and Allied Workers of America), which was one of the two main unions in Hawaii. (Klass 1970, p. 47)

## 1944

**Jan 7, 1944** Adriano Domingo was executed on Oahu. (personal message received from Mr. Walter Ikeda who held an official position in the Justice Department of Hawaii in the 1950s).

[Domingo was a civilian who was executed for the murder of another civilian but Mr. Ikeda did not remember the circumstances of the murder.

On the following website [http://stateofaloha.blogspot.fr/2014\\_05\\_01\\_archive.html](http://stateofaloha.blogspot.fr/2014_05_01_archive.html) one reads:

“On a January morning in 1944 Adriano Domingo became the last person executed in Hawaii. Domingo, was convicted of murder for stabbing a woman to death in a pineapple field on Kauai just 4 months before the execution.”

However, it is not true that Domingo was the last person executed in Hawaii. There were at least 3 others after him: Cornelius Thomas and Jesse D. Thomas on 1 August 1945 and Garlon Mickles on 22 April 1947 (see at these dates).]

**Feb, 1944:** In late February, the Fourth Marine Division made the island of Maui its home. Maui had a population of about 40,000. Camp Maui was established at 500 meters above sea level on the side of the extinct volcano Haleakala. More than 3,000 meter high, the volcano attracted rain clouds which gave the island a fairly wet climate. Buildings went up for offices, tents for living quarters; mess halls were constructed and roads carved through the mire (i.e. swampy ground). At the peak in 1944, the number of troops stationed on Maui exceeded 100,000. The main base of the 4th Marines was in Haiku. (1940 Census, Website “The Fighting Fourth” at: <http://www.fightingfourth.com/Maui.htm>)

**Feb 24, 1944:** A civilian employed in the Navy Yard at Honolulu, Lloyd Duncan was involved in a brawl with two armed Marines at the Navy Yard. The military authorities arrested him; he was tried by a provost court and sentenced to 6 months imprisonment. (The Florida Bar Journal 76,30, November 2002)

[This case is well known because it was used to challenge the legality of military tribunals in Hawaii.]

**Mar 24, 1944:** An internee was killed by a sentry at the Tule Lake Segregation

center. James Okamoto, a Nisei who had never been in Japan was returning from a work assignment when he was shot by a guard at the front gate.

(<http://www.geocities.com/Athens/8420/shootings.html>)

[The same website mentions 7 other cases in which internees were shot and killed by sentries in various camps.]

**May 21, 1944:** An explosion of Landing Ships for Tanks (LST) in Pearl Harbor killed 127 men and injured 380. (Allen 1950, Chronology)

[As shown by the articles of the “New York Times” and of the “Times” given below at the date of 16 June, this news was published in newspapers three weeks after the explosion.]

**May 22, 1944:** Memorandum on military control by a local of the AFL Teamsters’ Union [excerpt]

The workers of Hawaii have been patient and have accepted the dictates of the Military Governor. Patience has ceased to be a virtue. Civilian controls over labor must be established in Hawaii. (Antony 1955, p. 44)

**Jun 7, 1944:** All wages and salaries in the Territory of Hawaii were frozen by the War Labor Board. The Territory had been exempt from wage stabilization under an order of the Board issued in October 1942. (NYT p. 9)

**Jun 8, 1944:** ● (29,10) Two Army B-25s collided over Kalihi (in Honolulu County) killing 11 civilians and 4 soldiers; 10 homes were damaged or destroyed.

(<http://www.hawaiianhistory.org>)

**Jun 16, 1944:** The Navy announced tonight that 27 men were killed, 100 are missing and 380 were wounded in the explosion which destroyed several small landing craft in Pearl Harbor May 21. (NYT p. 1)

**Jun 16, 1944:** ● (37,129) An explosion occurred at Pearl Harbor during a transfer of ammunition which killed 27 (19 civilians and 8 from the armed forces); 100 are missing. The Navy Department also announced that 3 men were killed on Sunday [i.e. 11 June 1944] by an explosion of an ammunition dump on Oahu island. It gave a list of 7 others who are missing. (Times p. 3)

**Jun 30, 1944:** Police records for Kauai Island indicate that between 30 June 1943 and 30 June 1944, the number of so-called “Part I offenses” (i.e. murder, rape, larceny, robbery and theft<sup>53</sup>) was equal to 175 which represented a multiplication by 2.5 with respect to the previous year. The 175 crimes correspond to an annual rate of 5 per thousand people<sup>54</sup>.

<sup>53</sup>Part II crimes comprised: drunkenness, prostitution, gambling, minor assaults, and traffic violations.

<sup>54</sup>Under the hypothesis of a similar rate for the whole Territory one gets an annual number of  $422 \times 5 \sim 2,100$  “Part



[These data raise two questions:

- How does the rate in Kauai compare with the rate in the United States?
- How can one explain the sharp increase?

It is not easy to respond to the first question because the notion of “Part I offenses” is not used in standard statistical publications for the mainland. In the “Historical Statistics of the United States 1975, p. 413” there is a distinction between violent crime (murder, rape, assault) for which the rate was 0.12% in 1957 (first year available) and property crime (burglary, larceny) for which the rate was 0.72%; together these two classes seem to include “Part I offenses” and represent a rate of 0.84%. In other words the rate of 0.5% in Kauai is comparable to the rate in the rest of the country.

Regarding the second question it can be observed that during this period the troops present on Kauai were shifted from the defense of the island to war theater training. The percentage of troops absent from camp increased considerably as a result and liquor violations, gambling and other crimes reached high levels.

In a somewhat cryptic sentence, Klass says that “law enforcement reached its lowest ebb when the all-drafted 98th Division was stationed in Kauai in 1944” which probably means that the frequency of crime was higher than ever. (Klass 1970, p. 24, 46)]

**Jul 1, 1944:** The so-called Renunciation bill was signed into law by president Roosevelt. It allowed Japanese Americans to renounce their citizenship. Of the 5,589 who renounced their citizenship, 1,327 were eventually expatriated to Japan [another source, Daniels (2002), gives instead 4,724].

Most of the other renunciants remained in the United States stripped of their citizenship as American aliens. At the Tule Lake Segregation Center almost all the Nisei became renunciants. One of them was Joe Kurihara who had served in the US Army in World War I. He tried to press camp authorities for better treatment, but got imprisoned in the stockade and beaten.

(<http://www.tulelake.org/history.html>; Kiyota 1997)

**Jul 17, 1944** Port Chicago (near San Francisco), California. A deadly munitions explosion that occurred at the Port Chicago Naval Magazine. Munitions detonated while being loaded onto a cargo vessel bound for the Pacific Theater of Operations, killing 320 sailors and civilians and injuring 390 others. Most of the dead and injured were enlisted African-American sailors. (Wikipedia article entitled “Port Chicago disaster”)

**Aug 1944:** The 4th Marine Division returned to Camp Maui after the Marianas cam-

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I” crimes.



paign. (Allen 1950)

**Aug 1944:** The Fifth Marine Division arrived at Camp Tarawa on Hawaii Island (see above Dec 1943) to train for Iwo Jima, their first action. The battle of Iwo Jima began in February 1945. (Allen 1950)

**Aug 9, 1944:** Servicemen and civilians involved in assaults and fights all over the town (Honolulu Star Bulletin 9 August 1943, cited in Allen (1950, p. 354)) [Similar riots occurred again in mid-November 1945. Whereas the latter were reported in the New York Times (see below) the one of August 1944 was not. This observation suggests that the fact that the 1945 riot was the only one to get broad coverage was due to the end of censorship rather than to the fact that it was exceptional or unique.]

**Aug 11, 1944:** President Roosevelt arrived in Honolulu on July 26 to confer with General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz. He spent 3 days in the islands. (Times p. 4)

[Note that this announcement is made more than two weeks after the event, probably for security reasons.]

**Sep 1944:** Irene <sup>55</sup> Harada, the wife of Yoshio Harada who played a prominent role in the Niihau incident, was liberated in August or September 1944. After being arrested upon their arrival on the island of Kauai, she had first been kept in custody at Waimea jail, then at the Kauai county jail, then she was transported to Sand Island and eventually to the Honouliuli camp near Waipahu on the island of Oahu. According to Allan Beekman (1982) who has had several conversations with her in 1971, 1972 and 1982, the authorities suspected her of being an agent of Japan and “went to great lengths to force her to talk”. In spite of being an American citizen by birth she was detained and treated as a criminal without being ever tried. At one point she refused to eat and the keepers had recourse to a minister to console her and awaken her desire to survive. (Beekman 1982, p. 116-119.)

**Oct 25, 1944:** The White House announced the suspension of martial law in the Hawaiian islands. (Times p. 3)

**Oct 25, 1944:** The Japanese government has informed the US government that a Japanese ship, the Hakusan maru, will leave Japan on October 28 and proceed to a Soviet port to pick up relief supplies sent by the United States and Canada. The supplies are intended for distribution to British, Canadian, American, Dutch and other Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees held by Japan. (Times p. 3)

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<sup>55</sup>Her Japanese first name was Umeno; there is a file concerning her under this name at NARA (Record Group 389, ARC identifier 900406) see Chapter 7.

**Nov 18, 1944:** Two Japanese and two Koreans who were fishing on a beach of Oahu island after curfew were fired upon by a patrol party. One of them was injured. (NARA 2)

**Nov 22, 1944:** There has been referred to this office an investigation to determine the activities of certain civilians suspected of being involved in aiding deserters from the US Army. For instance, a Japanese woman residing at 3533 Maluhia Street in Honolulu has been known to be pro-Japanese and to associate with members of the armed forces. (NARA 2)

**Nov 22, 1944:** Charles Orville Wiese was arrested by the Honolulu Police Department for taking pictures of a LST and various small vessels maneuvering off the Waitiki Beach area. A report of the incident has been forwarded to the FBI. The seized film is in the process of being developed. (NARA 2)

**Nov 25, 1944:** Because a soldier stationed in Hawaii was reported in February of 1943 to have made communistic remarks, investigation was begun concerning him. Observation in Hawaii and the development of leads on the mainland failed to establish any connection between him and the communistic party<sup>56</sup> or to indicate that he was subversively inclined. On 6 May 1944 he received the Legion of Merit for "exceptionally meritorious conduct". (NARA 2)

[This observation shows that the surveillance of alleged Communists was not discontinued even in February 1943 in the middle of the war. In this connection see also 16 December 1944.]

**Nov 25, 1944:** A CID report gives the name of 9 dual citizens about to be paroled (i.e. liberated under police supervision) from the detention center of Honouliuli. Along with the names, the report also gives the dates of their arrests. The shortest detention was 4 months, the longest was 23 months and the average was 12 months. (NARA 2)

**Nov 25, 1944:** A project was started to clarify the status of all Japanese of doubtful loyalty not previously investigated. Altogether there are approximately 10,000 such Japanese on Oahu. So far about 20 of them have been interrogated. (NARA 2)  
[This project is certainly in relation with the induction into the US Army of men of Japanese ancestry that is progressively implemented.]

**Nov 29, 1944:** A fire at the Jungle Training Center motor pool destroyed two trucks, a shed and miscellaneous spare parts. (NARA 2)

**Nov 29, 1944:** Masuo Sumida is a dual Kibei citizen. An investigation about him

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<sup>56</sup>For some reason the report says "communistic" instead of Communist party, perhaps because in November 1944 the United States was still an ally of the Soviet Union.

was asked by the Norfolk, Virginia office of the FBI to determine the possibility of disaffection or espionage. (NARA 2)

[Subsequent reports until 31 December do not give the result of this investigation.]

**Nov 30, 1944:** During November there were 11 inter-racial disorders among American troops on Oahu. Negroes were involved in all cases. (NARA 2)

**Dec 2, 1944:** The discovery and translation of the minutes of the meetings of the Shinto League on the island of Kauai for the period from January 1938 to May 1941 revealed the names of a number of Japanese not before known to be Shintoists. They are currently being investigated. (NARA 2)

**Dec 2, 1944:** At a pier in Honolulu Harbor recently a crew was to fill a deep well tank on an army transport ship with 55-gallon metal barrels when a soldier noticed half-pound blocks of TNT scattered throughout the hold. A count revealed that there were 261 of these blocks. (NARA 2)

[The report says that according to the CID, carelessness not sabotage was responsible. Yet, the report does not explain how such an amount of TNT has found its way into the hold of this ship.]

**Dec 4, 1944:** Hideichi Miyahira is a dual citizen who stated he is reluctant of being drafted and wished to return to Japan and to renounce his US citizenship. In a written statement he said that he would refuse to fire against Japanese soldiers even if ordered to do so. On the recommendation of the Preliminary Hearing Board a warrant was issued for his detention. He will be detained at Honouliuli. (NARA 2)

**Dec 5, 1944:** An investigation was started on the loyalty of Masaichi Arashiro, a dual citizen, because of adverse information contained in his "Personal History Declaration" whereby he was placed in Classification No 4 of the Central Identification Bureau. The following factors are considered adverse to the subject.

- 1 He received military training in Japan for two years and failed to report it to the Honolulu Police Department.

- 2 Born at Wahiawa (Kauai island) in 1918, he was sent to Japan in 1921 and stayed there until 1936. His entire education was received in Japan.

- 3 He does not speak English.

- 4 He has not aided the war effort by buying bonds.

- 5 In March 1944 he requested that his employer secure his deferment from service with the US Army.

- 6 He has been arrested for blackout violation.

- 7 He has two uncles who live in Japan.

The following factors are considered favorable to the subject.

- 1 He stated that he wants the United States to win the war.

2 His parents, 4 brothers and one sister are living in the Territory of Hawaii.

(NARA 3)

[The “Personal History Declaration” was a form initially filled by foreigners who wanted to enter into the United States. In spite of being a US citizen, Arashiro had to fill it in as part of his loyalty check.

It is likely that the practical organizational framework of such loyalty investigations provided a suitable model for similar investigations which were conducted after 1945 in Germany and Japan. The so-called “Fragebogen” (which means “questionnaire” in German) that all Germans had to fill in was the analog of the “Personal History Declaration”.]

**Dec 6, 1944:** Mary Shizuko Muraoka was investigated for a censorship violation. Because the subject is a juvenile of 15 years of age no further action is contemplated at this time. (NARA 2)

**Dec 9, 1944:** Military Intelligence issued memoranda reports on 3 sabotage cases which had been under investigation for a while. (NARA 2)

[The source does not provide these reports]

**Dec 9, 1944:** An enlisted man of the US Navy had a fight with an unidentified Japanese who defended the attack on Pearl Harbor. (NARA 2)

**Dec 9, 1944:** Ms. Chiyoko KODAMA who owns a photo developing shop has been fined for violating censorship regulations. (NARA 2)

[The source does not say which regulation was violated.]

**Dec 9, 1944:** In the midst of an ammunition dump at Schofield Barracks, an Ordnance employee, 22-year old William F. Gartrell exploded 20 igniting fuses and one fragmentation grenade. He had been inducted in the US Army on 15 August 1944. (NARA 2)

[The report says that he was intoxicated, yet he was able to climb a 3-meter high fence to get into this area.]

**Dec 11, 1944:** Jack Noble Iaea was charged in Federal Court with impersonating an officer of the US Army. (NARA 2)

[The source does not give information about the sentence.]

**Dec 16, 1944:** According to the most recent CID (Counter Intelligence Division) survey, there are 94 Communists in the Pacific Ocean Area on which CID has specific information. Their names with the information concerning them have been forwarded to Washington according to standard procedure. (NARA 2)

**Dec 16, 1944:** According to information ascertained by the 81st CIC (Counter Intel-

ligence Corps) Detachment the Japanese “label” their espionage agents by shaving their left arm-pit, tattooing a minute code there and then allowing the hair to grow again. (NARA 2)

[One may wonder what was the purpose of such labels. Would it allow spies and saboteurs to be treated as prisoners of war rather than as criminals?]

**Dec 16, 1944:** Intercept of letters written by American Japanese reveal bitter anti-American feelings. Thus, Kasuo Watanabe, a 34-year old Kibei who was apprehended in Hawaii on 27 November 1942 and evacuated to the mainland in March 1943, wrote: “Giving a pledge of loyalty to the United States is equal to treason to our country... I’m simply dumbfounded at the barbaric conduct of the USA”. (NARA 2)

[It should be noted that these sentences were certainly translated from the Japanese language; perhaps the translator had given them a stark tone that they did not have in Japanese?]

**Dec 16, 1944:** Another intercept of a letter written by an internee at the Tule Lake camp says: “The celebration of Meijisetsu (i.e. 3 November, Meiji’s birthday) was held in the main mess hall. There were 370 people and under the direction of a teacher we sang Kimigayo, the national anthem, and read the Imperial Rescript. We have two organizations: the Young Men’s Association and the Young Men’s Mother Country Research Association. The latter has a membership of 700. We have a lecture on Japanese history twice a month. The young men have petitioned to go back to Japan”. (NARA 2)

[The report observes that such celebrations reinforced Japanese nationalism.]

**Dec 23, 1944:** There are about 400-500 prostitutes in Honolulu; 30 are working together in the Komatsuya hotel<sup>57</sup>, 65 are working alone and in addition to these 100 professional prostitutes there are about 300 local girls who are amateurs. At the time the prostitution houses were still open there were 300 registered prostitutes and an estimated 200 non-registered professionals. What is known in the jargon of the trade as a “trick” costs from \$20 to \$50. (NARA 2)

**Dec 23, 1944:** Letters of soldiers from Hawaii now stationed at Camp Fannin, Texas mentioned that they had several brawls and fights with haole [i.e. from the mainland] soldiers. As an indication of the bitterness that was being engendered, one letter says that many Hawaiian soldiers want to get guns with bullets in them and go after some of the haole enlisted men. (NARA 2)

**Dec 24-25, 1944:** ●(38,129) **Race riot on an important Pacific Island.** For

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<sup>57</sup>At this hotel, Army, Navy and Marine officers were preferred customers although enlisted men were not completely excluded.

weeks a few Marines had been throwing bricks, empty beer bottles and upon three occasions hand grenades into camps occupied by Negro servicemen. On 24 December a group of white servicemen fired upon colored sailors and ran them out the main town on the island. On Christmas Day (25 December) one Negro serviceman was shot and killed and another was shot and injured by white servicemen. Twice the Negro soldiers attempted to go to town to take vengeance. The first time they were turned back; the second time they were arrested and charged with rioting. (NYT Jul 8, 1945)

[It is only in early July 1945 that these incidents were made public by the secretary of the "National Association for the Advancement of Colored People" (NAACP) after his inspection tour in the Pacific. Even at that time the article did not specify the location of the "important Pacific Island". In July 1945 the war was not yet at an end and the Pacific theater was still under military censorship. More precisions are given below.]

**Dec 24-25, 1944: Agana race riot in Guam.** In July 1944, the 3rd Marine Division took two weeks to recapture Guam from the Japanese Army. In the following months racial tension built up. Discrimination against blacks involved intimidation by whites who shouted racial slurs, threw rocks, and occasionally hurled smoke grenades from passing trucks into the cantonment area for black sailors of the Naval Supply Depot. During the riots two Black Navy men were shot dead.

(Wikipedia article entitled "Agana race riot")

[We mention this riot because it was very similar to those which occurred in Hawaii. It can be noted that there were similar race riots between US servicemen in Australia.]

**Dec 27, 1944:** An enemy alien Japanese, Yamane Kanekichi, was reported to have falsified his "Personal History Declaration" with the Central Identification Bureau. (NARA 2)

[Many other Japanese aliens were accused of having given incorrect information on their "Personal History Declaration". On average, such accusations of falsification occurred with a frequency of about 2 or 3 times a week; thus, in late 1944 Edward Inouye, Edward Murakami, Kenji Ito, Edward Imai, Saito, Nagaoka, Kageyoshi Koja, Tetsuichi Akagi were all accused of falsification. At this point we do not know whether or not they were sentenced as a result.]

**Dec 28, 1944:** There was an explosion and fire at Pier 17 in Honolulu Harbor. The investigation by CID did not reveal any evidence of sabotage but the investigation of the incident is being continued by the Office of Naval Intelligence. (NARA 2, Daily report of investigation 30 Dec 1944)



[This explosion was *not* reported in the New York Times.]

**Dec 30, 1944:** George Uehara, a 18-year old Kibei, was investigated after his brother was interned on 14 March 1944; previously his father had been interned on 7 August 1942 and paroled on the mainland on 27 August 1943. Uehara gave the names of 5 other Japanese who are being investigated now.

Uehara is a full US citizen as a result of his birth not having been registered with the Japanese consulate. In his statement he said: “I do not want to be inducted into the United States Army, as I do not wish to bear the arms against either the Japanese or the Germans. His two friends, Kiyoshi Nakasone and Susumu Tokuhara, similarly declared that they would refuse to go into the US Army. Nakasone and Tokuhara are Kibei who have spent at least 15 years in Japan.

All three are recommended for exclusion [to the mainland]. (NARA 2, Weekly Counter Intelligence Summary, week ending 30 December 1944)

[It can be noted that, as during the McCarthy era, the investigators want the person to cite the names of other persons who share the same opinion. In the present case, the interrogation of Uehara lead to 5 other persons.

If on average each defendant gives the names of  $s$  persons, after a series of  $k$  rounds of hearings the number of suspects will be  $S = s^k$ . In other words, as soon as  $s \geq 2$ ,  $S$  will increase very quickly. With  $s = 5$ , there will be  $S = 5^4 = 625$  suspects after only 4 rounds of hearings. Of course, some suspects may be named several times, an effect which will slow down the growth of  $S$ .]

**Dec 30, 1944:** In its first session since its establishment the Exclusion and Evacuation Hearing Board unanimously recommended Hideichi Miyahira, a 25-year old, Kibei of Honolulu be excluded. He is a Kibei who declared to be absolutely loyal to Japan and wishes to be repatriated [to Japan]. He had been in custody for one month awaiting hearing. Miyahira’s case now will come before the Intelligence Reviewing Board (composed of the heads of the three counter intelligence organizations here namely the CID, FBI and ONI). If, as is expected, exclusion is confirmed, he will be sent to the mainland and detained at Tule Lake. (NARA 2, Weekly Counter Intelligence Summary, week ending 30 December 1944)

[Located in northern California, Tule Lake was a “Segregation Center” where dissidents who would not pledge their loyalty to the United States were concentrated in order to be isolated from the rest of the Japanese American prisoners. The loyalty test was based on a questionnaire whose most critical section was constituted by questions number 27 (willingness to serve in the U.S. Armed Forces) and 28 (willingness to swear unqualified allegiance to the United States and forswear allegiance to any other nation or government) of the so-called “loyalty questionnaire”. The “Exclusion and Evacuation Hearing Board” was established in late 1944 by Special

Order 5 of the Military Commander.]

**Dec 30, 1944:** Flickering lights coming from a neon sign at the Hilo Theater recently attracted the attention of two soldiers. The two soldiers who are able to read Morse code picked up a message which either was gibberish or a code. The CID branch office on Hawaii island is investigating. (NARA 2, Weekly Counter Intelligence Summary, week ending 30 December 1944)

**Dec 30, 1944:** In Honolulu the CID validated 575 people for inter-island travel. 358 were validated on Maui, 125 on Molokai, 82 on Lanai, 176 on Hawaii and 400 on Kauai. (NARA 2, Weekly Counter Intelligence Summary, week ending 30 December 1944)

[This excerpt implies that even after the end of martial law inter-island travels were still restricted.]

**Dec 30, 1944:** During the week from 23 Dec to 30 Dec 1944 1,571 persons were apprehended; the detailed figures are as follows:

- 1,403 Japanese which represent 89% of the total (among them there were 878 aliens and 525 US citizens).
- 114 Germans (69 aliens and 45 citizens).
- 17 Italians (15 aliens and 2 citizens) (NARA 2, Weekly Counter Intelligence Summary, week ending 30 December 1944)

[Was this a “normal” or an exceptional week? In the first case it would mean that during the whole year some  $1500 \times 52 = 78,000$  persons, mostly Nikkei, were arrested; this was in addition to those on the West Coast who have been interned in 1942.]

**Dec 30, 1944:** During the week from 23 Dec to 30 Dec 1944, 380 persons were excluded or relocated on the Mainland all of whom were of Japanese descent (7 aliens and 365 US citizens). (NARA 2, Weekly Counter Intelligence Summary, week ending 30 December 1944)

[If one assumes the same weekly rate for other weeks in the period 1942-1944 one arrives at a total of about 60,000 persons excluded or relocated on the mainland. This is a fairly large number which needs to be confirmed.]

**Dec 30, 1944:** At this date the Counter Intelligence Division in Hawaii had under investigation:

- 18 cases of espionage
- 1 case of sabotage
- 63 cases of subversion
- 1 case of sedition
- 928 loyalty investigations

- 135 disaffection investigations

(NARA 2, Daily report of investigation 30 Dec 1944)

[One would need to know more precisely what kind of offenses are understood under these terms and a more detailed description of these cases; unfortunately, the source gives little details especially for the most serious cases.

No matter the precise definitions, the first three items in this enumeration show that the assertion (mentioned in chapter 1) according to which there was not a single case of espionage, sabotage or subversive activity is not correct.]

## 1945

### **Jan 12, 1945: Letter from the Governor of Hawaii to the Director of the Division of Territories and Island Possessions at the Department of Interior in Washington, excerpt.**

The [Hawaiian] censorship office is staffed with people whose honesty I would not question but leaks have been reported of confidential business information. You cannot make our objections too strong to the continuation of this censorship. In addition to other beneficial results this would free a large staff of able persons for badly needed help in other fields. (NARA 21)

[In spite of the wish expressed by Governor Ingram Stainback censorship will continue for almost one year, that is to say, some 14 months after the end of martial law in October 1944.]

**Mar 1, 1945:** Acting on behalf of the “Joint Army-Navy Disciplinary Control Board” military authorities in Honolulu put many amusement stores of the “Clip Town” area in downtown Honolulu “off limits” for servicemen. The move was ordered because these operators charged outrageous prices. [NARA 10]

[Unrest and troubles which occurred (or became known) later on suggest that, apart from the high prices, there may have been some other reasons.]

### **Apr 1, 1945: Special Orders No 12, excerpt.**

The office of the Postal Censor is established as a section of the Office of Internal Security under the Military Commander of Hawaii.

[Signed] By order of the Military Commander of Hawaii. WM. R. C. Morrison, Brigadier General. (NARA 21)

[The same special order contains similar provisions for the offices of the Cable and Radio Censors. When the decision became known in Hawaii the “Star-Bulletin” observed that this move was in fact in line with the executive order (No 9489) of 26 October 1944 which ended martial law in Hawaii. Yet, this provision of the order was generally overlooked at the time of its issuance. Gen. Richardson revealed its

intention to take control of censorship when he testified before the House of Representatives subcommittee of naval affairs (Star-Bulletin 20 and 21 March 1945).

This decision prompted Governor Stainback to write another letter (after the one of 12 January cited above) to the Director of the Division of Territories at the Department of Interior in which he stated that he does not see the reason for any censorship of communications in Hawaii (NARA 21).]

**Apr 1, 1945:** ● (38,131) Death of two Japanese from Hawaii, Shoichi Asami (51 year old) and his youngest son Harold (11) who were aboard a Japanese ship, the Awa Maru, sunk by an American submarine. The story of the Asami family, which is told in Knaefer (1991, chapter 2), is of interest because it illustrates the exchange of prisoners between the United States and Japan. It is summarized below.

- Shoichi Asami was arrested by two FBI men in his house in Honolulu around midnight on 7 December 1941. He was the managing editor of the Japanese section of the bilingual newspaper “Hawaii Times”.

- Months later the family of Mr. Asami (i.e. his wife and his five children) received a letter from him sent from a prisoner camp on the mainland. He wanted the family to prepare to leave because they were all to go to Japan with him on an exchange ship.

- In the fall of 1943 the whole Asami family left the United States aboard the liner Gripsholm. The voyage took them first to South America (Rio de Janeiro), then to Africa (Lourenço Marques in the Portuguese colony of Mozambique), Goa (India) and Singapore.

- Instead of continuing the voyage to Tokyo, the Asami family decided to stay in Singapore.

- In March of 1945 Ms. Asami and two of her daughters came back to Japan on board a hospital ship. Mr. Asami and his youngest son left aboard the Awa maru, a Japanese ship which had been used for the exchange of prisoners since June 1942. Marked with a special green-red-green pattern, the exchange vessels were to proceed unescorted and had to follow specified routes to their destination.

- In spite of the fact that the Awa maru was supposed to be given safe passage by Allied forces, it was hit by four torpedoes from the Queenfish, an American submarine, in the night of 1 April 1945 in the Formosa Strait. The safe-passage message which had been sent to all American submarines apparently had been discarded by the Commander of the Queenfish. The ship quickly sank with his 2,000 passengers. [It would be interesting to know how many Japanese from Hawaii returned to Japan in exchange vessels. For instance, it is known that 2,264 Japanese (permanent residents as well as citizens) from 13 Latin American countries were deported to Japan through of the exchange program.]

(<http://www.campaignforjusticejla.org/resources/pdf/hostageFAQ.pdf>)

**Jun 12, 1945:** James K. Apao was arrested by Military Police for smoking in a restricted area on Pier 40, Honolulu. About 40 meters from where Apao was smoking there was a quantity of explosives and ammunitions. Apao is a US citizen born and raised in Honolulu. He lives in House No 25 of the Palolo Evacuation center [Palolo is located about 6 kilometers east of Honolulu]. A sailor who was also smoking in the vicinity was apprehended at the same time as Apao. On 3 July the United States Attorney suggested that an administrative disciplinary measure be taken against him. (NARA 3)

[We do not know to which administrative disciplinary measure the Attorney referred.]

**Jul 11, 1945:** The curfew and blackout were maintained until July 11, 1945. However, it should be noted that the blackout did not apply to the port of Honolulu, to Hickam Airfield or to Pearl Harbor; throughout the war all these places were illuminated like Christmas trees. (Antony 1955, p. 59)

**Aug 1, 1945:** ● (40,131) Cornelius Thomas and Jesse D. Boston were executed at Schofield Barracks. (Wikipedia article entitled: “List of individuals executed by the United States military”).

[This article does not say on what charges they were indicted and sentenced, but one can find some additional explanations on the following website:

<http://www.honolulumagazine.com/Honolulu-Magazine/November-2008/Among-the-Tombstones/>

In the cemetery of Schofield Barracks there are the graves of 7 American soldiers executed for crimes of mutiny and murder.

Some details are given for 3 of them.

- Army Private Cornelius Thomas shot a dairy camp worker to death during a botched home invasion on Maui.
- Private First Class Jesse D. Boston was convicted of killing a Wailuku housewife.
- Garlon Mickles, a soldier accused of assaulting a female War Department employee on Guam was hanged on April 22, 1947.

None of these 3 cases has anything to do with mutiny but the source does not give any details for the 4 other soldiers.

However, another source, namely an article of the Honolulu Advertiser

<http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2001/Apr/22/ln/ln05a.html>

tells us that Herman Perry (one of the 4 other soldiers) was hanged on March 15, 1945, in Kalaikunda, India, for killing his platoon lieutenant while working on the

Burma Road with the 849th Engineers. This, of course, was mutiny.]

**Aug 16, 1945:** At about 15:00, an affray ensued between two Negro soldiers and two Caucasian sailors during which each of the two Negro soldiers resorted to the use of pocket knives. A Military Policeman was slightly injured. (NARA 4)

**Aug 23, 1945:** At 09:45 the employees of the gas production unit of the Honolulu Gas Company marched into the Iolani Palace Grounds and sat on the Palace steps. The employees who are members of the Gasoline and Oil Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, demanded a wage increase of about 10%. Two days later, after ratification of an agreement between the union and the company, they went back to their jobs. Gas started flowing back through mains at 9:00 on 26 August and by noon the service was restored in all districts. (NARA 4)

**Aug 24, 1945:** At about 19:35 two Caucasian soldiers and Negro civilians came to fight and were arrested. (NARA 4)

**Aug 28, 1945:** At about 20:30, a Negro soldier while walking with his wife was assaulted by four civilians. The civilians riding in an Army jeep called the soldier a "Black bastard" and attacked him. Two of the Caucasians were charged with assault and battery by Civil Police. The two other participants were not apprehended. (NARA 4)

**Sep 1, 1945:** By September 1945, the Counter Intelligence Corps in Hawaii had investigated 6,000 Army volunteers. In order to assess their degree of loyalty the CIC used the following criteria:

+1 if:

- using an Anglicized first name
- being a registered voter
- had married an American citizen
- had attended an American high school or college

-1 if:

- using a Japanese first name
- married a citizen from Japan
- had attended a Japanese language school
- was a fisherman

(Okihiro 1991)

[Another loyalty test was to ask whether the person would accept that his (her) name be used in pro-American propaganda either in Hawaii or in Japan (NARA 2).]

**Sep 1, 1945:** The case reports which were completed and closed in the week ending 1 September comprised: espionage (5), disaffection (7), subversive activity (13).



Results in all cases were negative. (NARA 4)

**Sep 6, 1945:** At 13:00 hours, union trucking and warehouse employees of Theo H. Davies and Company attended a work stop meeting and voted to go on strike. About 100 workers are already on strike. (NARA 4)

**Sep 8, 1945:** Honolulu. Increased fraternization of Japanese civilians with the Okinawa prisoners of war was reported. The Japanese civilians follow them and gather round the place where they work in attempts to converse with them and pass messages and gifts. This office has determined that several of the civilians so involved have strong adverse records. However, no subversive intent has been discovered. The increased fraternization apparently has been encouraged by a laxness on the part of the guards. (NARA 4)

**Sep 10, 1945:** A total of 106 employees of the Purity Inn and Ice Cream department of Dairymen's went on strike in a dispute over pay. On 11 September, 105 additional employees joined the strike bringing the total to 211. (NARA 4)

[The source does not say how the strike ended probably because it was still continuing on 15 September, the end of the period covered by this monthly summary.]

**Sep 14, 1945:** 18 alien internees from the Honouliuli Internment camp were released. Two of these requested and were refused immediate transportation to Japan. Only three local internees remain in custody on this island. There are three Kibei who have declared their intent to renounce their American citizenship and return to Japan. They are being held pending action by the Department of Justice. (NARA 4)

**Sep 15, 1945:** Illegal traffic in morphine, opium, marijuana and codeine sleeping pills has so increased in Honolulu during the war that police officials consider it a definite menace to the community. The marijuana is produced here by peddlers; morphine is placed in the life raft first aid kits and a number of syrettes have been stolen by persons having access to pneumatic rafts at army airfields. (NARA 4)

**Oct 13, 1945:** During the week from 6 to 13 October there were two incidents of fights between servicemen and local youths. One of them occurred in Honolulu and the other on the opposite side of the island. They have caused some comment in the local community. (NARA 4)

[The source does not give more information about the identity of the "local youths" or about possible casualties.]

**Oct 18, 1945:** Masao Akiyama, Mamoru Sadanaga and Gihei Yamamoto who are Hawaiian born Japanese filed a voluntary renunciation. Their expatriation will be accomplished after these renunciations had been approved by the Attorney General of the United States. (NARA 4)

**Oct 22, 1945: Letter from Secretary of the Interior Ickes to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal about the continuation of censorship in Hawaii, excerpt.**

I have recently been informed by a resident of Honolulu that the Navy Department will not permit the publication in local newspapers of the schedules of ship sailings. I should appreciate your informing me whether it is expected that the restriction will soon be lifted. (NARA 21)

[The fact that censorship was still in force 2 months after the end of the war suggests that it had more to do with local events than with the war. We do not know exactly when pre-censorship ended but, anyway, due to their magnitude the riots that occurred in mid-November were difficult to hide.]

**Nov 14, 1945: Honolulu. 1,000 Navy men rioted in Honolulu.** Patrols of military police enforced an uneasy peace in the Damon Tract residential district following a riot by 1,000 naval officers and enlisted men in retaliation for unprovoked attacks by civilian native Hawaiians. Armed with bayonets, rocks and hammers, naval personnel stormed through the streets for several hours last night and early today stoning houses and smashing at least two automobiles. 50 officers and men were arrested by city police but were released this morning and will be questioned by their superiors. The riot was touched off by servicemen's long-smoldering resentment against what they termed civilian hoodlums. Numerous soldiers and sailors have been waylaid, beaten and robbed. A naval air station spokesman charged that native policemen had failed to take appropriate action against offenders. He said that there were 30 beatings of sailors in October. These men last night heard that another sailor had been beaten and they decided to do something about it. (NYT p. 1)

[The fact that this incident is the first to be mentioned in the New York Times has probably more to do with the lifting of military censorship than with the actual course of events. More specifically if there were 30 incidents in October 1945, it is unlikely that there were none at all in the months before October.]

**Nov 14, 1945: ●(41,131)** Several hundred American sailors from the naval air base at Honolulu armed with bayonets, clubs, rocks and hammers rioted in the residential section of the city last night after one of their number had been fatally injured by a "gook" [disparaging term for an Asian person]. For weeks local hooligans have been assaulting sailors and soldiers. (Times p. 4)

[The NYT article does not mention that a soldier was *fatally* injured by persons of Asian descent (the inhabitants of Japanese ancestry made up 67% of the persons of Asian descent).]

**Nov 14, 1945:** Honolulu's "gooks" went into hiding today as armed shore patrols and police moved into the wrecked Damon Tract district to prevent a recurrence of

Monday night's mass rioting. (The Oelwein Daily Register 14 November 1945)

**Nov 15, 1945:** Account given by an Australian newspaper. Honolulu. Attacks on US servicemen by native civilian larrikins (Australian term for hooligan) led to a riot in the Damon Tract residential district in Honolulu, in which 1,000 Navy officers and sailors sought to avenge the killing of a sailor.

Armed with bayonets, clubs, and other weapons, the sailors ran wild for several hours, breaking windows and overturning motorcars, until dispersed by local police, and Army, Navy riot squads. 50 Navy men were arrested by civilian police, but released for questioning by their superiors.

It is said non-white civilians resent being called "gooks" by servicemen.

Among those detained by the police was Lieutenant Blair Coleman, of the Naval Air Station, who was mentioned by the police as having incited the men to "clean up the Damon Tract district"; also Lieutenant R. M. Singer, Press officer, who told reporters that Hawaiian natives stoned jeeps which contained Hawaiian girls out with servicemen. (The Argus, Melbourne, 15 November 1945)

[The article does not say if some civilians were killed. One would expect that fights involving rioters armed with bayonets may lead to serious injuries. This article says repeatedly that it was a problem between servicemen and the Hawaiian natives. But who exactly were these "Hawaiian natives"? The article calls Damon Tract a residential district. Was it a "good" residential district or a poor one? Some answers are provided in a biography written by B.J. Cayetano (2010) who was a native of this district. It turns out that the residents of Damon Tract were mostly fairly poor Filipinos. At that time, Hawaiian Filipinos had a reputation to be given to violence. In the 1950s a large part of the Damon Tract district became part of the new airport.]

**Nov 16, 1945:** Honolulu. Violence between servicemen and civilians flared anew today. Three large gangs of hoodlums attacked small groups of sailors in downtown Honolulu. Several Navy men were beaten so severely that they required hospital actions. Police said that a gang of 30 civilians waylaid two sailors while a gang of 10 attacked two seamen in a taxi lot in the downtown section. Somebody who witnessed the attack said the hoodlums jumped into a taxi and raced away before police arrived. (NYT p. 4)

**Nov 21, 1945:** Letter to Ernie Adamson, Committee on Un-American activities from Colonel William J. Hughes Jr, Assistant Chief of Military Justice Division complying with a request of 21 November 1945 to answer questions concerning martial law and detention camp internees.

- Q: Number of American citizens tried for serious offenses by military courts during martial law?

Answer: During the period of martial law there were approximately 55,000 cases tried by the provost courts. [In order to provide an estimate of the number of *serious* offenses Col. Hughes provides the following argument.] It would be a stupendous task to undertake a check of these 55,000 cases. The persons sentenced to one year or more were all detained at Oahu prison, thus by counting the numbers of detainees at Oahu prison one gets an estimate. This check indicates that there were only 200 persons sentenced to one year or more.

[This is a fairly fragile argument. It does not take into account the fact that some prisoners may have been transferred to other camps either in Hawaii or in the continental United States. Does the figure of 200 even represent the total of all those who passed through Oahu prison?]

- Q: How many US citizens were interned in Hawaii?

Answer: 617; among them 570 of Japanese ancestry.

- Q: How many death sentences were adjudged by military authorities in Hawaii under martial law?

Answer: 2; Bernhardt Otto Kuehn and Saffary John Brown.

(Papers of T.H. Green reel 1, frame 79)

[The statement about the number of death sentences is certainly not correct. The soldiers Cornelius Thomas and Jesse Boston committed their crimes in Hawaii and were executed at Schofield Barracks (see 1 August 1945) which means that they were certainly tried and sentenced in Hawaii by a military court. The following document

<http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2001/Apr/22/ln/ln05a.html>

from the Honolulu Advertiser gives some additional explanations.

Recently examined original documents at Schofield Barracks say that Boston was “executed by musketry” and Thomas was “executed by hanging”. Why this difference? They were tried by two different military commissions and each commission could recommend the method of execution.

**Dec 10, 1946:** Excerpt of General Orders No 91 (10 Dec 1946).

A “Meritorious Service Unit Plaque” has been awarded by the Commanding General, US Army Forces in the Middle Pacific to the 120th Replacement Battalion for outstanding devotion to duty in the performance of exceptionally difficult tasks on Oahu from 15 January 1945 to 30 September 1945. (NARA 22)

[What were these difficult tasks?]

## 1946

**Jan 22, 1946:** Thirty one Hawaii sugar plantations have agreed to pay \$1.5 million in settlement of violations of the Fair Labor Standard Act. Some 10,000 workers had

filed suit for non-payment of overtime and minimum wages. (Shanghai Herald p. 3)

**Feb 26, 1946:** Military courts established under martial law in Hawaii after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had no power to try civilians, the Supreme Court ruled 6 to 2 in an opinion taken as laying a broad precedent. (NYT p. 1)

[What impact had this decision on the remaining prisoners who were serving long terms? Charges against them were immediately filed in territorial courts and they remained in confinement. Not a single one of the hundreds of Japanese Americans interned in Hawaii sought redress in the courts after this decision (Allen 1950), Legal Affairs magazine, <http://www.legalaffairs.org>)

Another source (Green papers, reel 50) says that Secretary of War, Robert Patterson, instructed Military authorities in the Territory of Hawaii to release all individuals held as a result of any conviction by provost courts. After the decision of the Supreme court, he could hardly avoid such a step but it seems that his instructions were carried out only formally. The prisoners were released only to be charged again under a civilian tribunal.]

**Mar 3, 1946:** A Honolulu grand jury charged Jisho Yamashita, Japanese national, with disloyalty to the United States on the ground that as late as last October 1945 he was telling Japanese Americans that victory over Japan was nothing but American propaganda. (North China Daily News p. 3)

[Two remarks are in order:

- There is something bizarre in the fact that a Japanese national can be charged with disloyalty to the United States.

- Testimonies of Japanese people in Hawaii show that “shortly after Japan’s surrender, bizarre rumors started to circulate among the Issei that Japan had won the war and that the victorious Japanese fleet would be arriving at Pear Harbor to take over the Islands”. (Knaefler 1991, p. 22)

[See also below Sep 11, 1946]

**Mar 3, 1946:** The US Supreme Court ruled 6 to 2 that the provost court trials held in Hawaii following the attack of Pearl Harbor in December 1941 were unconstitutional. The martial law and total military rule were called an antithesis of American rights. Although martial law was terminated on 24 October 1944, the military courts continued to function until after V-J Day. Of the immediate results to be expected after the Court’s decision would be the release of those serving jail terms. What the effect would be on those who already served sentences or paid fines remained to be determined. (NYT The Week in Review p. E2, Israel 1967).

**Apr 6, 1946:** There were between 100 and 200 deaths in Hawaii after a seismic wave coming from Alaska hit the islands. Most of the known dead were at Hilo.



(Times p. 3)

**Apr 22, 1946:** Honolulu. Resenting an order a Japanese prisoner of war struck one of the guards who in turn hit them with a carbine butt. Thereupon the other POWs came to his help. The guards opened fire injuring two prisoners. (North China Daily News p. 2)

[This is the version of the guards; it would be interesting to know the version of the prisoners.]

**May 2, 1946:** Honolulu. Four Japanese have been arrested for displaying the Rising Sun flag in honor of Emperor Hirohito's birthday. (North China Daily News p. 6).

[This episode occurred after martial law had officially been lifted.]

**May 11, 1946:** Approximately 1,500 men, women and children of Japanese origin resident in Canada were repatriated this month from Vancouver. They voluntarily accepted repatriation some months ago when the government sought their views on the matter. It was found that about 4,000 expressed the wish to return to Japan. (Times p.3)

**Sep 11, 1946:** An article published in the "Far Eastern Survey" comes back on the rumors of Japanese victory that spread among Issei. The article is based on a report issued in the series "What people in Hawaii are saying and doing" published by the "War Research Laboratory", which is how the Sociology Laboratory of the University of Hawaii was relabeled during the war. The article emphasizes the following points (Hormann 1946)

- The rumors took several forms (i) President Truman had been flown to Tokyo to apologize personally to the Emperor for the atomic bomb. (ii) Admiral Halsey had been taken prisoner by the Japanese (iii) The arrival of the Japanese fleet at Pearl Harbor was imminent.

- Several religious and cultural movements were involved in the propagation of these rumors. One of the most popular organizations is Seicho-no-Ie (Home of infinite life and power), a movement which had reached Hawaii before the war but had not attracted a large following. The monthly meetings of Seicho-no-Ie were attended by several hundred people. The meetings have continued since V-J Day and there is little sign of abatement of interest. They often involve music and dance.

- Similar reactions have been observed elsewhere in similar circumstances. Whenever a group is threatened with annihilation it takes refuge in desperate attempts to maintain the group solidarity and existence. The phenomenon has been observed among aboriginal peoples whose culture and social organization have been disorganized by western civilization. The "Ghost Dance" religions among Plains Indians flared up in the period from 1870 to 1890 . Indians of several tribes were expect-



ing a messiah who would save them. Such movements are usually referred to as *revivalistic movements*.

**Nov 16, 1946:** The strike of the sugar workers which has lasted for 75 days is likely to come to an end. The workers' pay was raised 18 cents to 70 cents per hour but the union's demand for a union shop was not accepted. When the strike began on 1 September 638,000 of the 850,000 tons of the harvest was already harvested. (NYT p. 2)

## 1947

**Jan 27, 1947:** It has been announced that the repatriation operation has come to end.

- 3,411 Japanese were repatriated from Hawaii to Japan;
- 2,322 Ryukyans were repatriated from Hawaii to Okinawa;

Thus, if one adds together Japanese and Ruykyans, some 5,700 people from Hawaii were returned to Japan (inclusive of Okinawa).

- Moreover, some 2,600 Koreans were repatriated from Hawaii to Korea.

(NYT 9 January 1947, p. 2; Times 27 January 1947 p. 3)

[There are two questions concerning the Japanese repatriated from Hawaii.

- Are prisoners of war included in these data?
- Why does this article only mention Japanese from Hawaii and not people of Japanese ancestry from the continental United States?

The fate of Canadian Japanese may give us a clue for the answer to the first question (Kage 2004). In 1946 almost 4,000 Canadian residents of Japanese ancestry were exiled to Japan. The majority of them were Canadian citizens. The policy for the expulsion was defined by Prime Minister McKenzie King in a speech he made on 4 August 1944 at the House of Commons. In his speech he categorized Canadians of Japanese origin into two groups (i) Those who were loyal to Canada and were willing to comply with the policy of dispersion which in concrete terms meant that they had to move east of the Rockies. (ii) The Japanese Canadians who were unwilling to move to the east. Regarded as disloyal to Canada, they had to be sent "back" to Japan.

When the end of the war was in sight a loyalty survey of all residents of Japanese ancestry was conducted. They were asked (and encouraged) to give up citizenship and "repatriate" to Japan. Initially, over 10,000 chose to be exiled to Japan. When they heard about the difficult situation in Japan, about one half of them changed their mind and only 4,000 were removed to Japan in 1946.

Regarding the second question, it is known (see Daniels 2002) that 4,724 American

residents of Japanese ancestry were repatriated to Japan (3,065 of them were American citizens). Probably this figure does *not* include the 3,411 residents of Hawaii who were repatriated. There are two reasons for that.

- Hawaii was at that time a territory. For that reason, US statistics (for instance in the publication of vital statistics) of that time treat mainland states and Territories separately.

- Were the residents from Hawaii included in the figure of 4,724, they would constitute  $3411/4724 = 72\%$  of the repatriated. Among the repatriated there were many who renounced their American citizenship. Among the later at least 70% were Tule Lake internees. We do not know how many of the Tule Lake internees came from Hawaii. However, if one accepts that about one thousand Hawaii residents of Japanese ancestry were moved to the mainland, it is clear that there must have been at most a few hundreds at Tule Lake. In other words, they cannot make up a majority of the 4,724.

If this conclusion is correct, there were:  $4724 + 3411 = 8,135$  residents of Japanese ancestry who were repatriated to Japan.

**Apr 22, 1947:** ●(42,131) Garlon Mickles was executed at Schofield Barracks. (Wikipedia article entitled “List of individuals executed by the United States military)

[We do not know for what crime he was sentenced and executed.]

**Apr 29, 1947:** ●(42,132) Thirty prisoners at the stockade of Schofield Barracks attacked a lieutenant and 4 enlisted men as they were conducting a roll. Following the attack on the guards, the prisoners attempted to escape but were driven back by tear gas and gunfire during which one of them was killed. Prisoner Edward Perry of Oahu was shot through the head and killed by guards closing in on the prisoners. Among the 12 ringleaders who face a penalty of death there are 11 territorial residents. (NYT p. 18, Miami Daily News-Record, 2 April 1947, p. 11)

[Usually, such riots happen whenever prisoners are mistreated. The articles which reported this event just repeated the official military press release.]

**Nov 1947:** Six months after executive order 9835 was issued by President Truman<sup>58</sup>, the military authorities in Hawaii were in the process of screening 26,000 civilian employees of the Army and Navy. The Honolulu Advertiser had been carrying on an anti-communist campaign since 1946. (Holmes 1994)

**25 Nov 1947:** Dr. John Reinecke and his wife Aiko were dismissed from their teaching position in Honolulu on charges of Communist leanings. Asked by a Star-

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<sup>58</sup>Executive Order 9835 established a loyalty program in the United States which was designed to root out Communist influence within the various departments of the federal government.

Bulletin reporter if he was in fact a Communist, Reinecke replied “It is very well known that I share a number of opinions with the Communists but that does not mean that I am one.” (Richard Gladstein’s papers, Southern California Library for Social Studies and Research, Los Angeles)

[This dismissal marked the real start of a “Red Purge” in Hawaii. A similar purge which involved the large-scale screening of teachers and journalists started at about the same time in occupied Japan.

Actually, the governor of Hawaii, Ingram Stainback, had made the dangers of Communism a favorite speech topic since March 1947. In other words, Hawaiians enjoyed less than two years of peace of mind between war time loyalty investigations (which continued even after martial law was formally abolished) and the start of the campaign against labor unions and leftist groups by the FBI and other organizations investigating un-American activities.

After being dismissed in 1947, Reinecke was officially fired in 1948 before being indicted in August 1951 and sentenced in July 1953 (see below). Eventually, the sentence was overturned by an appeal court in 1958 and in 1976 the Hawaii Board of Education also overturned the firing.]

## 1948

After the attack on Pearl Harbor the Alien Property Custodian took outright possession of 42 corporations (including three Japanese-managed banks) and approximately 100 parcels of real estate. Some were sold, but in December 1948 the American government still held 17 corporations and 41 parcels of land. Under the War Claim Act of 1948 the proceeds from sale would be used in paying compensation to persons interned by the Japanese government. (Allen 1950)

**Oct 6, 1948:** Tomoya Kawakita, a 28-year-old dual citizen who renounced his US citizenship and during the war served as an interpreter in a Japanese prison camp, was sentenced to death by a tribunal in Los Angeles. (NYT p. 15)

Kawakita appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court, which heard it in April 1952. On June 2, 1952, the Supreme Court ruled to support the lower court’s judgment and confirmed Kawakita’s death sentence. However, President Dwight D. Eisenhower viewed the punishment as excessive and on October 29, 1953 commuted Kawakita’s sentence to life imprisonment. Ten years later, during the closing of Alcatraz prison where Kawakita was serving his time, President John F. Kennedy pardoned him on October 24, 1963 on the condition that he be deported to Japan and banned from American soil for life. (Wikipedia article entitled “Kawakita v. United States”.)

[As several hundred Nisei served in Japan during the war, it would be interesting to

know how many of them were tried and sentenced after 1945.]

## After 1950

**Apr 1950** The House Un-American Activities Committee began to hold hearings in Honolulu. 70 labor leaders were summoned to appear before this committee. Among them was Jack Kawano, the leader of the Honolulu International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU). He and 28 others refused to testify and were charged with contempt of Congress. (Star-Bulletin 18 October 1999)

**Jun 10, 1950** Hawaii is hoping for early ending of docks strike. On the west coast, the long-shore wage is \$1.82 per hour, whereas in Hawaii it is \$1.42 per hour. (NYT p. 14)

**Aug 28, 1951:** In synchronized raids at 6:30 in the morning the FBI arrested 7 leaders of the ILWU (International Longshore and Warehouse Union) and of the Communist party. Among them were:

- Jack Hall, the regional director of the ILWU
- Charles Fujimoto, the chairman of the Hawaii Communist Party and a chemistry professor at the university of Hawaii, along with his wife who was the ILWU secretary
- Former High School teacher John Reinecke (see above in 1947)
- The publisher and two employees of the newspaper “Honolulu Record”

They were indicted under the 1940 Smith Act by a federal grand jury on charges of conspiring to advocate the violent overthrow of the United States government.

(Honolulu Advertiser, 2 July 2006)

**July 4, 1953:** After a trial which lasted 7 months all the seven defendants except Eileen Fujimoto were sentenced to the maximum punishment of 5 years in prison. (Honolulu Advertiser, 2 July 2006)

[The defendants remained free while the appeal was pending and 5 years later the convictions were overturned. However, no compensations were offered for the financial losses and moral damages incurred as a result of this indictment.]

**Aug 12, 1955:** The Renunciation Act through which Japanese American could renounce their US citizenship was declared “null, void, and without legal effect” by the US courts. (Kiyota 1997)

## Incidents in internment camps

Investigating the situation in the internment camps on the Mainland is a natural con-

tinuation of the study concerning Hawaii because many people from Hawaii were transferred and interned on the Mainland. Once in these camps (either the relocation camps or the internment camps of the Department of Justice) they were mixed with internees from the Mainland which means that it becomes meaningless to make a distinction between the two populations.

“Incidents” is of course a fairly broad term. In what follows, we mainly concentrate our attention on incidents which resulted in death.

## **Symbols**

In symbols such as ●(2,3) the first figure corresponds to fatalities among American soldiers while the second gives the number of deaths among internees.

**Apr 9, 1942: ●(0,2) Fort Sill, Oklahoma.** A group of Hawaii Nikkei internees departed from Sand Island on 17 March 1942 and arrived to Fort Sill on 9 April 1942. Shortly after his arrival, Mr. Kisaburo Oshimo allegedly tried to escape and was shot dead. During the following night an internee from the Mainland died from a shock possibly caused by the first death. (These two fatalities are reported in the biography of Yasutaro Soga (2008, p. 57) but he was not a witness because he came to the mainland with a later group.)

**Jul 27, 1942: ●(0,4) Lordsburg internment camp, Southern New Mexico.** At 1:40 pm 147 internees from the Bismark Temporary Camp in North Dakota arrived at Lordsburg. Among them were H. Isomura and T. Kobata. As both were ill they were left behind at the station to wait for a car to take them to the camp which was 4 kilometers from the station. After the new internees arrived at the camp they learned that Isomura and Kobata had been shot dead. This triggered an uproar. It was explained that the two men had been shot after trying to escape. All internees agreed that the two men had been sick for a long time and would never have tried to escape. They asked for an autopsy to be conducted but the request was denied. A subsequent court-martial acquitted the soldiers who had committed the homicide. (Soga 2008, p. 78)

**Dec 6, 1942: ●(0,6) Manzanar Relocation Center, Central California.** On the night of December 5, six masked men beat Fred Tayama, the leader of the Japanese American Citizens League. Because it was a mouth-piece of the administration, this organization was despised by many. The leader of the Kitchen Workers Union, Harry Ueno, was arrested for the beating despite a lack of conclusive evidence. On the evening of 6 December there was a gathering of hostile protesters. Tear gas was used to break up the demonstration. Although no orders were given to shoot, soldiers fired into the crowd, and a 17-year old was killed and eleven others were wounded.

One of the wounded died later on December 11.

(<http://www.javadc.org/manzanar.htm>; the [www.javadc](http://www.javadc.org) websites are maintained by the “Japanese American Veterans Association”.)

**Late 1942: Jerome Relocation Center, Arkansas.** Jerome was the only site that reported shootings of internees by American civilians.

- A local farmer on horseback came across three Japanese-Americans on a work detail in the woods. Assuming that they were trying to escape, he fired and wounded two of the young men. Other scuffles were reported (no precise dates are given by the source)

- A contractors guard shot and injured three Nikkei boys who had thrown rocks at him.

- A Dermott farmer shot at a Japanese-American soldier who had been visiting relatives in Jerome.

The Jerome Relocation Center was closed on 30 June 1944.

([http://www.javadc.org/jerome\\_relocation\\_center.htm](http://www.javadc.org/jerome_relocation_center.htm),

**Apr 11, 1943: ●(0,7) Topaz Relocation Center, Utah.** A military policeman shot and killed James Hatsuaki Wakasa, claiming that the elderly Issei was trying to escape. Wakasa was walking toward the barbed-wire fence but unable to hear or understand the guards warnings. The accused guard was found not guilty and news of the acquittal was censored from the camp newspaper to avoid massive rioting.

([http://www.javadc.org/topaz\\_relocation\\_center.htm](http://www.javadc.org/topaz_relocation_center.htm))

**Nov 1-4, 1943: Tule Lake Relocation Center, Northern California.** Office of the Attorney General, Memorandum for the President, 10 November 1943.

Title: [Serious disturbances at Tule Lake](#).

500 Japanese internees armed with knives and clubs shut up Dillon Myer [War Relocation Authority director from 1942 to 1946] and some of his administration officers in the administration building *for several days*. The Army moved in to restore order. (The Internment of Japanese Americans, Records of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (FDRL1), reel 3)

[This is an official account. Nevertheless, the versions which were published subsequently do not say that Dylon Myer was kept confined in the administration building *for several days*. Some accounts even deny that the internees were armed with knives and clubs. Was the report of the Attorney General an overstatement? It seems unlikely.]

**1944: Heart Mountain, Wyoming.** After the War Department decided to draft Japanese-Americans directly from the camps, there was an organized resistance to the draft at the Heart Mountain camp. This action led to the largest mass trial in



Wyoming history. In July 1944, 63 Japanese-Americans were convicted and sentenced to 3 years in federal penitentiaries. Yet, more than 900 men and women from Heart Mountain (i.e. 9% of the population of the camp) did serve in both the Pacific and European theaters. Of those, 20 were killed in action.

([http://www.javadc.org/heart\\_mountain\\_relocation\\_center.htm](http://www.javadc.org/heart_mountain_relocation_center.htm))

**Spring 1944:** ● (0,9) **Tule Lake Relocation Center, Northern California.** In the spring of 1944, an internee was shot and killed during an altercation with a guard and the general manager of the Business Enterprise Association was found murdered.

([http://www.javadc.org/tule\\_lake.htm](http://www.javadc.org/tule_lake.htm))

**Mar 24, 1944:** An internee was killed by a sentry at the Tule Lake Segregation center. James Okamoto, a Nisei who had never been in Japan was returning from a work assignment when he was shot by a guard at the front gate.

(<http://www.pbs.org/childofcamp/history/timeline.html>.)

[This episode is probably the same as the previous one.]

## Chapter 5

# Quantitative evidence

### Provost courts

Our general objective is to understand the relations between the population of Hawaii and the troops. For instance one would like to know the frequency of the brawls or riots between servicemen and residents or between white and black servicemen, the number of illegal strikes, the number of persons tried for acts of sabotage, the number of residents killed by sentries, and so on and so forth.

The data from provost court trials in Fig. 5.1a are not detailed enough to give a precise picture.

Two kinds of sources would possibly provide more precise answers. (i) Records of provost court trials giving a fairly detailed description of charges (ii) G-2 or internal security reports that describe incidents. So far, we were only able to find such reports for the period after November 1944 (NARA 2).

In other words we are not in a position to give a definite picture of the relations between troops and residents.

### Activity of the Hawaiian Alien Processing Center

This department was organizing “hearings” in order to decide whether or not people should be interned for the duration of the war. In spite of its name this department processed American citizens as well as aliens. For instance, during the first semester of 1942 this board had the activity summarized in the table below. (Source: Papers of Major General Thomas H. Green, reel 2):

If, just in order to get an order of magnitude, this activity rate is extended to the 7 semesters of the war one gets a number of people interned of the order of:  $600 \times 7 = 4,200$

### Response to registration for military service

Our objective here is to provide broad information about the response of Japanese

TERRITORY OF HAWAII  
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR  
IOLANI PALACE  
HONOLULU, T. H.

28 February 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: Thomas H. Green, Brigadier General, AUS.

SUBJECT : Report of the activities of the Legal  
Section for the period December 7,  
1941 through December 31, 1942.

PROVOST COURT

CASES REVIEWED

Col. Neal D. Franklin, JAGD. PC #1, Honolulu	10,199
Lt. Col. John R. Hermann, INF., PC #2, Honolulu	7,048
Lt. Col. Thomas N. Griffin, INF., PC #2, Honolulu	1,468
Major Samuel E. Murrell, JAGD., PC #3, Honolulu	93
Col. James F. Hanley, JAGD., PC #4, Honolulu	447
Hawaii	1,888
Honolulu	8,611
Kauai	1,227
Lanai	218
Maui	1,268
Molokai	218
Palmyra Island	1
Pearl City	1,333
Schofield Barracks	<u>1,704</u>
Total Provost Court Cases Reviewed.....	35,723




-1-

**Fig. 5.1a** Number of reviewed provost court trials in 1942. Whether or not all cases were reviewed or only selected cases is not yet clear. Whatever the answer, the numbers given above can be used in a relative sense. The 6 courts in Honolulu represent 78% of the total number of cases while the 8 courts of Oahu (which also include Pearl City and Schofield Barracks) represent 86% of the total. So far, we were not able to find similar data for 1944. *Source: The papers of Major General Thomas H. Green, reel 14, frame 241. Available at the NDL, call-number: YF-A15*

Americans during the war both in Hawaii and on the mainland.

The first observation concerns the response made by the two populations to induction



**Fig. 5.1b** Number of provost court trials per month. So far, we were not able to find similar data for the period after May 1943. *Source: Papers of Major-General Thomas H. Green: reel 14, frame 241. Available at the NDL, call-number: YF-A15*

**Table 5.1: Persons examined and interned**

	Persons examined	Interned	Percent interned
Aliens	670	602	90%
American citizens	301	265	88%
Dual citizens	232	212	91%
Non dual citizens	69	53	77%
<b>Total (Jan-Jun 1942)</b>	<b>670</b>	<b>602</b>	<b>90%</b>

in the armed forces. There were three steps in this process.

- In March 1942, the army (illegally) reclassified the Japanese Americans as enemy aliens (category IV-C).
- In January 1943 Japanese Americans were nevertheless allowed to volunteer for military service.
- In January 1944, the draft was re-instituted for all Japanese Americans.

In January 1943, the army decided that induction would be preceded by a screening procedure. To this effect all Japanese Americans over the age of 18 were to fill in a questionnaire. Question number 28 was particularly controversial:

“Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faithfully defend the United States from any attack by foreign or domestic

forces, and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor or any other foreign government power or organization?"

These were strong words. Was it really necessary to forswear allegiance to the Japanese emperor before going to Italy to fight the Germans? Most probably the phrasing of this question responded to a different agenda, namely severing the ties between Japan and the Japanese American many of whom, one should remember, had dual citizenship. The fact that the War Department was not really eager to send them to Europe can be seen from the fact that they arrived in Europe only in May 1944, that is to say almost one year and a half after being inducted (Kimura 1988, p. 233)<sup>59</sup>.

On the mainland there were about 120,000 people of Japanese descent. Of these 60,000 were US citizens; 19,000 were eligible for draft (i.e. between the age of 18 and 38) within the War Relocation Authority Centers and approximately 4,000 outside the centers in the parts of the countries which were not considered as military zones<sup>60</sup>. About 1,500 Japanese American volunteered<sup>61</sup>. This gives a response rate of  $1500/23000 = 6.5\%$ .

In Hawaii, there were about 30,000 American Japanese eligible for the army and of these 9,500 responded positively (Kimura 1988, p. 232) which gives a response rate of  $9500/30000 = 32\%$

6.5% against 32%: does it make sense to compare these figures? Not really. The situations of the two communities were fairly different. (i) Most of the mainland American Japanese were in relocation centers (ii) Because Hawaii was much closer to Japan than was California one would expect the Japanese Americans in Hawaii to keep stronger links with Japan than those in California<sup>62</sup>(iii) Above all one would need to know if the registration was conducted in the same way in Hawaii as on the mainland. For instance was the insistence on question 28 quite as strong in the two cases?

### **Response to draft**

Although draft of Japanese-Americans was introduced in January 1944, all men were not called at the same time. As a matter of fact we do not know how many were called

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<sup>59</sup>The 100th Battalion was formed earlier mainly from members of the Hawaii Territorial Guard who had been dismissed on 19 January 1942, but even in this case the delay between induction and combat was about 15 months. It is often said that the 442nd Regimental Combat Team which eventually absorbed the 100th Battalion was the most decorated of all US units, but it must be kept in mind that this ranking holds only if one takes into account the size of the unit which was small and its length of service which was short.

<sup>60</sup>These figures are given on the website: <http://archive.japantoday.com/jp/bbs>. Muller (2001, p. 39) gives different data, namely that there were only 10,000 eligible for the army on the mainland. This figure is given without making a distinction between the Japanese who were in relocation centers and those who were not. In a general way, Muller's goal is to provide a qualitative account rather than a truly quantitative description.

<sup>61</sup>The two sources cited in the previous footnote agree on this figure.

<sup>62</sup>A shorter distance meant a journey which was less expensive and could therefore be done more frequently.

up. We do not even know with reasonable accuracy how many Japanese Americans served in the army<sup>63</sup>. A statement found on the Internet says that there are 16,000 names of Nisei on the Nisei War Memorial in Little Tokyo (Los Angeles). The historian Roger Daniels (2002) says that 25,000 served in the military whereas an article published in the New York Times (12 November 1995) says there were 33,000.

In other words, at this point it is impossible to compute a response rate with any reasonable accuracy.

One observation that can be made is that the Japanese-Americans who served in the 442nd Regimental Combat Team numbered 5,200. These there were 2,600 volunteers from Hawaii, 1,200 volunteers from the mainland and 1,400 who constituted the 100th Battalion and who came also from Hawaii. This leads to the following remarks.

- Volunteers from Hawaii constituted  $(2600 + 1400)/5200 = 77\%$  of this unit.
- This famed unit constituted only about  $5200/30000 = 17\%$  of the Japanese-Americans who were drafted. One knows that as many as 5,000 served as interpreters in the Pacific War and later in the occupation of Japan.

### Draft resisters

According to Roger Daniels (2002) “293 young men were indicted for draft resistance while in camp<sup>64</sup>”.

However this figure provides only a partial picture of draft resistance. There are mainly two reasons for that.

- This number covers only American-Japanese who were still in relocation camps in early 1944. But by this time, the War Relocation Authority had already released tens of thousands of detainees to work or attend school provided they do not return to the forbidden zone in the west (Daniels 2002). Moreover, this figure leaves out the population of Hawaii. One would need to know how many draft resisters there have been in these two populations.

- It is known (see Daniels 2002) that 5,766 Japanese-Americans renounced their American citizenship and applied for expatriation to Japan<sup>65</sup>. However, it is often said that according to War Relocation Authority records, 13,000 applications were filed requesting abandonment of US citizenship and expatriation to Japan<sup>66</sup> and that the above figure of 5,766 merely corresponds to the number of applications that have been processed by the end of the war. If this interpretation is accepted, it would of

<sup>63</sup>It should be noted that neither the Navy nor the Air Force had been willing to induct Japanese-Americans

<sup>64</sup>261 were eventually sentenced and served time in federal penitentiaries

<sup>65</sup>It is often said that these Japanese-Americans had dual citizenship which means that in the days after their births they had been registered by their parents at the Japanese consulate. However, there have been cases of Japanese-Americans who did *not* have dual citizenship nevertheless renounced to their citizenship thus becoming stateless persons. One example is given in the biography written by Minoru Kiyota (1997)

<sup>66</sup>This statement can be found in “Friends of Historical Accuracy regarding the ethnic Japanese Evacuation of 1942, 23 June 2005; however the primary source, namely the reference of the War Relocation Authority record is not given.



course be most interesting to know the origin of these 13,000 applications. Did they originate mainly from the mainland or from Hawaii?

Obviously, renouncing to American citizenship was a way to refuse military service. But then one would like to understand why only 293 were indicted out of a total of more than 5,000.

A last facet of the question of expatriation needs to be mentioned. Expatriation is an act by which citizens can renounce to their citizenship. Thus Japanese-Americans who had dual citizenship could renounce either to their Japanese or to their American citizenship<sup>67</sup>. For that reason it is not always clear how the term “expatriated citizen” should be interpreted. The correct interpretation relies on the context. Thus, in the Weekly Counter Intelligence Division Summary of 30 December 1944 (NARA 2) one reads:

- “Kiyoshi Nakasone, 21-year-old expatriated citizen, would refuse to go into the United States Army. He lived in Japan from the age of 2 to 16. His only reason for expatriation was to aid himself financially. He was interested only in making money and returning to the Orient.” From this description, one would infer that Nakasone renounced his Japanese nationality.

- “Richard Mitsuo, 33-year-old expatriated citizen, former officer in Japanese societies, who is very little Americanized and has been reported by some as emperor-worshipping and favorable toward Japan”. It is unclear what should be the correct interpretation of “expatriation”.

Expatriation can also occur as a punishment. Congress has ruled that service in the army of a foreign country is a cause of expatriation<sup>68</sup>. The constitutionality of this legislation was upheld by the Supreme Court in the *Marks v. Esperdy* case in 1964. If strictly applied, this law would also have concerned US citizens who served in *Allied* forces in World War I and II. For that reason Congress explicitly set these two cases apart. But this exemption does not extend to other conflicts. Current law<sup>69</sup> provides that US citizens who accept an employment under a foreign government

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<sup>67</sup>There were even cases of people who first renounced to one and then to the other. One example is Tsuyoshi Iwamoto. He was born in 1916 in Hawaii. As his birth was registered with the Japanese government he had dual citizenship. He was educated in Hawaii until the age of 18 when he went to Japan. He was a baseball star and with his team he visited Hawaii in July-August 1940. While there he expatriated himself because he had the intention of returning to Hawaii after graduation in Japan. Thus, he returned to Japan on his American passport and once in Japan he registered as an alien as required by Japanese law. In June 1942 he was visited by the military police who called him a traitor. Under this pressure on 27 July 1942 Iwamoto applied to the Ministry of Home Affairs for recovery of his Japanese nationality, a request which was granted on 21 September 1942. According to his testimony he did not formally renounce to his American nationality but after the war US Courts ruled that his action was equivalent to “voluntarily expatriating himself”. For more details see: *Tsuyoshi Iwamoto versus John Foster Dulles*, case No 15441, US Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

<sup>68</sup>Expatriation is different from denaturalization. The first applies to citizen born in the United States, whereas the second applies to persons who were born abroad and acquired US citizenship by naturalization. There is a table in Chapter 6 which shows that there were well over one hundred denaturalizations during World War II.

<sup>69</sup>Bettwy (S.) 1992: Assisting soldiers in immigration matters. *The Army Lawyer*, April, p. 3-18.

thereby forfeits their citizenship.

These are the broad rules about expatriation, but it should be noted that there have been dissenting opinions. Thus, in a ruling of 12 September 1951, the US District Court of Hawaii ruled that Congress could not deprive a native (as opposed to a naturalized) citizen of his citizenship for the reason that he had served in the Japanese armed forces. This issue was of great importance at that time for it concerned several thousands American-Japanese who had served in the Japanese armed forces during the war. According to this ruling, it is only by fulfilling a Japanese procedure of naturalization involving renunciation to US citizenship that a Japanese-American could lose his (her) US citizenship. At this point, it is not clear which of these conflicting views prevailed in the cases which arose in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

## Chapter 6

# Espionage and sabotage

Although the present report is about Hawaii, for this chapter we will extend the geographical area under consideration to the mainland. There are two main reasons for doing this.

- As we have seen in the introduction, the statement that there have been no acts of espionage or sabotage by Americans of Japanese ancestry has been made not only for Hawaii but also for the continental part of the United States.
- Censorship regime was lighter on the mainland than in Hawaii. Therefore it will be easier to document what happened on the mainland. Generally speaking during the war acts of sabotage were indeed reported by newspapers albeit not with much details.


## Sabotage

Basically, there are two different methods which can be used in order to investigate disasters (explosions, fires, train crashes) due to sabotage.

- The first method consists in trying to find out which ones of these conflagrations were labeled as being due to sabotage after investigation by the FBI.
- The second method consists in recording the number of conflagrations during the war years and then to compare these figures to peace time data.

By using the first method we would be confronted with two difficulties. Whether or not one believes the FBI to be a reliable source, it is never a sound methodology to rely on only one source. As a matter of fact, it will be seen below that after 1943 the FBI had a strong tendency to attribute the conflagrations to accidental causes rather than to sabotage even before any serious investigation was conducted.

A comparison with World War I is quite instructive. First, it shows a similar pattern for the two wars (see Fig. 6.1). What makes the comparison with World War I particularly interesting is the fact that several saboteurs were tried as German agents. In other words during World War I it was officially recognized that there had been acts of sabotage directed by the enemy. It is true that especially in the first years of World War I there was also a tendency to attribute many explosions to accidental causes



**Fig. 6.1 Explosions in US defense factories during World War I and World War II.** The vertical scale on the left hand side refers to the numbers of explosions during the 4th quarter of each year of World War II; the vertical scale on the right hand side refers to the annual numbers of explosions during World War I.

The quarterly and yearly numbers have been obtained through a key-word search in the articles of the New York Times and of the Times of London.

Why does the number of explosions decrease after 1917 and after 1941? Under the assumption that a substantial proportion of them were due to sabotage, there are two reasons. (i) The expulsion of the personnel of Axis embassies and consulates deprived the saboteurs of their support network (ii) After the United States entered the war, censorship (including self-censorship) did not allow explosions to be reported so freely as before. For more details about some of these explosions see the chronology section. *Sources: New York Times and Times of London.*

even before investigations were started. Several cases of this kind are cited in the chronology. The fact that a majority of these “accidents” were in reality due to sabotage was revealed by an Austrian publication of January 1939 which stated that at least 21 ammunition factories had been destroyed by saboteurs acting on instructions of the German High Command (for more detail see the chronology below).

## J. Edgar Hoover’s mantra

We use the word “mantra” because the statement that we discuss below has been repeated in all and every news conference by Edgar Hoover as well as by his aides. Even nowadays, it can be read on the website of the FBI.

Before discussing their meaning, let us cite some typical examples of such state-

# Preventing Sabotage Called Possible and Necessary

Recent Incidents and Those Prior to the Last War Are Recalled to Show How Urgent It Is for Us to Take the Measures Required to Control It

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

On Sept. 12, 1940, the smokeless powder plant of the Hercules Powder Company at Kenil, N. J., blew up. Smokeless powder was a serious defense bottleneck. The total American production was adequate to supply an army of only 100,000 men in battle, and Hercules was the major production unit. This bottleneck, seriously aggravated by the Hercules explosion, was not corrected until May, 1941, when the new factory at Charlestown, Ind., went into production. At Kenil fifty-two men were killed and fifty seriously injured.

There was no proof of sabotage, said the police. There was no proof of anything except that this important plant was gone and that half a hundred trained explosive operatives had been liquidated. One convenient thing about an explosion is that it ordinarily destroys the circumstantial traces of how it happened and silences the tongues that could tell the story. After the Black Tom and Kingsland explosions of 1916 and 1917 it took ten years of investigation to get the key evidence showing that these were German sabotage jobs, and it took twelve more years to prove it to the satisfaction of the German-American Mixed Claims Commission. Only in 1939 were damages awarded to the claimants.

## Axis Ships Damaged

In the night of March 29-30, 1941, United States authorities took possession of thirty ships of the European Axis powers lying in American ports. Twenty-seven of these had been put out of commission by the use of sledge hammers, acetylene torches and hacksaws on their engines, boilers and propeller shafts. They are now clogging American shipyards which have better work to do. There was no doubt about sabotage in this job. It had been ordered by the Italian naval attaché, sitting at his desk in Washington under the protection of diplomatic immunity. His recall was demanded by the President.

In the night of May 31-June 1, 1941, a fire on the Jersey City waterfront wiped out \$25,000,000 worth of docks, warehouses, freight cars, grain elevators, livestock and food supplies, including much material destined for Great Britain. Some workmen stated that the fires "seemed to break out in several places at once." But the Chief of Police of Jersey City said: "Put any sabotage ideas out of your mind."

On June 1, at the Boeing aircraft plant at Vancouver, B. C., just the other side of the unfortified frontier, the administration building and the center portion of the assembly plant were destroyed by fire, together with a hospital and construction equipment. Definite proof exists that Canadian sabotage

nated agencies, the FBI, Naval Intelligence and Military Intelligence. But you would also know that they face an impossible task. They must spread their protection thin over the whole sprawling structure of American industry and its warehousing and transportation facilities. You, on the other hand, would realize that you can choose your point of attack and concentrate upon it. You would go happily on your destructive way, operating through embassies in Washington which have the protection of diplomatic immunity, and thoroughly enlarged consular staffs in the industrial areas.

## What Happened Last Time

We can stop this. To understand how this can be done it is necessary to examine the story of sabotage in the last war. We have the authentic blueprint as to how destruction was organized from 1914 to 1917. It all came out before the German-American Mixed Claims Commission through documents admitted to be genuine by the German Government and through witnesses who proved to be unimpeachable. Having the blueprint, we have the knowledge to prevent a repetition, if we will.

During the old neutrality period acts of sabotage were matters of almost daily occurrence. The destruction of Black Tom Island on July 30, 1916, and of the munitions assembly plant at Kingsland, N. J., on Jan. 11, 1917, were merely the largest figures in a tragic pattern of disaster. For example, in a period of six weeks commencing Jan. 10, 1916, there were three explosions in du Pont plants, one in a Bethlehem projectile plant, one each in munitions plants at Bridgeport, Conn., and Bound Brook, N. J.; two bomb explosions in ships bound for Europe, two unexplained ship fires and two cases in which bombs were discovered in ship cargoes before they exploded.

Did the German Government really give directions for sabotage in the United States during the neutrality period, or is that just supposition and an old wives' tale? Before the Mixed Claims Commission Germany admitted the genuineness of the following telegram, dated Feb. 26, 1915, from the German Foreign Office to the embassy in Washington:

"For Military Attaché. People fit for sabotage in United States and Canada can be ascertained from the following persons: . . . In United States sabotage can reach all kinds of factories for war deliveries; railroads, dams, bridges must not be touched there. Under no circumstances compromise embassy, and equally Irish-German propaganda."

The last sentence requires no comment.

disbursed more than \$30,000,000 for sabotage, espionage and propaganda.

To discover the junior executives of the sabotage organization, one has only to call the roll of the German and Austrian consulates in the industrial areas. There was Franz von Bopp, German Consul in San Francisco, who headed the organization on the Pacific Coast. He was convicted in Federal court of complicity in blowing up a powder barge in Seattle harbor.

## Organization Was Elaborate

There was Alexander Nuber von Perked, Austrian Consul General in the metropolitan area. His activities became an open book due to the activities of a Czech disciple of Masaryk who was employed in his office. Under his direction worked Captain-Lieutenant Franz von Rintelen, who, as to munitions intended for the Allies, assured the general staff: "I'll buy up what I can and blow up what I can't." Under Nuber's direction there was organized, on board the Friedrich der Grosse, tied up at a pier in New York Harbor, a factory for the manufacture of bombs and incendiary devices.

Connected with the German consulate in Baltimore was Frederick Himsch, a former captain in the employ of the North German Lloyd. He drew up a list of the munitions plants slated for destruction. He found and placed Wosniak, who did the huge Kingsland munitions assembly plant job in January, 1917. His specialty, however, was inoculating with disease germs shipments of horses and mules to the Allies.

Let us recapitulate. Sabotage was ordered from Berlin. It was organized by the German military and naval attachés. It was financed through the German commercial attaché. Its junior executives were the German and Austrian consular staffs.

Now add one more fact. When the German and Austrian Embassies and consulates were expelled upon our declaration of war in April, 1917, sabotage stopped dead. This type of activity requires an intricate and extensive organization and it takes lots of money. Cut off its executive head and deprive it of its funds and it is paralyzed.

At the present time the Axis embassies have kept their staffs intact. Their consulates have maintained their personnel or increased them, some as much as 400 per cent. Why? The diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany consist of Herr Hitler and President Roosevelt taking to the air at irregular intervals and calling each other names. Commercial relationships between the two countries are non-existent.

On Jan. 4, 1941, THE NEW YORK TIMES carried a news item to the effect that

Fig. 6.2 a Excerpt from the New York Times of 8 June 1941 (section "editorials of the week", p. E8). The three columns are continued in Figure 6.2b.



was organized on American soil in 1915 and 1916.

On June 2 a four-motored Consolidated bomber being prepared for delivery to England crashed into San Diego Bay. The controls jammed. A spokesman for Consolidated stated that the controls could not jam unless they had been tampered with. The loss: \$250,000, 70,000 highly skilled man-hours, four test employes killed, one seriously injured. Nor is this the first time a carefully built, minutely inspected, skillfully operated unit of the American warplane production has crashed into the sea or into a mountain side.

#### More Harm Anticipated

No one can doubt that we are in for more of this unless something is done and done quickly.

Of course, we are in for it. Try to think German for a minute, as Daniel Boone used to think Indian. Put yourself behind those broad windows at Berchtesgaden, where the conquest of Europe has been planned. You have had considerable experience with the workings of the mind of the conqueror of Europe. You have seen him in action for eight years, two of them war years. If you were that man, would you sit idly by while the United States becomes the arsenal for the democracies, while it manufactures planes and tanks and shells and guns for no reason in the world except to be used against you? You certainly would not.

If you could—and the record of this war and the last shows that you can—you would incite strikes, blow up the armament plants, set ablaze the products of the factories, destroy the bombers and their personnel, obstruct transportation to the seacoast and plant bombs aboard the ships that carry supplies across the Atlantic.

You would know that you were opposed by three competent and coordi-

#### Money Paid to Saboteurs

Who were the executive heads of the sabotage organization? The military attaché to whom the above wire was addressed was Captain Franz von Papen, later Hitler's Vice Chancellor, now Hitler's Ambassador to Turkey. He was the head of the sabotage organization on land. We know that, thanks to a stupid mistake of his own. His recall was demanded by President Wilson in 1915. The British gave him a personal safe-conduct through the blockade, but when his ship touched at Portsmouth the British Naval Intelligence took all his baggage. Among other items of interest, they discovered check books and stubs showing that he had received \$3,102,000 for subversive activities and had disbursed a substantial part of this sum to known saboteurs.

Captain Karl Boy-Ed, the German naval attaché, performed the organizational work for marine sabotage. His was the job of seeing to it that the mysterious fires started on ships at sea, that a bomb indistinguishable from a lump of coal got into the bunkers to be thrown under the boilers by some hapless member of the black gang, that a time bomb of modest proportions was placed in the stern in such a way that in the middle of the Atlantic the steering gear was disabled and the propeller shaft warped.

Dr. Heinrich Albert, commercial attaché of the German Embassy, was the financial agent of the organization. One day Dr. Albert was on a New York subway train when a fight started between a combative passenger and a subway guard. While Dr. Albert was engrossed in the progress of the fray, a Secret Service agent, who by happy chance had with him an exact replica of the learned doctor's brief case, substituted the former for the latter. The papers thus filched showed that the doctor had

the Russian Government had transferred to the German Embassy a credit of \$15,000,000 in a New York bank. Why? Shades of Dr. Albert's \$30,000,000!

#### Picture Found Ridiculous

There are many silly things in this world of undeclared war and unneutral non-belligerency, but none is sillier than the picture of German and Italian diplomatic agents sitting in Washington, under the protection of a diplomatic immunity which no American citizen enjoys, drawing money upon American banks and using their time and talents to foster national interests which we have publicly declared to be incompatible with our own. We need no crystal ball to divine the activities of these augmented consular staffs, who have the run of the cities of our industrial sections and our seaports.

We can get rid of this menace simply by stating an obvious fact: That, for the time being, there are no diplomatic or commercial relationships between this country and the Axis powers. This is called technically a severance of diplomatic relations. It isn't really that, because the relations have long since been severed. It is merely a recognition of an existing status and the elimination of a foolish and dangerous pretense. It is not an act of war. We had no diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia for more than a decade prior to 1933.

We know what is going to happen if we allow these people to stay here. The history of the last war shouts the warning. And remember: We are far less neutral now than we were then; the British are far more dependent upon us now than then, and the German Government is far more efficient at boring from within now than then.

We can prevent further blows from falling. We ought to do it.

W. BARTON LEACH.  
Cambridge, Mass., June 3, 1941.

Fig. 6.2 b Excerpt from the New York Times of 8 June 1941 (section "editorials of the week", p. E8), continued. This very lucid editorial calls into question the posture of the Administration which consisted in negating the existence of sabotage by attributing all explosions to accidental causes. The article observes that a convenient thing about explosions is that they destroy all traces of how they happened. It points out that it took 12 years of investigation before the Black Tom and Kingsland explosions of 1916 and 1917 became recognized as the work of German saboteurs. Moreover, it emphasizes that these were merely the largest disasters on a long list; thus, within a period of 6 weeks between 10 January 1916 and the end of February, there were no less than 12 explosions in munition plants or on ships bound for Europe. The article gives the names of the persons of the German High Command who organized the sabotage actions; most of them were part of the embassy and consular staffs. The head of the the whole sabotage campaign was military attaché Franz von Papen who later became Hitler's Vice Chancellor. As indisputable cases of sabotage in World War II, the article mentions the sabotage of 27 of the 30 Axis ships seized by US authorities in late March 1941. These concerted sabotage actions were ordered and organized by the military attachés of the Axis countries. In his conclusion, the author of the article advocates the severance of diplomatic ties with Axis powers and the expulsion of their representations.



**Table 6.1 Seditious acts and their repression in the United States during World War II**

	Number of cases
Suspected acts of sabotage	27,000
Confirmed acts of sabotage	2,400
Arrests of Nikkei	17,477
Denaturalizations	> 146
Violations of the Selective Service Act	
• Cases	> 430,000
• Convictions	> 20,000

Notes: Arrest of Nikkei (i.e. persons of Japanese ancestry whether US citizens or not) refers to those interned by the Department of Justice; this figure does not include the Nikkei from the West coast who were “relocated”. Some data were available only for a shorter period of time than the whole duration of the war.

- Between 7 December 1941 and 31 July 1942, the FBI arrested nearly 10,000 aliens, about half of them Japanese, a third German (Times 17 August 1942 p. 5).

- The 146 denaturalizations are for the period ending on 31 December 1943.

- In the 12 months 1 July 1943–30 June 1944, there were 16,295 instances of suspected sabotage, 1,736 confirmed cases and 582 persons were convicted.

- The 430,000 cases of violations of the Selective Service Act are for the period from September 1940 to 31 December 1944.

- During 1944 there were 4,215 convictions for violations of the Selective Service Act and they resulted in an average sentence of 2.9 years (NYT 16 July 1944 p. 7; NYT 31 December 1944 p. 16).

- Between September 1940 and 31 December 1943 there were 131,000 cases of violations of the Selective Service Act and 6,500 convictions, i.e. one conviction for about 20 cases. The figure of 20,000 was computed from the 430,000 cases by using the same ratio.

- The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 which organized conscription was passed by Congress on 16 September 1940, becoming the first peacetime conscription in United States history. Violations can occur in different ways: failure to register, changing address without informing the authorities or failure to appear in response to a convocation. In order to be considered as a felony, it must be established that the non-compliance was made knowingly and willfully. This explains the huge discrepancy between the number of cases and the number of convictions: only one case in 20 resulted in a conviction.

Sources: NYT 5 April 1944 p. 11; NYT 31 December 1944.

ments.

- NYT 10 October 1943 (p. 9): “Mr Hoover reported no foreign-directed acts of sabotage; 90 convictions for sabotage were obtained, he said, but the acts were committed by persons on their own initiative, either from spite or maliciousness”.

- NYT 31 December 1944 (p. 16): “J. Edgar Hoover, director of the FBI, stated today that there had not been one act of foreign-directed sabotage in the country [in 1944]. There had been 44 convictions for sabotage but in most cases the saboteur acted on his own initiative out of malice or prankishness”.

Table 6.2a Saboteurs sentenced during World War II in the United States

FAMILY NAME, Given name	Year of arrest	US citizen (yes/no)	Sentence	Type
<b>1941</b>				
Captain of Villa Perosa	1941	no	3 y	sab
ETZEL, William	1941	yes	15 y	sab
SKELTON, Wandell	1941	yes	?	sab
<b>1942</b>				
BILGES, Frederick	1942	yes	3 y	sab
BURGER, Ernest	1942	yes	Life	sab
DASH, George	1942	no	30 y	sab
GROS, Hans	1942	?	15 y	sab
HAUPT, Herbert	1942	yes	Death, E	sab
HEINCK, Heinrich	1942	no	Death, E	sab
KERLING, Edward	1942	no	Death, E	sab
MAJUS, John	1942	yes	?	sab
NEUBAUER, Hermann	1942	no	Death, E	sab
QUIRIN, Richard	1942	no	Death, E	sab
THIEL, Werner	1942	no	Death, E	sab
<b>1943</b>				
ANTONELLI, Amerigo	1943	yes	?	sab
STEELE, George	1943	yes	1.5 y	sab
THOMAS, Harry	1943	yes	2 y	sab

Notes: “y” means year, “E” means Executed, “sab” means sabotage. This table gives a sample, rather than a complete list. For instance, along with the captain of the Italian ship Villa Perosa, 13 other crew members were indicted; moreover similar sabotages were committed on 25 other Italian ships. Similarly, along with Steele, 9 other welders were arrested. Moreover, because sabotage was considered as a very sensitive issue it is quite possible that some cases were not reported in the press.

Sources: *New York Times* (electronic archive).

- NYT 23 May 1945 (p. 21): “There were 1,796 suspicious fires in the year ending on 30 April 1945 but their investigation revealed that none could be traced back to enemy-directed sabotage”.

- Website of the FBI (25 March 2008): “Every suspect act [of sabotage] was the result of vandalism, pique, resentment, a desire for relief from boredom, the curiosity of children to see what would happen”.

The repetition of such statements raises two questions.

- Is it really true that *all* acts of sabotage were just the result of individual vandalism?

- Why did the FBI so much insist on the lack of a connection between saboteurs and enemy countries?

Direct as well as indirect evidence suggest a negative answer to the first question.

## Direct evidence of sabotage incidents

**Table 6.2b Persons sentenced for espionage during World War II in the United States**

FAMILY NAME, Given name	Year of arrest	US citizen (yes/no)	Sentence	Type
<b>1940</b>				
AUHAGEN, Friedrich	1940	?	2 y	spy
ROMERO, Rufo	1940	?	15 y	spy
<b>1941</b>				
DUQUESNE spy ring (33)	1941	27 yes, 6 no	300 y	spy
HONDA, Rikita	1941	no	suicide	spy
INGALLS, Laura	1941	yes	1 y	agent
KONO, Torachi	1941	no	–	spy
KÜHN, Otto	1941	no	Death, C	spy
TATIBANA, Itaru	1941	no	–	spy
<b>1942</b>				
CRAMER, Anthony	1942	yes	45 y	trea
EZIMA, Takeo	1942	no	15 y	spy
KERTESS, Ferdinand	1942	?	6 y	spy
KUNZE, Gerhard	1942	yes	?	spy
STEPHAN, Max	1942	yes	Death, C	trea
VON CLEMM, Werner	1942	yes	2y	agent
VONSIATSKY spy ring (4)	1942	4 yes	32 y	spy
<b>1943</b>				
CRANZ, Carl	1943	yes	8 y	spy
DE SPRETTTER, Erwin	1943	yes	30 y	spy
DONAY, Theodore	1943	yes	?	trea
KOENIG, Hans	1943	yes	8 y	spy
KUHN, Fritz	1943	yes	2 y	agent
KUHN, Elsa	1943	yes		agent
KUHN, Walter	1943	yes		agent
LEHMITZ, Ernest	1943	?	18 y	spy
LEINER, Helmut	1943	yes	30 y	spy
NEUBACHER, Ernest	1943	yes		agent
WEDEMEYER, Eric	1943	yes	8 y	spy
ORGELL, Carl	1943	?	?	spy
<b>1944</b>				
COLEPAUGH, William	1944	yes	Death, C	spy
DICKINSON, Velvalee	1944	yes	10 y	spy
FROELING, Walter	1944	?	5 y	trea
GIMPEL, Erich	1944	no	Death, C	spy
KREPPER, Carl Emil	1944	yes	12 y	spy
WERGIN, Otto	1944	?	5 y	trea

Notes: “y” means year, “C” means “Commutated” (i.e. death sentence not carried out), “agent” means “propaganda agent”, “trea” means traitor.

Sources: *New York Times* (electronic archive); website of the FBI.

In a number of cases there is evidence of a connection between the saboteurs and the government of enemy countries.

- For instance, when the ships seized in US ports by the American government were sabotaged by their crews this had been ordered by the military attachés of enemy countries (see the chronology at the date of 10 May 1941).
- Another example is the arrest of “250 railroad men in connection with the Nazi sabotage plot to blow up the famous horseshoe curve of the Pennsylvania railroad near Altoona” (NYT 2 July 1942 p. 1). The fact that it was a “Nazi sabotage plot” is explicitly acknowledged in the account given by the New York Times<sup>70</sup>.
- A third case is the sabotage committed in a factory producing hand grenades in 1943 (see the chronology at the date of 23 June 1943). On account of the fact that 7 persons were arrested including the director it can hardly be argued that these acts were individual acts of vandalism. Moreover, the article published in the New York Times on 8 June 1941 (Fig. A2) is a clear protest against the official policy which consisted in denying the occurrence of sabotage actions.
- A fourth case is the sabotage which led to the wreck of the Cleveland-Pittsburgh express (see the chronology at the date of 18 March 1941). For obvious reasons it is usually easier to determine what caused a train derailment than to find the cause of an explosion in a powder factory. The fact that the rails have been tampered with is a fairly clear signature of a sabotage. It is somewhat more difficult to assess the motives of the saboteurs especially if the police was not able to arrest them as in the case of this train wreck. It was established that the sabotage was in fact aimed at a train transporting military personnel (see at the date of 21 March 1941).

We gave a detailed account of this specific case which occurred before the United States entered the war but there were in fact numerous similar derailments, and many concerned trains of military importance such as oil trains, munitions trains or trains transporting servicemen. Surprisingly, press coverage of such derailments became more and more sketchy as the country became more deeply involved in the war. As a typical example of this “discretion”, one can mention the train wreck which occurred on 11 September 1943 near Altoona, Pennsylvania (3 kilometer east of the horseshoe curve). It involved three different trains, two freight trains and an empty passenger car train, and resulted in the death of the engineer of one of the trains. The article about this wreck has only 90 words. It gives no indication about possible causes and provides no information about the kind of shipments carried by the two freight cars.

- In September 1942, Vincent Palokis burned (and destroyed) 3 railroad bridges in Imperial County, California. (see the chronology at the date of 10 September.) It is difficult to believe that this was done purely for personal motives because such actions appear to be very rare in peacetime.

- In 1942 in Washington State 6 Japanese were arrested for having blown up

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<sup>70</sup>Naturally, the number of the arrests is somewhat puzzling. No ring of saboteurs can work efficiently with so many ring members. Probably the FBI was hoping that the real saboteurs would be among those arrested.

sections of the railroad track in Jefferson County (see the chronology at the date of 19 September 1942). Again, it seems unlikely that 6 persons will act together for purely personal motives.

- The fact that many official reports cannot be trusted is not confined to (possible) sabotage actions. It also extends to the sinking of American vessels off the west coast. Two illustrations are given in the fascinating and minutely documented book that Burl Burlington (1992, p. 345) has written about the role of the Japanese submarine fleet.

(i) From Japanese sources, it is known that on 7 June 1942 submarine I-26 torpedoed the American merchant ship *Coast Trader* off Seattle. The ship sunk within 40 minutes. Yet, the Naval Board of Inquiry decided that *Coast Trader* had suffered an accidental internal explosion rather than a submarine attack. Such an explanation might have been convincing for a ship carrying ammunitions but that was not the case of *Coast Trader*. It is understandable that through its report the Navy did not wish to give valuable information to the Japanese and in addition it was probably reluctant to admit that 6 months after Pearl Harbor Japanese submarines were still active at short distance from the US coast.

(ii) On 11 January 1942 at 7:15 pm the US carrier *Saratoga* was hit amidship by a torpedo from submarine I-6 (see the chronology). The carrier took on 1,100 tons of seawater and (at least) 6 seamen were killed. The damaged ship was able to return to Pearl Harbor and subsequently was repaired on the west coast. Yet, no information was given about this incident in the *New York Times* (or in other newspapers). In this case it would probably have been difficult to explain the damage by an accidental explosion.

- NARA holds 10 files entitled: “Prevalence of sabotage, First [or 2nd, 3rd, etc] Service Command” (1941-1946) which were created by the “Internal Security Division” of the “Office of the Provost Marshal General” at the War Department<sup>71</sup>. Each Service Command corresponds to a region of the United States. For instance, the Ninth Service Command, the only one which we have examined, covers the West. Although fairly sketchy, these reports contain descriptions of sabotage actions. Often these actions were carried out by organized groups of people

### **Indirect evidence about sabotage incidents**

In the previous section we listed cases in which there is direct evidence of sabotage intended by an enemy country; these cases are fairly few however. In our opinion there were many more but for this broader class we have only indirect evidence which provides a high degree of likelihood instead of certainty.

1 During the war there were about 2,500 confirmed acts of sabotage. Many of

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<sup>71</sup>In addition they are files for sabotage actions against railroads (ARC: 980298), or sabotage at national level (ARC: 980367, ARC 733535).

them occurred in sensitive places like shipyards and quite of few were committed not by single individuals but by *groups* of people (see the chronology below at the dates of 7 February 1942, 9 November 1942 and 20 April 1943). Furthermore, there were cases where several war production plants blew up in the same night; that occurred for instance in New Jersey and Pennsylvania on 13 November 1940 (see the chronology below). Obviously, such cases cannot be easily explained away on the account of boredom or resentment.

2 The 10 saboteurs (a group of 8 arrested in 1942 and two others arrested in 1944) who came on board of German submarines obviously intended to commit acts of sabotage directed by an enemy country. Quite surprisingly these saboteurs were arrested almost immediately after their arrival. However it is difficult to believe that the German officers in charge of sabotage were so inefficient and inactive that their attempts were limited to these two failures.

3 In espionage cases the FBI did not deny that the spies had a connection with enemy countries. Table 6.2b shows that there were numerous espionage cases. Moreover, most of the defendants were US citizens against whom the policy of preemptive arrests of enemy-aliens was not effective. If there have been so many spies working for enemy countries, how can one explain that there was not a single saboteur?

4 If all sabotages were really the result of pure vandalism and resentment one would not expect the sudden increase after 1940 which is shown in Fig. A1. Sometimes it is argued that the increased number of accidents was due to the pressure put on workers to work with greater speed than in peace time. Under such an hypothesis one would expect an overall increase in the number of factory deaths. Yet, no such increase can be observed. In 1936, 18,500 factory deaths were recorded by the National Safety Council, whereas between 1941 and 1945 the average annual figure was 17,200.

5 It is well known (and recognized by official American sources) that during World War I the German Army was very active in organizing sabotage actions in the United States. From a military perspective, such actions are highly effectual. In World War II an average of 14 rounds were required to kill an enemy tank in tank-on-tank engagements. Thus if 10,000 rounds are blown up in a factory or in New York harbor by a team of saboteurs this would save some 700 German tanks from destruction. In terms of the result/cost ratio such actions are so effective that any sensible military commanders will devote adequate means (in terms of men, training, money, logistics) to the organization of sabotage actions. German saboteurs were highly “efficient” in World War I; the idea that in World War II, their actions were limited to the two botched attempts that were immediately identified and stamped out by the FBI seems an unlikely proposition.

6 Broad programs were set up to screen workers in sectors involved in produc-



tions of military material. By the end of 1943 about 1.2 million Americans and 21,500 aliens had been screened. During 1943, about 12,000 subversives were removed. More details about these programs are given below at the date of 8 May 1942 and 31 December 1943. If sabotage had been due only to “pranks” (as stated by the FBI) such programs would have been pointless.

7 For sabotages committed for personal reasons damages could be covered by insurances. On the contrary, sabotages directed by an enemy country would be considered as acts of war which would not be covered by insurance companies. This may have been a good reason for denying the existence of real cases of sabotage.

We now come to the second question. Why did the FBI deny that there were (real) sabotage actions? We have already mentioned the insurance issue. There may be a second reason.

The FBI advocated a policy of preemptive arrests in order to prevent sabotage from being committed. In the week after Pearl Harbor over 3,000 so-called enemy aliens had been arrested. In contrast only 1,000 were arrested during the first three months of World War I (NYT 23 September 1942). The “Alien Enemy Control Unit” (a department of the FBI) was created by president Roosevelt in the fall of 1939 and received a high level of priority. Lists of aliens sympathetic to their country of origin were established and used as soon as war was declared<sup>72</sup>. The whole system has been conceived as a preventive policy. In order to show that this policy had been successful it was essential to claim that the acts of sabotage which were committed had no relation whatsoever with enemy countries.

As most information on matter of sabotage were provided by the FBI we can hardly expect that it would contain facts which would contradict the claims of its director. However, the FBI was not the only organization which fought against spies and saboteurs. The intelligence and counter-intelligence sections of the army, navy and air force also played an important role. We will see that their reports include acts of sabotage committed in connection with enemy countries.

### **Censorship in the balloon-bomb episode**

This episode comes as a confirmation of our previous assessment.

- During 6 months information about the incidents was completely suppressed.
- The threat was disclosed by the War Department and the FBI only after it had all but disappeared. Then, the official line became that the attempts made by the enemy had been completely ineffective and did not lead to any damage; according to a statement made by the War Department “these attacks were so scattered and aimless that they constituted no military threat” The only recognized victims were

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<sup>72</sup>It is reported that Edgar Hoover was not favorable to the mass internment of Japanese Americans. The reason is probably that this was considered too broad a move to be efficient.

6 civilians: the pregnant wife of a minister and 5 teenagers. It would have been difficult to imagine more appropriate victims for the purpose of demonstrating the dark side of Japanese warfare methods.

First we will recall the facts as presented by the War Department; then we will try to assess the truth of the official version.

Between 3 November 1944 and April 1945 some 9,000 balloon-bombs were launched by the Japanese from the eastern coast of Japan in the direction of the western coast of the United States<sup>73</sup>. The balloons were filled with hydrogen and were 10 meter in diameter; they carried a 15 kilogram anti-personnel fragmentation bomb and two incendiary bombs. In addition they carried a small flash bomb which would provoke the explosion of the balloon with its remaining hydrogen once it reached the floor.

According to G-2 reports, some 300 balloons were reported to have reached the United States. They landed mainly in states of Washington, Oregon, Montana and Idaho but about 30 fell in California, Arizona, Nevada, Utah and New Mexico<sup>74</sup>.

What were the real objectives of the Japanese is not obvious. It has been said that they wanted to provoke forest fires but between November and March almost all forest areas were covered with snow or were too damp to catch fire easily.

The Office of Censorship imposed a blackout about the very existence of the balloons until 23 May 1945 when information released by the War Department revealed their existence. The ban was lifted for two reasons:

- 1 The threat had almost disappeared because in April 1945 US bombers had been able to destroy the main hydrogen production factory near Tokyo. After that only few balloons were reported to have reached the United States.


- 2 An accident which occurred on 5 May 1945 convinced the authorities that unexploded balloons represented a danger against which people living in the countryside had to be warned. Indeed, on 5 May (the article by Rogers cited above says "5 March", probably a misprint). a minister's wife and 5 Sunday School students were killed by one of the grounded balloons near Bly, Oregon. Apparently the balloon had been on the ground for some time because there was still snow on the ground under the device whereas there was no longer any snow elsewhere in the forest. The incident was reported in US medias on 23 May after the ban had been lifted.

It seems that self-censorship of American newspapers even made them refrain from reporting forest fires, especially in the West. Between 1936 and 1943 the aver-

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<sup>73</sup>To produce 9,000 balloons required a substantial industrial effort at a time when almost everything was in short supply in Japan. At first sight it would seem surprising that the Japanese High Command devoted so much resources to attacks which were completely ineffective.

<sup>74</sup>[http://web.mst.edu/~\\_rogersda/forensic\\_geology/Japanese%20vengeance%20bombs%20new.htm](http://web.mst.edu/~_rogersda/forensic_geology/Japanese%20vengeance%20bombs%20new.htm)  
J. David Rogers: How geologists unraveled the mystery of Japanese vengeance balloon bombs in World War II.



**Fig. 6.3 Diagram of a balloon sent toward the West Coast.** According to American sources some 9,000 balloons were launched between November 1944 and April 1945. Fragments of some 300 balloons were recovered in the United States. *Source: Mikesh (R.C.) 1973: Japan's World War II balloon bomb attacks on North America. Smithsonian Annals of Flight No 9, Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington DC.*

age number of articles published in the New York Times containing the expression “forest fire” was equal to  $N_{1936-1943} = 48 \pm 7$  (where 7 is the confidence interval for a 95% confidence probability level)<sup>75</sup>. In 1944-1945 this number fell to  $N_{1944-1946} = 20 \pm 3$  (the numbers were: 22, 17, 21). Then, in 1947-1950 it resumed its pre-1944 average:  $N_{1947-1950} = 55 \pm 14$  (the numbers were 21, 67, 53, 66, 35).

There are some reasons which suggest that the official version that the balloon-bomb

<sup>75</sup>The numbers as as follows: 65, 32, 50, 45, 44, 61, 47, 43. Of course, not all these articles reported actual forest fires, some simply referred to this expression in another context.

attacks made no damage whatsoever may not be true.

- In March 1945, at Cold Creek, Washington, a balloon knocked out electrical transmission lines leading from the Columbia River's Bonneville Dam to the Hanford Works which stopped the cooling pumps for a nuclear reactor which was producing plutonium for the Manhattan Project. This resulted in a three days' production loss<sup>76</sup>. It is also possible that the reactor suffered some damage because cooling pumps should never be stopped (even if the reactor is shut down) unless the fuel rods get damaged.

- According to military sources, a comprehensive plan was set up to counter balloon attacks. It included the following steps: (a) Create a special air defense zone to protect military and war industry assets near Seattle ("Sunset Project"). In addition a contingent of hundreds of civilian spotters, called the Ground Observer Corps, was trained to scan the skies for strange objects (remember that balloons could not be detected by radar). (b) Attempt aerial intercepts of balloons: "Operation Firefly". (c) Establish a "smoke jumper" capability to respond to forest fires caused by balloons. The 555th Parachute Infantry Battalion was assigned to this mission.

Would it have made sense to design such a plan if the balloons had been completely ineffective?

## Chronology: World War I

Symbols such as ●(23) give the cumulative number of deaths of factory workers.

It is instructive to have a look at what happened in World War I because the comparison shows that in both wars there were explosions in the same powder plants particularly those of the "Hercules Powder Company". This observation makes it fairly unlikely that they were due to purely accidental causes. In contrast to the official attitude in World War II, the occurrence of sabotage actions by foreign agents was clearly recognized in World War I.

**S, Sep 18, 1914:** ●(3) An explosion at the Wright Chemical Works caused by gun-cotton [an explosive] resulted in 3 deaths. (NYT 19 September 1914 p. 5; NYT 31 July 1916, p. 4)

**S, Sep 30, 1914:** ●(8) H. B. Thearle, President of the Pain Fireworks Display Company of America, and four employees were killed by an explosion which destroyed the Pain Company's plant in Chicago, Illinois; the explosion occurred just a few blocks from the business center of the city. (NYT 1 October 1914, p. 6; NYT 31 July 1916, p. 4)

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<sup>76</sup>Source: <http://www.scn.org/~bq450/ATFO.txt>

**S, Oct 3, 1914:** ●(12) Four men were killed and damage amounting to at least \$20,000 was done by an explosion at 10:40am which demolished eight buildings of the Detwiller Street Fireworks Manufacturing Company's big plant in Jersey City. (NYT 4 Oct, 1914 p. 26; NYT 31 July 1916, p. 4)

**S, Feb 4, 1915:** Vanceboro, Maine. In a statement Werner Van Horn, held for dynamiting the St. Croix Bridge, asserted that arrangements for destruction of the bridge were made in Germany. He said he was paid for the job. (NYT p. 3)

**S, Mar 7, 1915:** ●(17) Haskell, New Jersey. Five workers, one a boy, were killed by an explosion of gun-cotton in a plant of the Du Pont Powder Company. Four one-story buildings were wrecked and burned. (NYT p. 6)

**S, Mar 8, 1915:** Machias, Maine. Werner Horn, the German reservist who attempted to blow up the international bridge at Vanceboro, Maine in early February 1915 asserted that he did so as "an act of war" against Great Britain. He will be taken to Bangor tomorrow for arraignment on indictments charging illegal transportation of explosives from New York to Vanceboro. (NYT p. 1)

[After being tried in US courts, Horn was sent to Canada where he was declared insane by a court in Ottawa and was eventually deported (NYT 23 July 1923 p. 6).]

**S, Apr 2, 1915:** ●(22) An explosion at the "Equitable Powder Company" plant in Alton, Illinois caused 5 deaths. (NYT 2 April 1915 p. 6,9; NYT 31 July 1916, p. 4)

**S, May 11, 1915:** A powder plant of the Du Pont Company blew up at Carney's Point. Six men were severely injured. (NYT p. 24)

**S, May 13, 1915:** ●(24) A gun-cotton explosion at the Anderson Chemical Company in Wallington, New Jersey caused 2 deaths. (NYT 13 May p. 5; recapitulating list: NYT 31 July 1916, p. 4)

**S, May 26, 1915:** Fourth blast within ten days at the Carney's Point plant of the Du Pont Company. (NYT p. 14)

**S, May 30, 1915:** On May 30 there was an explosion on a barge in the harbor of Seattle which was loaded with dynamite destined to Vladivostok. It broke all the plate glass in the business district of Seattle. (NYT 27 November 1915, p. 3)

**S, Jul 17, 1915:** ●(31) Montreal, Canada. Seven persons were killed in a cordite explosion today at the plant of the Canadian Explosives Company at Beloeil (Quebec), about 40 kilometers from Montreal. (NYT p. 6)

**S, Jul 11, 1915:** Fire bombs were put on Allies' ships by a sabotage ring in New York. Four fire bombs were discovered on the steamship Kirkoswald and these

bombs were of a similar sort as those found aboard several other ships loaded in New York and bound for France (e.g. the Bankdale, Devon City, Lord Erne, Cressington Court). (NYT p. 1)

[An article of 9 August 1940 in the Times says that the same kind of bombs were used to put a ship on fire shortly after it left New York.]

**S, Aug 3, 1915: ●(34)** Two soldiers and a civilian lost their lives at the United States Frankford arsenal in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania when time fuses used on shrapnel shells ignited mysteriously. (NYT 4 August 1915 p. 5; recapitulating list: NYT 31 July 1916, p. 4)

**S, Aug 30, 1915: ●(36)** Washington, Delaware. Two workmen were instantly killed in an explosion of two black powder mills of the du Pont Powder Company. The explosion wrecked the only part of the works that could not be duplicated. (NYT p. 1)

**S, Sep 1915: ●(38)** An explosion at the fireworks factory of North Bergen, New Jersey caused two deaths. (NYT 31 July 1916, p. 4, the exact date in not given in this retrospective list which covers the period September 1914–July 1916)

**S, Sep 1915: ●(41)** Shells exploded at the Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, killing 3 persons. (NYT 31 July 1916, p. 4, the exact date in not given in this retrospective list which covers the period September 1914–July 1916)

**S, Sep 1, 1915: ●(44)** A train carrying 3.5 tons of dynamite was wrecked in Pionle, California. It blew up killing 3 railmen. (NYT 1 September 1915 p. 5; recapitulating list: NYT 31 July 1916, p. 4)

**S, Sep 30, 1915: ●(48)** Paterson, New Jersey. Four thousand men were busy making smokeless powder explosives for the Allies in the plant of the du Pont Powder Company when a fire started which killed four workmen. Officials said the accident was not caused by Teuton agents. (NYT p. 1)

[It can be noted that the statement about the causes of the fire came very quickly after the disaster.]

**S, Oct 2, 1915: ●(49)** Pompton Lake, New Jersey. Another explosion occurred in a Du Pont Powder factory. One man was killed and 13 burned in the second disaster in three days. A big new building was wrecked. (NYT p. 17)

**S, Oct 8, 1915: ●(53)** Fearing a plot to wreck the plant of the Aetna Explosive Co. in Emporium, Pennsylvania where an explosion last night of 120 tons of smokeless powder destined for the Allies killed four men, the 500 employees refused to return



to work today. (NYT p. 20)

**S, Nov 3, 1915:** ●(54) One man was killed in a powder mill explosion. (NYT p. 22)

**S, Nov 14, 1915:** Wilmington, Delaware. A Du Pont powder mill was destroyed by an explosion. No one was hurt for all the employees were out of the mill at the time. The cause of the blast is not known. (NYT p. 3)

**S, Nov 27, 1915:** San Francisco. Charles C. Crowley, a detective of this city, was arrested on the charge of conspiracy to further the destruction of munition plants and the blowing up of vessels carrying war supplies to the Allies. In particular Crowley is accused of supplying money to pay men to set afire and blow up docks and ships. The warrant makes the following charges.

- On 9 May 1915 Crowley paid Louis J. Smith to go to Seattle to destroy by dynamite vessels having aboard ammunition for the Allies. (in this respect see the date of 30 May 1915).

- Together with Smith, Crowley took employment with the Hercules Powder Company in San Francisco in order to obtain information concerning the shipment of explosives.

- Crowley and Smith had instructions from persons not named to destroy by dynamite all vessels bound from Pacific coast ports with munitions for Britain, France and Russia.

The Federal District Attorney applied “third degree” (a synonym of torture) to Crowley for 48 hours previous to ordering him indicted. (NYT p. 3)

**S, Nov 27, 1915:** In June 1915 the Bankdale, a British steamer left New York with a cargo of war supplies for Le Havre in France. During the voyage, 6 fire bombs exploded in No 2 hold but the ship could nevertheless arrive at destination. In November 1915, there was a similar incident on a trip from New York to Bordeaux where the ship arrived with a fire in her forward hold. (NYT p. 3)

**S, Dec 1, 1915:** ●(85) Wilmington, Delaware. 31 men were killed by a terrific explosion of black powder which demolished the packing plant at the Hagley Yard plant of the du Pont de Nemours Powder Company. (NYT p. 1)

**S, Dec 11, 1915:** ●(86) An explosion at a fuse plant in Redington, Pennsylvania killed an employee. (NYT p. 6)

**S, Dec 14, 1915:** Robert Fay, Max Breitung, Dr. Herbert Kienzle, Walter Scholz and Engelberg Bronkhorst were indicted several weeks ago for conspiracy to destroy munition laden ships by means of bombs. Max Breitung is a nephew of Howard N. Breitung, the banker and ship owner. (NYT p. 4)

**S, Dec 15, 1915:** San Francisco. The name of Franz von Papen, recalled Military Attaché of the German Embassy at Washington, was drawn into the Government's investigation of pro-Germans' alleged bomb plots. Federal officials said telegrams in the Government's possession showed that the question of the price to be paid for the destruction of an explosive plant at Pinole, California, was "put up to" Von Papen. (NYT p. 1)

**S, Jan 10, 1916:** ●(91) Wilmington, Delaware. This city was shaken shortly before 1 o'clock this morning by a terrific concussion accompanied by a deafening explosion when, five miles away, in Carney's Point, N.J., Plant No. 1 of the du Pont Powder Company works was blown to pieces. 5 people were killed. (NYT p. 1)

**S, Jan 11, 1916:** Wilmington, Delaware. While officials of the Du Pont Powder Company were issuing statements this afternoon denying there was anything suspicious about the cause of the explosion in the company's plant at Carney's Point, New Jersey, early this morning, two more explosions occurred in the Hagley yard plant of the same company north of this city. (NYT p. 8)

**S, Jan 13, 1916:** Powder blasts continue. Du Pont attributed them to the haste in war work. (NYT p. 5)

[However, it can be observed that several explosions occurred during the night at a time when no employees were in the factory.]

**S, Jan 26, 1916:** Two persons were hurt in an explosion that occurred at a Du Pont Powder factory. (NYT p. 5)

**S, Feb 9, 1916:** San Francisco. Franz Bopp, German Consul General for San Francisco was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury for conspiracies to blow up ammunition plants and ships. Along with Mr. Bopp some 31 other persons were indicted; among them were Baron E.H. Von Schack, German Vice-Consul in San Francisco and Maurice Hall, Consul for Turkey. (NYT p. 1)

[Were these people not protected by their diplomatic status?]

**S, Apr 13, 1916:** ●(94) An explosion at a Du Pont plant in Bluefields, West Virginia wrecked a powder factory and caused the death of 3 persons. (NYT p. 9)

**S, May 10, 1916:** ●(99) Lake Hopatcong, New Jersey. The nitroglycerin units of the Atlas Powder Company's mills were destroyed by an explosion at 12:43 pm. It caused 5 deaths. (NYT p. 10)

**S, May 16, 1916:** ●(113) Gibbstown, New Jersey. An explosion that was felt over an area of many miles wrecked one of the buildings of the Refauno plant of the du Pont Powder Company killing at least 14 workmen and injuring a score more. Other

buildings of the plant many yards distant were wrecked. (NYT p. 9)

**S, Jun 7, 1916:** ●(114) Wayne, New Jersey. One man was killed and 8 injured as the result of an explosion at the Wayne plant of the du Pont Powder Company. (NYT p. 3)

**S, July 22, 1916:** ●(116) An explosion in a plant of the Hercules Powder Company killed two persons. (NYT p. 9)

**S, July 14, 1916:** ●(120) Haskell, New Jersey. 4 workmen were killed in the blowup of a Du Pont plant. 12 buildings are wrecked. Major Sylvester begins his investigation but does not believe that saboteurs are to blame. (NYT p. 14)

[Once again, the possibility of sabotage is discarded before the investigation is completed.]

**S, July 31, 1916:** There have been many explosions since the war began. The du Pont Powder Company has suffered a long series of accidents during the time war munitions have been going abroad. This is evident from the inspection of the list of explosions that have occurred during the war. (NYT p. 4)

**S, Aug 12, 1916:** ●(123) Three workmen were killed in an explosion at Du Pont plant at Carney's point. (NYT p. 16)

**S, Sep 13, 1916:** ●(126) Three persons died in an explosion at a Du Pont factory. (NYT p. 4)

**S, Sep 16, 1916:** ●(128) Workmen were burnt in a powder explosion when a blending tower was destroyed in a Dupont factory. (NYT p. 3)

**S, Nov 4, 1916:** Six men confess a subway dynamite plot. Three of them admitted a part in blowing up Lenox Avenue Station on 25 October 1916. (NYT p. 1)

**S, Jan 12, 1917:** Fire in the ammunition plant of the Canadian Car and Foundry Company, near Kingsland, New Jersey, yesterday afternoon destroyed the factory, with a loss estimated at \$ 5 million. Exploding shells rained for hours. It was the last consignment destined to Russia (total order amounted to \$ 83 million). There is no hint of a plot. Fire is believed to have started from a spark. (NYT p. 1)

[Once again the conclusion that there was no sabotage action is drawn before the investigation is started, let alone finished.]

**S, Jan 13, 1917:** 400 tons of smokeless powder exploded at the du Pont powder works at Haskell, New Jersey, last night, and for the second time in 36 hours, New York and Northern New Jersey were jarred and frightened by a munitions disaster. Haskell is 50 kilometers northwest of New York City. Official investigation shows

no trace of incendiarism. (NYT 13 January p. 1, NYT 14 January p. 7)

**S, Mar 6, 1917:** Fritz Kolb, a young German, was arrested in New York by detectives from Captain Tunney's "Bomb Squad". High explosives were found in this hotel room. Captain Tunney said that Kolb acted alone, whereas the chief of police of Hoboken said that evidence has been obtained which shows that Kolb was only one of those taking part in a widespread conspiracy. (NYT p. 1)

[This article is interesting because it shows two police officers holding completely different positions. Did one of them have information that the other did not have?]

**S, Mar 8, 1917:** Michael J. Herlihy was tried as dynamiter for blowing up the subway. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. (NYT 8 March 1917 p. 7, 23 March 1917 p. 10)

**S, Apr 11, 1917:** ●(253) Chester, Pennsylvania. More than 125 munition workers, at least half of them girls, were killed in an explosion this morning at the plant of the Eddystone Ammunition Corporation, one kilometer from Chester. (NYT p. 1)

[This is a rare case where suspicions of sabotage were raised immediately after the disaster; yet the investigation did not bring about a clear conclusion.]

**S, July 10, 1917:** ●(259) Vallejo, California. A powder magazine at the Mare Island Navy Yard station blew up at a naval station in San Francisco Bay. 6 persons were killed. The investigation tried to find evidence of a plot. (NYT p. 10)

**S, Aug 26, 1917:** ●(264) The Mare Navy Yard magazine explosion which killed 6 persons on 10 July 1917 was the result of a deliberate act by persons unknown. (NYT p. 5)

[It is a long article but it does not say on what evidence is based this statement.]

**S, Aug 26, 1917:** The investigation of the Vallejo explosion found that it was the result of an act of sabotage. (NYT p. 5)

**S, Oct 16, 1917:** ●(268) An explosion at the Gibbstown plant of the Du Pont company wrecked the building and killed 4 workmen. (NYT p. 10)

**S, Nov 6, 1917:** ●(273) 5 persons were killed in a war plant fire for which German agents are blamed. (NYT p. 13)

**S, Jan 28, 1918:** ●(285) New Port, Rhode Island. An explosion at the Newport Naval Torpedo Station killed 12 of the 3,000 civilian employees. (NYT p. 4)

**S, Jul 28, 1918:** Two Germans admit a plot to blow up a munition plant at Irvington, New Jersey. The United States District Attorney expected to make more arrests as the result of the capture of the two men caught in the act of blowing up two war

plants. (NYT p. 10)

**S, Jul 30, 1918:** A private detective gave Federal Officials details of plans to destroy New Jersey war plants. As a result, Dr. Frederick W. Bischoff was arrested in connection with a plan to blow up a war plants at Irvington, New Jersey. (NYT p. 6)

**S, Aug 15, 1918:** Many employees of the Hercules Company were burned as the result of a flareup at a powder company. (NYT p. 8)

**S, Sep 8, 1918:** ●(289) Four employees were killed in a fire at Pompton Powder works. (NYT p. 11)

**S, Oct 5, 1918:** Frederick W. Bischoff, a dentist, was sentenced today to serve twenty-five years at hard labor in the Maryland Penitentiary for conspiring to blow up the Gould and Eberhardt munitions plant, at Irvington, New Jersey. (New York Tribune p. 12, 14)

**S, Jan 18, 1939:** Washington. The munitions plant at Kingsland, New Jersey, was one of 21 ammunition factories officially reported by the German High Command as having been destroyed prior to the entry of the United States into the First World War. (NYT p. 1)

## Chronology: World War II

Symbols such as ●(23) give the cumulative number of deaths among factory workers.

**S, Jan 18, 1940:** ●(2) Suspecting sabotage, Federal detectives have begun the investigation of the explosion of 3,000 liters of nitro-glycerin which occurred at the Gibbstown, New Jersey plant of the Dupont de Nemours company. Two workmen were killed and the shock was felt as far as Pennsylvania.

In 1916, when German agents were attempting to prevent the delivery of war supplies to Allies there were 3 explosions in this plant which cost altogether 18 lives. (Times p. 5)

[The fact that this plant was already targeted in World War I makes this explosion a fairly clear case of sabotage planned by the German High Command.]

**S, Jan 18, 1940:** The agents of the FBI asserted that the 17 men whom they arrested in New York during the week end had planned to obstruct the manufacture and transport of munitions. Many of the persons were of German or Irish descent. (Times p. 5)

**S, May 5, 1940:** Penns Grove, New Jersey. A two story building was destroyed at

5:30 am today by an explosion of smokeless powder at the powder plant of du Pont de Nemours Co. at Carneys Point, about 5km south of here on the Delaware River. The plant was empty at the time of the explosion. (NYT p. 5)

**S, Aug 1, 1940:** ● (6) Fire in a paint factory in Camden, New Jersey caused at least four fatalities. Damage is estimated at \$ 2 million. The safety commissioner refused to drop the sabotage theory in the blast. (NYT p. 22)

**S, Aug 9, 1940:** An explosion followed by a fire occurred in a hold of the Norwegian cargo ship *Lista* some time after she left New York for Liverpool. A tug from New York went to her help and beached her. The FBI has started an investigation which suggests that the fire was caused by an incendiary bomb of the type used by German agents in the last war. (Times p. 3)

[Surprisingly the articles published in the New York Times do not suggest that the fire was caused by an incendiary bomb but conclude that the cause was accidental (see below). But the articles also suggest that the investigation was surrounded by much secrecy. The incendiary bombs to which the article refers have been put on steamers carrying war supplies; an example is given above at the date of 27 November 1915.]

**S, Aug 9, 1940:** In addition to the FBI agents, the agencies present at the questioning included the Naval Intelligence Service, the Sabotage Squad of the Police Department, detectives of the Harbor Squad and the Norwegian Consulate general. Agents of the operator, the Cosmopolitan Steamship Company made every effort to keep details of the fire secret. No one would say what the *Lista's* cargo had been. The crew consisted mainly of sailors from the Philippines and Latin America but no one would say how many Norwegians there were apart from the captain and main officers. (NYT p. 1,17)

**S, Aug 10, 1940:** No sabotage seen in ship fire. A story of leaking oil in the engine room was told by witnesses. (NYT p. 15)

**S, Sep 13, 1940:** ● (58) 52 persons were killed in the explosion of a US powder plant. A series of explosion wrecked the Hercules Powder Company's plant for making dynamite and smokeless powder at Kenvil, New Jersey. The Hercules Company is one of the largest manufacturers of explosives in the United States. This plant is located only a few kilometers from the Army's Pichanny Arsenal where there was a serious explosion in March after 3 minor explosions in the course of the previous month. (Times 13 September p. 4, NYT 16 March 1941)

[Here again it is the recurrence of similar incidents which suggests that this series of sabotages were caused by saboteurs working for the enemy. There will be several other explosions in Hercules Powder plants subsequently (see below).]



**S, Sep 24, 1940: ●(60)** Dower, New Jersey. Two men were killed and eleven other civilian employees, three of whom women, were injured this morning by an explosion in a fuse recovery building at the US Army's Picatinny Arsenal. This arsenal is only a few kilometers from the Hercules Powder Works at Kenil where less than a fortnight ago, an explosion killed 50 men. There are rumors that both explosions had been caused by saboteurs. (NYT p. 23)

**S, Nov 11, 1940: ●(61)** An explosion occurred at a plant of the American Cyanamid and Chemical Corporation located 6 kilometers east of Somerville, New Jersey. One employee was killed. Sabotage is ruled out. (NYT p. 21)

**S, Nov 13, 1940: ●(77)** Explosions occurred in 3 powder plants. 14 persons were killed. (NYT p. 1)

An article published in the Times of London gives the following precisions.

- 10 persons were killed by an explosion which wrecked the plant of the United Railway Signal Corporation at Woodbridge, New Jersey.

- 3 men were killed in an explosion at the works of the American Cyanamid and Chemical Corporation at Edinburg, Pennsylvania. It was the second fatal accident in three days. A third explosion which injured several workers occurred on 17 November 1940 in a plant of the same company. (NYT 18 November 1940 p.1,12)

- 3 men died in an explosion at the plant of the Trojan Powder Company near Allentown, Pennsylvania.

(Times p. 3)

**S, Nov 13, 1940:** Fire swept an armory in Georgia. (NYT p. 1)

**S, Nov 13, 1940: ●(83)** Two blasts in Pennsylvania killed 6 persons. In each a building was blown to bits. One belonged to the Trojan Powder Company, the other to American Cyanamid. One of the plants was engaged in making detonators. (NYT p. 4)

**S, Nov 18, 1940:** Pittsburgh. An unexplained explosion, the third in a week, in a plant of the American Cyanamid and Chemical Corporation, badly damaged a building. Two men were injured. Fire apparently started from outside. (NYT 18 November 1940 p. 1; Times 19 November 1940 p. 3)

**S, Nov 29, 1940:** An explosion in a Du Pont plant near Fort Lewis razed the powder building. (NYT p. 23)

**S, Dec 3, 1940: ●(87)** A dynamite blast killed four persons. The explosion took place in the mixing room of the plant near Tacoma. (NYT p. 24)

**S, Feb 27, 1941:** During the inquiry of the Dies commission it was reported that

license plates of motor cars that had attended the German-American Bund camp at Handover, New Jersey had been traced to a famous arsenal, some to a barrack of the National Guard, and 3 to the Hercules powder plant in New Jersey where subsequently an explosion killed 52 employees. The public is not likely to believe the conclusion of the Department of Justice that the plant explosion was the result of speeding up a technical process. (Times p. 5)

[This article shows that the British did not believe the official explanations offered by American authorities.]

**S, Mar 16, 1941: ●(92)** At 9:15 pm the Cleveland-Pittsburgh Express derailed and hurtled down the river bank. 5 persons were killed. According to the results of the investigation were made public on 8 May 1941, the accident was due to malicious tampering with the track. (Sayers and Kahn 1942)

**S, Mar 18, 1941: ●(97)** Baden, Pennsylvania. After the Cleveland-Pittsburgh express struck a loosened rail, the locomotive overturned and 5 cars plunged down a 15 meter embankment into the Ohio River; 5 passengers were killed and 114 injured. It was announced that definite evidence of sabotage had been discovered. All spikes had been pulled from the outside rail next to the river. The end of the rail facing the oncoming locomotive was moved half a meter away from its normal position. A hunt for the saboteurs was started by federal, state and railroad agencies. Samuel Mekee in charge of the FBI office in Pittsburgh promised a complete investigation. E.W. Smith, vice-president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, announced that a \$ 5,000 reward had been posted for information leading to the arrest of the persons responsible. (NYT p. 25)

[Despite the offer of a reward and the efforts of the FBI it does not seem that the saboteurs were arrested. At least, there was no subsequent article in the New York Times about this train wreck which means that if the saboteurs had been arrested the news of the arrest and trial were kept secret for security reasons.]

**S, Mar 21, 1941:** It was learned today that there were 18 enlisted men and 44 Russian engineers aboard the Pennsylvania Railroad train which sped along the track 15 minutes before the accident near Baden. (NYT p. 42)

**S, Mar 21, 1941:** Kenvil, New Jersey. At the same plant of the Hercules Powder Company where 52 persons were killed on 12 September 1940, there was another blast today, but no one was killed. The blast was felt 8 kilometers away. (NYT p. 42)

[This was the second recorded explosion at a powder plant of the Hercules Powder Company.]

**S, Mar 22, 1941:** The construction quartermaster officers at Fort Meade in Mary-

land have confirmed reports that sabotage has been going on there for months. Among other things, the timber uprights in the barracks had been sawn so that a high wind would bring down the roof; spikes had been driven into electric power cables. The officers emphasized that the work was not that of a mere spiteful individual but of men who “know their business”. (Times p. 1)

**S, Mar 31, 1941:** Armed boarding parties from fleets of United States Coast Guard patrol boats took control of 30 Axis merchant vessels in 16 American ports and of 35 Danish freighters in nine ports and seized their officers and crews after at least 20 of the vessels had been damaged by sabotage committed by crew members. (NYT p. 1)

[There can be little doubt that these acts of sabotage were ordered by the governments of Germany and Italy. This was explicitly recognized by an Italian ship captain; see below at the date of 8 June 1941.]

**S, Apr 12, 1941:** ●(100) Belvidere, New Jersey. Three men were killed in an explosion in a small building of the new smokeless powder plant of the Hercules Powder Company. (NYT p. 17)

[This was the third recorded explosion at a powder plant of the Hercules Powder Company.]

**S, May 10, 1941:** The captain and chief engineer of the Italian cargo steamer Villa Perosa were sentenced to 3 years imprisonment and 8 members of the crew to 18 months each for damaging the engines of the vessel. They said they had been ordered to do so by the Italian Naval Attaché in Washington. (Times p. 3)

**S, Jun 2, 1941:** The docks and railways in Jersey city were laid wast by a fire; great amounts of grain destined to Britain were destroyed. (Times p. 3)

**S, Jun 8, 1941:** This is a highly informative article. Below we give a few excerpts but the whole article can be found in Fig. A2 at the beginning of this appendix.

- In the night of 29 to 30 March 1941, US authorities took possession of 30 ships of the Axis powers lying in American ports. 27 of these had been put out of commission by the use of sledge hammers, acetylene torches and hacksaws on their engines, boilers and propeller shafts. They are now clogging American shipyards which have better work to do. There was no doubt about sabotage in this job. It has been ordered by the Italian naval attaché, sitting at his desk in Washington under the protection of diplomatic immunity. His recall was demanded by President Roosevelt.

- On the night of May 31–June 1, 1941 a fire on the Jersey City waterfront wiped out \$25 millions worth of docks, warehouses, freight cars and grain elevators including much material destined to Great Britain. Some workmen stated that the fires seemed to break out in several places at once. But the Chief of Police of Jersey

City said: "Put any sabotage ideas out of your mind".

- In the First World War, when the German and Austrian embassies and consulates were expelled upon our declaration of war in April 1917, sabotage stopped dead. Previously it had been organized by the German military and naval attachés and its junior executives were the German and Austrian consular staffs. This type of activity requires an extensive organization and a lot of money. At the present time the Axis embassies and consulates have maintained their personnel or increased them, some as much as five times. We need no crystal ball to divine the activities of these augmented consular staffs.

[signed] W. Barton Leach, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

**S, Jun 10, 1941:** Two Japanese were arrested in a spy plot. They were accused of conspiracy to obtain national defense information to be used for injury of the United States and in the advantage of a foreign power. The first is Itaru Tatibana, 35 years old, a lieutenant commander in the Japanese Imperial Navy and registered as a language student at the University of Southern California. The second is Torachi Kono [also written Toraichi], 36, for many years the majordomo of Charles Chaplin, the comedian. (NYT p. 3)

[It can be noted that the age indication for Kono is wrong. He was in fact 53. As to Tatibana he is reported as being 35 but in the article of Time Magazine (below) he is said to be 39. Born in Japan in 1888 and raised in Hiroshima, Kono immigrated to the United States around 1906. In 1916 he was recruited by Charles Chaplin as chauffeur. In the early 1920s, Kono became Chaplin's majordomo. He was dismissed after Chaplin married his third wife, Paulette Godard. He then started a personal business as a lawyer. At the moment of his arrest Kono was 53 years old and had been a resident in the United States for 35 years. Neither of the two men was ever tried but Kono remained under arrest in various detention camps.]

(Wegars 2005; <http://www.imdb.com>).

Commander Itaru Tachibana who was arrested in 1941 for violation of the espionage statutes, was released on \$50,000 bond and finally left the country in June, 1941 at the request of the State Department.

Other Japanese Naval Officers involved in this subversive group were Lieutenant Commander Sadatomo Okada, Commander Iwao Arisaka, Lieutenant Commander Sadayoshi Nakayama and Engineer Lieutenant Wataru Yamada. Okada and Yamada, like Tachibana, were requested to leave the United States because their activities were considered to be inimical to the safety of this country, and Commander Arisaka and Lieutenant Commander Nakayama sailed suddenly from New York for Brazil in July, 1941.

(NAVY 1941)

[It can be noted that there are two different spellings: Tatibana (NYT) and Tachibana (Navy report)]

**S, Jun 10, 1941:** Al D. Blake, former yeoman in the US Navy was charged with two Japanese with conspiracy in an espionage plot against the United States but a Federal official called him a hero today. (Christian Science Monitor p. 3)

**S, Jun 23, 1941:** One of the neatest spy stories ever uncovered broke into print last week in Los Angeles. Arrested by FBI men were two dapper little Japanese and Al Blake, a US citizen. Al turned to be no spy but a hero. A yeoman in the US Navy during World War I, 50-year old Al Blake was approached some four months ago by a Japanese named Toraichi Kono. Kono was once Charlie Chaplin's valet and private secretary and now has a small business. Kono asked Al Blake if he would get in touch with yeomen aboard the USS Pennsylvania, try to worm out some Navy secrets from them. Then he went to Naval Intelligence officers. They told him to go ahead and work with the Japanese. Enter at this point a Japanese bigshot Itaru Tatibana, a lieutenant commander in the Imperial Japanese Navy. Tatibana put up the money to pay for Al Blake's snooping. Altogether, he received several thousands dollars from the Japanese which he turned over to US officials. He made two trips to Hawaii. The Navy handed him some obsolete firing data for the USS Phoenix and several ancient code books.

Two weeks ago Navy Intelligence decided its case was complete. FBI men arrested the suspects on a charge of conspiracy to obtain national defense information for a foreign power. In Tatibana's room they found a truckload of assorted information about the US Navy. (Time Magazine 23 June 1941)

[We cited a fairly long excerpt of this article to show that in matter of espionage and sabotage the information given in newspapers and magazine must be taken with a pinch of salt for the obvious reason that their sole source of information was the FBI. Despite being presented here as "one of the neatest spy stories" the two alleged spies were never tried; in fact, the charges against Tatibana were dropped on 25 June 1941 on instruction of the Attorney General (Christian Science Monitor 25 June 1941 p. 16). Moreover, one would probably not expect a real spy to keep all its secret documents at his home.]

**S, Jul 5, 1941:** Immediately following a meeting on June 24, 1941, when Takeo Ezima received a number of microphotographs of material obtained by German espionage agents, he contacted Kanegoro Koike, Paymaster Commander of the Japanese Imperial Navy, assigned to the Office of the Japanese Naval Inspector in New York City. At the request of the State Department, Ezima was not prosecuted. He sailed for Japan on 5 July 5 1941, and Kanegoro Koike followed on 14 August 1941.



(NAVY 1941)

[It is not clear for what kind of reason Takeo Ezima and Kanegoro Koike were allowed to regain Japan. They were probably covered by diplomatic immunity but that is the case of most high level spies.]

**S, Jul 22, 1941:** The Senate Naval Affairs Committee introduced confidential information to show that there had been widespread sabotage at the Mare Island Navy Yard on the Pacific Coast. (Sayers and Kahn 1942)

[It is noteworthy to observe that this statement was made at a moment when the United States was not yet at war and self-censorship of the media not yet enforced. After December 7, 1941 all official statements claimed that there were no (or very few) sabotage actions. Apparently, the numerous large scale explosions which occurred between 1942 and 1945 and caused several hundred fatalities were all attributed to accidental causes.]

**S, Aug 23, 1941:** ●(129) A second ship was destroyed in New York harbor within a week. At least 29 persons lost their lives in the first fire. (Times p. 3)

**S, Sep 16, 1940:** Columbus, Ohio. 22 of the 61 cars of an oil train jumped the tracks at a crossing. Over 1,000 cubic meter of oil intended for the East Coast went up in flames. A man was seen jumping from the train shortly before it was wrecked. (NYT p. 25)

**S, Nov 5, 1941:** Michael W. Etzel, 22, a native from Baltimore, was accused of damaging B-25 bombers being manufactured by the Army. He was a aircraft plant subforeman at Glenn Martin. The jury presented 24 separate counts against the young man: 22 counts of slashing or snipping electric wires in the center sections of 22 bombers and 2 counts of cutting tubings in 2 planes. On 18 November 1941, Etzel was sentenced to 15 years in prison (NYT 5 November 1941 p. 10; NYT 18 November p. 12)

**S, Dec 12, 1941:** Insurance companies refused bomb risks. The rates set by the *Explosion Conference*, an inter-company organization created in November, are the only recognized in the insurance market. (NYT p. 20)

[It would be interesting to know more about the rules set by the Explosion Conference. Incidentally, the attitude of the insurance companies may have been a rationale for the behavior of the FBI consisting in denying that the explosions were caused by saboteurs acting for an enemy country. In that case the damages would have been considered as war damages and would *not* have been covered by insurance companies. In addition one may suppose that the insurance companies themselves got financial support from the government, otherwise their position would have become untenable.]



**S, Dec 18, 1941:** In Britain all property owners pay an insurance tax to the government which covers the risk associated with war. In the United States the “War Insurance Corporation” has been created for the same purpose. It remains to be decided if subscription will be on a voluntary or obligatory basis. At present the policy of insurance companies is to explicitly exclude damages caused by acts of war. Needless to say, whether a sabotage action is an act of war is a matter of debate. If carried out on order of a higher authority it may be considered as an act of war; on the contrary, if it is committed without connection to an enemy country it will come under the ordinary riot coverage. (NYT p. 45,49)

[This distinction may explain why the FBI always insisted on the fact that acts of sabotage were committed for individual motives.]

**S, Feb 6, 1942:** On very definite suspicions of espionage among enemy aliens in the Mare Island Navy Yard area, Federal agents raided dozens of places, rounding up aliens and seizing cameras or radio sets. (NYT p. 10)

**S, Feb 10, 1942:** The former French liner “Normandie” now called the “Lafayette” is on fire in New York harbor. The fire started at 2 pm. (Times p. 4)

**S, Feb 11, 1942:** 20 Japanese aliens in Monterey were seized with arms. Three Buddhist priests were arrested, namely Rev. Koyo Tamanaka, 43, Rev Bunyu Fujimura, 38 and Rev. Hoshin Fujikado, 38. Moreover, James Charles Grub, 26, was found in possession of blueprints of 5 defense plants. In addition, John George Majus, 36, an American born citizen who was a carpenter on the freighter Calmar was arrested after he was reported cutting the steering rod of the freighter with a hacksaw. After first denying the charges, Majus confessed. (NYT p. 12)

**S, Feb 17, 1942:** In raids conducted in the Sacramento area, FBI agents uncovered two areal bombs casings, weapons, secret documents and US Army uniforms in the possession of Japanese aliens. The Federal agents said that the bombs were not loaded. The officials also seized signal-lights and enough equipment to make a complete short-wave radio transmitter. The casings and uniforms were found in the possession of Hamada Takahashi described as a Japanese naval officer. Kiju Sato, secretary of the Sacramento Japanese Association was seized with two rifles and a revolver. Ten other Japanese were arrested. (NYT p. 1,17)

**S, Mar 10, 1942:** The United States Steel Corporation announced yesterday that it had placed \$ 1 billion of insurance on its plants and equipments with the Factory Insurance Association as a protection not only against fire and windstorm damage, but also against sabotage and malicious mischief by agents of enemy. (NYT p. 19)

[US Steel probably would not take such a costly insurance if no sabotage actions had been recorded so far.]

**S, Mar 12, 1942:** Sabotage is suspected in the parachute silk fire at San Diego. (Los Angeles Examiner of 12 March 1942, cited in Sayers and Kahn 1942)

**S, Mar 16, 1942:** Flames swept a warehouse used by the US Army. An official declared that the blaze was not accidental. (San Francisco Examiner of 16 March 1942, cited in Sayers and Kahn 1942)

**S, Mar 27, 1942:** ●(160) Easton, Pennsylvania. 31 men were killed outright at 9:18 am by the explosion of 21 tons of gelatinite at the Sandt's Eddy plant of the Leigh Portland Cement Company quarry about 11 kilometers north of Easton. (NYT p. 1)

**S, Apr 22, 1942:** On April 28, 1942, at Franconia, Arizona, John Terry Hogan was arrested and charged with breaking lock and signal on railroad operating in interstate commerce. He was sentenced to a period of 18 months. (NARA 6)

**S, May 8, 1942:** On this date the US Army has assumed responsibility for the control of subversives, the distribution of Personal Security Questionnaires<sup>77</sup>, fingerprinting and other security procedures in all plants engaged in Army or Navy contracts or sub-contracts.

In accordance with this directive the District Intelligence Office of the Third Naval District [headquarters in New York City] was asked to transfer all records regarding subversives in plants to [Army] Military Intelligence.

On 1 May the addressees of the present directive were requested to furnish the District Intelligence Office with a list of persons discharged from plants because of subversive tendencies. (NARA 7)

**S, Jul 2, 1942:** Altoona, Pennsylvania. 250 enemy aliens were seized here tonight by agents of the FBI in connection with a Nazi sabotage plot to blow up the famous horseshoe curve of the Pennsylvania railroad near Altoona. Employees of the Pennsylvania railroad's main shops were among those arrested. The FBI had learned that invaluable information about the railroad horseshoe curve was transmitted to the Nazi sabotage ring who had been arrested in New York.

The raid in Altoona came only a few hours after FBI agents had struck simultaneously in 20 New Jersey towns and cities and seized 16 suspects. (NYT p. 1)

[On 16 March 1941 there had been a derailment at this place in which 5 were killed; there will be another on 11 September 1943 which caused the death of the train engineer.]

**S, Jul 17, 1942:** The Department of Justice announced that the death sentence would be demanded for Herbert Karl Friedrich Bahr, the 29-year old spy arrested on board

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<sup>77</sup>This activity is usually described by the expression "PSQ'ing the personnel of a company".

the refugee ship Drottningholm. Bahr, a naturalized American citizen will be charged with conspiracy to obtain and disclose war secrets. On 3 September he received a 30-year sentence. (NYT 17 July p. 7; NYT 3 September 1942 p. 1)

[The article does not reveal to what kind of secret information Bahr had access.]

**S, Jul 19, 1942:** 13 German aliens and one Italian alien were arrested in New York. (NYT p. 18)

**S, Jul 19, 1942:** Between June 1941 and June 1942, there were 218 convictions for acts of sabotage which included train wrecking, depredations against defense plants and damage to ships. 56 persons were convicted of espionage or failure to register as foreign agents. In the seven months between 7 December 1941 and June 1942, some 9,400 aliens of enemy nationalities were apprehended by the FBI. These included 4,700 Japanese, 3,000 Germans and 1,500 Italians. (NYT p. 18)

**S, Jul 28, 1942:** At Hopeman Brothers Shipyard No 3, Richmond, California, Heinrich Roedel was suspected of incendiarism. An escaped internee, he is presently in custody of the military authorities and will be surrendered to the United States Marshall as soon as the investigation is complete. (NARA 6)

**S, Aug 8, 1942:** Hazel Sutton was apprehended near Goose Lake, California near a place where the sheriff discovered a cache of dynamite. She had a 32 caliber revolver [i.e. a small revolver]. After her fingerprints had been checked and no prior record was found, she was released. (NARA 6)

[It seems somewhat surprising that this person was released so quickly.]

**S, Aug 19, 1942:** Werner von Clemm, 44 years old, a United States citizen of German birth, was convicted in Federal court yesterday of conspiring with the German High Command. He was charged with importing Nazi diamonds. On 25 August he was sentenced to two years imprisonment, the highest possible penalty. The judge also announced that he would move to have the prisoner's citizenship annulled. (NYT 19 August 1942 p. 1; NYT 25 August 1942 p. 10)

**S, Sep 9, 1942:** 13 disloyal United States citizens of German origin were deprived of their acquired citizenship yesterday by a Federal Judge; 7 had failed to oppose denaturalization proceedings, 5 had consented to this action and one actually requested denaturalization. (NYT p. 13)

**S, Sep 10, 1942:** In Imperial County, California, a section of the large railroad bridge on the Southern Pacific Railroad, and two bridges on a branch line were burned and destroyed by Vincent Palokis, alias Bill North who was indicted and awaits trial. (NARA 6)

[The burnings of these bridges were not mentioned in the New York Times.]

**S, Sep 15, 1942:** 6 naturalized Americans are alleged to have aided Herbert Haupt, one of the executed saboteurs. They are the parents of Herbert Haupt, his uncle and aunt and a couple of friends. On 25 November the 3 men were sentenced to death by electrocution and their wives to imprisonment for 25 years. On appeal, one was sentenced to life imprisonment whereas the two other men were sentenced to 5 year imprisonment, a sentence considerably reduced with respect to the first one. (NYT 15 September 1942 p. 3; NYT 16 November 1942 p. 4; NYT 25 November 1942 p. 3; NYT 15 June 1944 p. 8; NYT 23 July 1944 p. 9)

**S, Sep 19, 1942:** The weekly report concerning prevalence of sabotage in the 9th Service Command states that “apart from the investigation by the FBI the G-2 section of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army has made many investigations of suspected sabotage, records of which are available in the G-2 Section of the War Department. (NARA 6)

[These records would certainly be of interest but so far we have not been able to find them.]

**S, Sep 19, 1942:** The same weekly report summarizes all cases of sabotage which occurred in the 9th Service Command since 7 December 1941. Among them is the case of 6 Japanese being arrested in Washington State for blowing up a section of the railroad track in Jefferson County. They were turned over to the FBI. (NARA 6)

[The date of the sabotage is not given; it was probably before people of Japanese ancestry were sent to detention camps.]

**S, Sep 25, 1942:** ● (172) Dickerson, Maryland. Rescue crews tonight had removed twelve bodies from the twisted wreckage of two passenger trains and a fast freight train in which twenty persons were believed to have died. (NYT p. 1)

**S, Nov 9, 1942:** Three guards at the Navy Yard in Brooklyn who systematically looted a warehouse of drills and precision tools were rounded up by detectives of the safe and loft squad. (NYT p. 25)

**S, Jan 6, 1943:** Ernest Neubacher, 26 years old, American-born member of the Hitler Youth Movement in Germany in 1935–1936, who, since Pearl Harbor, had had a job as a machinist in the Navy Yard in Brooklyn, was imprisoned for keeping brass knuckles in his Yorkville home. (NYT p. 11)

**S, Feb 19, 1943:** Elsa Kuhn, wife of Fritz Kuhn, former national “Führer” of the German-American Bund, has been taken into custody. Their son, Walter, 19-year old, also has been apprehended. (NYT p. 9)

**S, Mar 8, 1943:** The derailment of a military train on its way to Camp Upton on Long Island injured 26 inductees. (NYT p. 21)

**S, Mar 19, 1943:** Fritz Kuhn and 10 other German-American Bund leaders were deprived of United States citizenship yesterday by Federal Judge John Bright. Fritz Kuhn became a naturalized US citizen in 1934. The Court decided that by accepting Adolf Hitler's "leadership principle" the Bund was thoroughly un-American. (NYT p. 21)

**S, Apr 20, 1943:** George Arnold Steele, a 20-year old ship welder was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. Nine other shipwelders are awaiting trial. (NYT p. 3)

**S, Apr 27, 1943:** Harvey L. Thomas, 21, former aircraft inspector at the Glenn Martin plant was sentenced to 2 years in prison for sabotaging planes. He damaged electrical parts. (NYT p. 10)

[At the same plant another worker was sentenced to 15 years in November 1941, see above.]

**S, May 11, 1943:** At the Salinas Army Air Base in California, all planes were grounded as a result of the discovery of an unknown foreign substance in the carburetors of all planes at the base. (NARA 6)

**S, May 21, 1943:** 130 cubic meter of gas burned after a derailment. (NYT p. 13)

**S, Jun 23, 1943:** ● (173) Kenil, New Jersey. One man was killed by an explosion at the Kenil plant of the Hercules Powder Company where 52 persons had been killed in September 1940. (NYT p. 23)

[This was the 4th recorded explosion in a Hercules Powder plant and the third at the same site.]

**S, Jun 23, 1943:** M. Edgar Hoover announced that 7 persons have been arrested at Rochester, New York State, on charge of faulty manufacture of incendiary bombs and hand grenades. They were charged with willfully failing properly to load a powder charge. Moreover attempts were made to pass material previously rejected by an army inspector.

Among those arrested in Amerigo Antonelli, 52, a naturalized citizen native of Italy. He was the president and treasurer of the company. The plant superintendent and several foremen were also arrested.

The army took possession of the factory on June 12. (Times p. 3)

[Two interesting observations can be made about this story. (i) Edgard Hoover's usual description that sabotage acts were committed by "persons on their own initiative, either from spite or maliciousness" hardly applies to this case. It was certainly a concerted plan, otherwise it would be difficult to explain the simultaneous arrests of the president, superintendent and foremen. (ii) The news was made public 11 days after the plant was taken over by the army.]



**S, Jul 20, 1943:** Shell fragments and bullet slugs peppered the town of Monroeville, Ohio for more than 3 hours after a car loaded with high explosives and 15 other cars of an eastbound freight train were derailed. (NYT p. 15)

**S, Jul 27, 1943: Traitors.** Eight American citizens, including two women, who have been broadcasting Axis propaganda from Germany and Italy, were indicted in absentia for treason by a District of Columbia grand jury. Their names are: Jane Anderson, Robert Henry Best, Douglas Chandler, Edward Delaney, Constance Drexel, Fred W. Kaltenbach, Max Koischwitz (who died in August 1944), Ezra Pound. (NYT p. 1; Wikipedia, entry for Robert Henry Best.)

[After the end of the war some 27 Americans were hunted in Europe by American authorities on charges of treason.

- On 16 April 1946 Best (who was an American by birth) was sentenced to life imprisonment.

- The poet Ezra Pound (born in Idaho) was arrested by American forces in Genoa on 6 May 1945. On 14 February 1946 he was found incompetent to face trial by a special federal jury and sent to St. Elizabeths Hospital in Washington, D.C., where he remained for 12 years from 1946 to 1958.

- Chandler also put in a defense of insanity but he was sentenced to life imprisonment. As of 1969 he was still in jail (Oral History Interview with Oscar R. Ewing).

- Jane Anderson (born in Atlanta) devoted most of her broadcast for Radio-Berlin to exposing the “communist domination” of the Roosevelt and Churchill governments. She was arrested but never tried.

- Herbert John Burgman, former United States Embassy clerk in Berlin, was sentenced to serve 6 to 20 years in the Federal penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. He was accused of broadcasting for the Nazis from Germany (NYT 21 Dec 1949 p. 1).

- Mildred E. Gillars (born in Maine) who made broadcasts for Radio-Berlin was sentenced to 10-30 years imprisonment.

- Iva Toguri Aquino, the so-called “Tokyo Rose” who broadcast propaganda for Radio-Tokyo was given a 10-year sentence in 1949.

- William Joyce (born in New York) broadcast propaganda for Radio Berlin; because he held a British passport he was tried by a British court in 1945 and hanged on 3 January 1946.

- John Amery, a British citizen who broadcast for the Germans and Italians was tried in November 1945 and hanged on 19 December 1945 (Wikipedia).]

**S, Sep 7, 1943:** ●(253) 80 persons were killed when 8 cars of the Express from Washington to New York derailed at 6 pm, 6 km south of the North Philadelphia



station. The FBI ruled out the possibility of a sabotage. (NYT 7 September 1943 p. 1; NYT 9 September 1943 p. 52; NYT 14 September 1943 p. 12)

[It seems that the possibility of sabotage was ruled out very early and before the inquiry was completed.]

**S, Sep 11, 1943: ●(254)** Altoona. Pennsylvania Railroad's trains were wrecked in a three-way derailment. The engineer was killed. (NYT p. 28)

**S, Oct 31, 1943:** Highland, New York. Explosions that sounded like the booming of cannon sent thousands of gallons of oil and gasoline up in flame and smoke today in the spectacular wreck of a freight train. The exploding oil cars set fire to 3 near-by houses. (NYT p. 44)

**S, Dec 18, 1943: ●(332)** Lumberton, North Carolina. A broken rail caused the derailment of 3 coaches of a Florida-bound train. This derailment caused one death. About 35 minutes later a northbound train smashed into the 3 coaches which had fallen over the double track. This second wreck caused the death of 47 servicemen and 33 civilians. In spite of the evidence of a broken rail, the FBI reported that there was no evidence of sabotage.

A Congressional investigation of the appalling number of wartime train accidents was asked in a resolution introduced by the Democratic Representative of New York. (NYT p. 9)

**S, Dec 31, 1943:** Since 7 December 1941, 1.5 million Americans have been screened under a loyalty investigation program. In addition 21,500 aliens were screened under the "Alien Aeronautical Contracts Program".

Under the "Removal of Subversive Program" 928 people were removed during the month of December<sup>78</sup>. If this average can be considered fairly steady during the whole period it leads to a figure of about 12,000 subversives removed annually<sup>79</sup>. For the 6th Service Command there were only 10 persons removed; as their names are given we can see that 8 of these subversives were of German descent and 2 of Japanese descent. For the New York area as many as 500 people were removed; in this case their names were not given.

About 1,200 agents were involved in these programs. These investigations were conducted partly by the Personnel Security Division of the War Department and partly by private credit companies under the supervision of the Security Division. The figure of 1,200 agents does not include the personnel of the private companies.

(NARA 5)

<sup>78</sup>The document does not clearly say how the term "removed" should be understood. Does it mean removed from their jobs or removed to a detention camp?

<sup>79</sup>It is more likely that more persons were removed in the first months after December 1941; this suggests that the figure of 12,000 probably underestimates the number of subversives removed in 1942 or 1943.

This loyalty investigation can be seen as a forerunner and a model for the loyalty investigation of federal employees ordered by President Truman in 1947.]

**S, Jul 11, 1944:** The trial of Mrs Velvalee-Dickinson, 50 year old, who is accused of having served as a Japanese spy was set for July 31 in Federal Court. If convicted, she will face execution or a long prison term. (NYT p. 8)

[On 15 August 1944 she was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment, see below.]

**S, Jul 19, 1944:** ● (652) Port Chicago, California. 320 sailors and civilians were killed in the double explosion which shattered two munitions ships at the Port Chicago Naval Magazine, 70 kilometers northeast of San Francisco. This is a crucial storage facility where ships are equipped in bombs, shells, mines and other explosive devices. 63 % of the dead were African American sailors of an ordnance battalion. Three weeks after the disaster this battalion refused to load any ammunition in what was called the Port Chicago Mutiny. In November 1944, 50 of them were sentenced to terms at hard labor of 8 to 15 years by a court martial. The real cause of the explosion was never determined. (NYT 19 July 1944 p. 1; NYT 19 November 1944 p. 29; Wikipedia article entitled “Port Chicago disaster”.)

**S, Aug 11, 1944:** Ammunition exploded after a train wreck. (NYT p. 7)

[This is (at least) the 5th derailment of an oil or ammunition train in the past two years.]

**S, Aug 15, 1944:** Mrs. Dickinson [see above at the date of 11 July 1944] was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. She blamed her husband (who died on 29 March 1943) who had agreed to act as an agent for the Japanese. She said he had received \$ 25,000 for his services from the Japanese. (NYT p. 19)

[It is not clear to what kind of intelligence Mr. Dickinson had access.]

**S, Oct 21, 1944:** ● (752) Cleveland. Huge gas tanks exploded at the East Side Gas plant. The flames struck a 50-block area and remained out of control for hours. The number of dead may reach 40. A first tank exploded at 2:30 pm, a second at 3:00 pm. (NYT p. 19)

[This article which appeared on page 19 had only 637 words which represents about one column; it attests that after the beginning of the war the newspapers followed a policy of restraint in reporting such disasters. Subsequent articles on this fire containing revised fatality figures were also short articles in the inside pages of the journal.]

**S, Oct 22, 1944:** The death toll in Cleveland’s disastrous explosions and fire climbed toward the 100 mark as a systematic search was made of the ruins which cover 1.3 square kilometer in the eastern part of the city. 1,500 people were left homeless. The FBI is reported to be studying the possibility of sabotage in the explosion of the gas

plant. (NYT p. 41)

[The final death toll estimate reached 121 (NYT 25 October 25, p. 9).]

**S, Dec 4, 1944:** The National Association of Insurance Commissioners has approved the report on “filling the gaps” between losses insured by the Federal War Damage Corporation and those insured by the insurance industry. (NYT p. 35)

[It is not clear what should be understood by the expression “filling the gaps”.]

**S, Dec 4, 1944:** The House of Representatives amended the law on sabotage of 20 April 1918. This was in fact only one step in a series of modifications to this law. The discussion of these modifications covered almost the whole duration of the war; apart from Congress it also involved the Secretary of War, the Provost Marshal General, the Department of the Navy, the Attorney General. The changes concerned several points. One of the most important was how to deal with the act of knowingly producing faulty war material. Should only workers be held responsible or should management also be charged? (NARA 9)

**S, Dec 10, 1944:** ●(754) San Francisco. A nitroglycerin line exploded today on the Hercules Power Company’s reservation 40 kilometer northeast of San Francisco, killing two persons, injuring at least thirty, wrecking two buildings and shattering windows in towns near by. (NYT p. 56)

[This was the 5th recorded explosion in a Hercules Powder plant. The fact that an explosion of this amplitude was recorded in a short article (342 words, i.e. less than one column) on page 56 once again shows the policy of restraint of US newspapers.]

**S, Apr 19, 1945:** Elsa Kuhn, the wife of Fritz Kuhn, former German-American Bund leader, was seized by American troops in Germany near Nuremberg. Her 21-year old daughter was arrested at the same time. Her son, Walter, 19-year old, was also arrested in Germany near Kaufbeuren on 29 June (NYT 19 April 1945 p. 1; NYT 29 June 1945 p. 3)

**S, May 19, 1945:** Fritz Kuhn, once leader of the German-American Bund, has been ordered deported to Germany as an undesirable alien, the Department of Justice announced today. (NYT p. 4)

**S, Aug 25, 1945:** Through Executive Order 9603, President Truman terminated the possession of certain industrial plants taken over by the Federal Government. The seizure of these plants (about 30 altogether) by the US Army or US Navy took place mainly in 1944 and 1945. Most often the seizure was not for security concern but rather as an attempt to prevent a strike or to enforce a regulation that the owners did not wish to follow. Naturally, companies raised strong objections and challenged these actions in court.

One of the first seizures was authorized by Executive Order 9108 of 21 March 1942 through which the government took control of the Toledo, Peoria, and Western Railroad Company. From January 1944 on similar Executive Orders came in close succession (21 January, 7 February, 23 February, etc.). Although well documented by numerous articles published in the NYT these seizures seem to be a forgotten episode of World War II.

A key-word search in the articles of the NYT reveals that there were numerous labor contests and strikes during the war. In other words, the seizures prevented only some of the strikes. The numbers of work stoppages in the period 1941-1948 are given in the following table (Historical Statistics of the United States p. 179):

1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948
4,288	2,968	3,762	4,956	4,750	4,985	3,693	3,417

In contrast, according to current accounts, there were no strikes whatsoever in Hawaii during the duration of the war. If really true, this would show that martial law was very effective in suppressing strikes even after it was (partially) lifted in October 1944<sup>80</sup>.

The Executive Order of 25 August 1945 released only a part of the plants to their owners. As a matter of fact, some new seizures took place in the days before. (Text of Executive Orders and NYT articles)

**S, Oct 5, 1945:** Fritz Kuhn was taken in US custody on German soil as he was leaving ship after being deported to Germany. (NYT p. 25)

**S, Apr 25, 1946:** Fritz Kuhn will be freed from an internment camp tomorrow because he is no longer considered as a threat. (NYT p. 8)

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<sup>80</sup>A search with the keywords “strike” + “union” between the dates of 1 November 1944 and 15 August 1945 produced 773 NYT articles; but if the keyword “Hawaii” is added, the search gives 0 article. Other sets of keywords lead to similar results. Thus, “striking”+“workers” produce 165 articles; this number is reduced to 2 if “Hawaii” is added and in fact both articles are spurious in the sense that none is really about work stoppages in Hawaii. On a simple basis of population proportionality, if there were of the order of  $4700 \times 9.5/12 = 3,720$  strikes on the mainland between 1 Nov 1944 and 15 Aug 1945, one would expect:  $3720 \times 0.42/131 = 12$  strikes in the Territory of Hawaii and (at least)  $773 \times 0.42/131 = 14 = 2$  articles about them in the NYT.

It can also be noted that the Department of Labor has no data about Hawaii for the period of the war.

## Chapter 7

### The Niihau incident

Niihau is an island located in the north of the Hawaiian archipelago. It is 30 km long and about 6 km wide. In 1941 it had a fairly small population of the order of one hundred persons. After the bombing of Pearl Harbor a Japanese pilot landed his Zero fighter aircraft on the island because leaking fuel made him unable to reach the *Hiryu*, his aircraft carrier.

His presence on the island from Sunday December 7 1941 to the date of his death, apparently on Saturday 13 December, gave rise to various incidents. As already explained in the chronology, there are conflicting accounts of these events. In this appendix we try to compare the Japanese and American accounts. They are fairly different.

For a person who cannot read Japanese it is not easy to explore the accounts given on the Japanese side. In this endeavor I had the privilege to get the help of several colleagues; I am particularly grateful to Professor Yuri Aruka (Chuo University), Ms. Kimiko Tonegawa (librarian at the International Christian University, Tokyo) and Professor Annick Horiuchi (University of Paris 7).

According to an information from Ms. Tonegawa, there was a NHK program about the Niihau incident which was broadcast in Japan on 18 October 1979 and a second time on 14 January 1980. The program was entitled: “An American tale (third episode)”<sup>81</sup>. However this program seems to antecede the one mentioned by Allan Beekman in 1982 (see below). May be there have been two different programs?

Irene Harada, the wife of the Japanese-American who died with the pilot gave several testimonies (i) To a board of American officers on 19 December 1941. (ii) To the Japanese Consul in Hawaii on 10 September 1955. (iii) According to Beekman (1982) she also gave an interview to a NHK team in 1982. According to an investigation done by NHK personnel in 2008 it seems that this interview (if really there was one) was never broadcast.

Incidentally, Allan Beekman died on 29 October 2001 at the age of 88 (StarBul-

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<sup>81</sup>This information was given to Ms. Tonegawa by Ms. Isozaki from the NHK museum. According to Mr. Fukuda, a director at the NHK Special Program Center, NHK did not keep any record of this program (personal email received on 24 March 2009).

letin.com, 2 November 2001 <sup>82</sup> ).

In the first section we try to set up a chronology of the episode based solely on Ms. Harada's testimonies. In so doing, our objective is to see to what extent this version differs from the account given in the New York Times (see the chronology chapter) and subsequently in Beekman's book.

## Chronology based on Ms. Harada's testimony in 1941

Ms. Irene (Umeno) Harada was born in Hawaii and was therefore an American citizen. Before getting married her name was Tanaka. Her parents lived in Kapaa on the eastern coast of the island of Kauai. Her husband was also an American citizen. Ms. Harada declared that they came to Niihau because Mr. Robinson, the owner of the island, wanted Mr. Harada to work as a beekeeper. Mr. Harada was working under the supervision of Mr Shintani, the third person on the island who was able to speak Japanese. She says: "Shintani was Harada's boss". Both Mr. Harada and her wife were able to speak Japanese, but Ms. Harada says that her husband could read only very little Japanese.

Mr. and Ms. Harada had 3 children. The eldest was 7-year old at the time. Two of the children were on Kauai (the neighboring island) and the third was with them on Niihau.

Before giving the answers of Ms. Harada, the record of the hearing gives the following precisions.

- The FBI does not have any information about Ms. Harada.
- There is no mention of Ms. Harada in the report rendered to the Commanding Officer by Lieutenant Jack H. Mizuha who investigated the events on Niihau<sup>83</sup>.

The declarations of Ms. Harada on 19 December were made under oath. The record is fairly sketchy and not always very clear as to the date of the events.

**Niihau, Sunday, Dec 7, 1941:** 12:30 pm. As the Harada were preparing for lunch, a Hawaiian fellow came to their home to call on Mr. Harada. Ms. Harada did not learn about the reason, namely for her husband to act as an interpreter, until 4:10 pm. She says "I stayed that night at the camp and came back home in the following morning". It is not exactly clear what she means by "the camp" but it is said that this place was located about 2.5 km from her home.

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<sup>82</sup>The obituary gives the following information about him. Although he never went to college, Beekman was a voracious reader and a student of the Japanese language. Beekman married Take Okawa, a former Japanese-language schoolteacher educated in Tokyo and Hawaii who collaborated with her husband on many Japanese immigrant stories. During the 1960s and 1970s, Beekman worked as a security guard at Queen's Medical Center. He championed the rights of Japanese and Okinawan Americans with articles and letters to the editor of the Honolulu dailies.

<sup>83</sup>There is no file bearing the name of "Mizuha" in the electronic catalog (2011) of the American National Archives.



**Niihau, Monday, Dec 8, 1941:** Ms. Harada came back home in the morning. On the evening she went back to the camp. Ms. Harada also says: “On Monday they went to Kii to meet the sampan”. Kii is a place on the north-east coast of the island. In response to a question, Ms. Harada confirms that when she said “they” she meant her husband and the aviator.

**Niihau, Tuesday, Dec 9, 1941:** As no sampan came on Monday, they (i.e. the pilot and Mr. Harada) went again to Kii on Tuesday and they even spent the night there.

**Niihau, Wednesday, Dec 10, 1941:** Mr. Harada came back home on Wednesday. In response to the question: “Where was the aviator kept Wednesday night?”, Ms. Harada answered: “At our place with the guards”. “At our place” probably means at her home.

**Niihau, Thursday, Dec 11, 1941:** Ms. Harada stayed at home all the day with Mr. Harada.

**Niihau, Friday, Dec 12, 1941:** Mr. Shintani often stopped at Ms. Harada’s house on his way to work. On Friday morning, he came with the aviator and with her husband. They had lunch together. It was the last time that Ms. Harada saw her husband alive.

When Ms. Harada was asked:

“Did you hear any shots fired?” she replied “No”. It is not clear to what day this question refers. As it comes after the question regarding the last time Ms. Harada saw her husband (namely on Friday) it is plausible that it also refers to Friday.

After the question about the shots there is a question about planes:

Q: “You saw planes?”

A: “Yes, When some Hawaiian ladies notified us we went out and saw some planes”. This was probably also on Friday.

There is only one question about the death of her husband and the answer is fairly surprising:

Q: “When did you first find out your husband committed suicide?”

A: “When I came to Lihue” [Lihue is the main city of Kauai Island.]

The conclusions of the hearing are somewhat puzzling:

“Findinds:

- 1 The internee is an American citizen
- 2 The internee is apparently loyal to the United States
- 3 The internee is apparently not connected with any subversive activities.

Recommendations:

In view of the above findings the Board recommends that the internee for her own good and protection be interned.”

A warrant of arrest against Ms Harada was issued on 20 January 1942 in the following terms:

“You are hereby commanded to take the body of Mrs. Umeno Harada on suspicion of being an alien enemy of the United States and to detain said person pending final action by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, US Army.”

[Signed] Lt. Colonel George W. Bissel

It can seem surprising that in spite of the findings of the Board, Ms. Harada was nevertheless labeled an enemy *alien*; however, this was a fairly common practice.

## Precisions given by Ms. Harada in an interview of 1955

In September 1955 the Consul General of Japan in Hawaii, Mr. Kanayama, was ordered to organize an interview of Ms. Harada about the Niihau incident which had occurred some 14 years earlier. One may wonder what brought about such renewed interest. It can be observed that the interview took place only 2 years after the Peace Treaty of 1953 through which Japan recovered control over its foreign diplomacy.

For the purpose of the interview Mr. Takegoro Sata who was one of the consuls visited the island of Kauai where Ms. Harada was living. The island is 180 km distant from Honolulu. Mr. Sato spent two days (and of course one night) in Kauai. Why did he not rather call Ms. Harada by phone? Did he intend to ask her questions on specific points? We are not yet able to answer these questions. The text of the interview is not given in a question-answer form (as was the case for the previous testimony) but rather as an summary account written by Mr. Sato.

This account was released by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 22 December 2008 (it was the 21th disclosure of diplomatic records). The release contained two documents: one which was typed and the other which was handwritten (MOFA 1).

In 1941 Ms. Harada had three children: a 4-year old girl who was with her on Niihau and two older children (7 and 6-year old) who were living with relatives on Kauai. According to her declarations in the interview, her husband was a beekeeper on Niihau; he was a stalwart and tall man whose height was 176 cm and he was a former sumo-wrestler.

There are three important points that this interview helps to clarify.

- Ms. Harada declared that she was not able to see the body of her husband.

If one accepts the official version of the story it is difficult to understand why. In-

deed why should the villagers have bared Ms. Harada from seeing the body of her husband? On the contrary, if one assumes that the rescue party from Kauai arrived *before* the bodies were discovered then Ms. Harada was probably taken into custody before being able to see the body.

- In 1953 Ms. Harada received the visit of a former Japanese officer who had taken part in the raid on the Pearl Harbor. It would be interesting to know if he has written an account of their discussions.

- Many American accounts tell us that the pilot, Mr. Nishikaichi, and Mr. Harada terrorized the people of Niihau<sup>84</sup>. The interview provides a clue to what happened. The main objective of the pilot was to destroy everything that could be of interest to the enemy and particularly his maps and the aircraft itself. After dismounting the guns he put the plane afire with gas that was stored in the Robinson home. Photographs of the burned aircraft can be found on the Internet (Fig. 7.1).



**Fig. 7.1** The burned Zero fighter aircraft on the island of Niihau. The 20mm cannon of the left wing have been removed.

Source: <http://www.airspacemag.com/history-of-flight/Zero.html>

The next objective of the pilot was to get back the maps which had been taken away by a Hawaiian. As the maps could not be found in the Hawaiian's home the obvious idea was to set fire to the house in the hope that the maps would burn at the same time. It is to prevent the other people from extinguishing the fire that the two men used the gun taken from the plane. Obviously, they did not aim at the people otherwise there would have been many fatalities whereas all accounts tell us that nobody on Niihau died except from the pilot and Mr. Harada.

After the arrival of the rescue team, Ms. Harada was incarcerated with her 4-year old daughter. Shortly after, the child was released and taken to relatives. When Ms.

<sup>84</sup>e.g. Washington Post 6 December 1969 p. AW14: "All night the two Japs ransacked village homes. They dismounted the plane's machine guns and fired aimlessly into the homes." The article tells us that Mr. Harada committed suicide with "a single blast into his stomach" and that the rescue party from Kauai arrived 3 hours later. It can be noted that an earlier article of the Washington Post (17 December 1941 p. 1) said that Mr. Harada had to shoot himself twice.

Harada was set free 33 months later she was depressed and without resources. She said that she attempted to take her life several times.

## Precisions given by Mr. Shintani (hearing of 29 Jan 42)

Mr. Ishimatsu Shintani was apprehended on Niihau on Sunday 14 December and the hearing took place at Lihue, Kauai on Thursday 29 January 1942 at 9 am (NARA 12).

The hearing began with the reading of a report. "For the benefit of the board, I will read extracts of the report rendered to the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Battalion, 299th Infantry by Lieutenant Jack H. Mizuha who investigated the events subsequent to the landing of a Japanese Light Bomber Plane on Niihau." These excerpts give the version of the story which has subsequently been repeated by all writers. They concern only the events in which Mr. Shintani was directly involved. The deaths of the pilot and Mr. Harada are not mentioned.

During this hearing Mr. Shintani provided the following precisions.

Q: How many children do you have living at your home on Niihau?

A: Six.

Q: Is your wife Hawaiian?

A: Yes. I'm a bee keeper on Niihau. Mr. Harada was my helper.

Q: You are Harada's boss?

A: Yes.

Shintani: On Friday night, it was already dark, I heard 11 shots fired. Less than 5 minutes later Harada and the pilot pounded on the door of my house. I hid in the lavatory about 50 meters away. Then I ran into the mountains and hid. When I heard a Hawaiian calling the people to come out from the Koa forest I came out. This was about one o'clock on Saturday afternoon [13 December].

Q: What did you find when you came out?

A: I returned home; all Hawaiians returned home.

Q: At that time was Harada and the aviator dead?

A: I heard that they were dead.

Q: Did you ever see the bodies?

A: No.

This hearing is puzzling. According to the official version Mr. Harada and the aviator died on Friday night. What then was the point for Mr. Shintani and the whole Hawaiian population to hide in the forest until Saturday 1pm? Moreover why did

he not see the body of Mr. Harada, his associate. It is also strange that he does not mention the arrival on the island of the military detachment nor his arrest.

The hearing was conducted under oath but through an interpreter who was Lieutenant Bert N. Nishimura. It is possible that some questions or some answers were not understood correctly because there are some contradictions. After the question regarding the bodies, there was the following question.

Q: Did you see Mrs Harada any time during that week?

A: No.

Yet, one knows from Mrs Harada's testimony that Mr. Shintani stopped by her house. as a matter of fact, a little bit later on in the hearing he says that he had seen Mrs Harada on Friday.

Q: On Friday did you go to Harada's house with him and the aviator?

A: Yes.

Q: At what time?

A: At noon.

Q: Then you did see Mrs. Harada?

A: Yes.

Q: How long did you stay there?

A: About a half hour.

How can one understand such conflicting answers? The Board did not press that point. A possible explanation is that Mr. Shintani understood "during *that* week" as the week which followed the death of Mr. Harada.

Another point which is unclear is the social and professional position of Mr. Harada. Mr. Shintani said that Harada was his helper. Yet, Mr. Harada had a job before coming to Niihau. How can one understand that he dropped that job to become the helper of a beekeeper. Moreover we learn in this hearing that the Harada family was living in the house of the Boss.

Q: You live in the camp?

A: Yes.

Q: How far from your home does Harada live?

A: Harada lives at the home of the Boss, two miles away?

Why should the helper of the beekeeper live in the house of the Boss and so far away from the beekeeper himself?

### **Recommendations of the Board**

The Board recommends that the internee, Ishimatsu Shintani, be tried by a Military

Commission. The board adjourned at 10:35 am.

[The hearing had lasted one hour and a half. As far as one knows Mr. Shintani was never tried by a Military Commission. From his internee card (NARA 11) one learns that he was transferred to the prisoner camp at Fort Missoula, Montana on 5 June 1943 (which means that he was interned in Hawaii until that date), then to the Santa Fe camp in New Mexico on 6 April 1944. On 7 November 1945 he was transferred to Hawaii but the card does not say whether he was released or not.



## Chapter 8

### Conclusion

It has been said that during the period of martial law in Hawaii there were no incidents whatsoever. This raises a serious question. Why?

It is a common saying that “Good science is all about replication”. Reproducibility is indeed one of the main requirements of the scientific method. It refers to the fact that similar situations should lead to similar outcomes.

Several situations are known which in many respects were identical to martial law in Hawaii. For instance, Iceland is an island with a population fairly similar to the one of Hawaii. When British and American troops were brought in, this resulted in many incidents: brawls, assaults, even sabotage, nervous sentries who shot and killed residents, numerous traffic accidents and so on<sup>85</sup>. If a fairly similar situation can lead to a completely different outcome, then it would mean that in order to explain the difference one needs to take into account subtle and fairly unclear characteristics of each case. In other words, the effect that we wish to study, namely the interaction between two populations, would become a fairly complicated phenomenon. Before coming to such a conclusion one must of course ascertain that the facts on which it is based are correct.

If it turns out that eventually (that is to say once one has been able to get reliable data) the occupations of Iceland and Hawaii are fairly similar, one would be in a much better position regarding the crucial question of reproducibility.

If, in addition, one observes that the occupations of Germany or Japan were not very different either, then this would suggest that a small number of parameters are sufficient to account for the key features of this phenomenon.

In other words what is at stake here goes much beyond the issue of getting a correct view of the era of martial law in Hawaii.

In spite of limitations in the availability of sources, the present study suggests that it is not correct to say that there were no incidents. This is best revealed by the clashes between troops and population that came to light in late 1945 as soon as censorship

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<sup>85</sup>For more detail the interested reader can consult “Relation between Allied Forces and the population of Iceland” published by the same author in the series of studies of occupation episodes.

was partially lifted.

In addition, during the period of martial law there were so many trials, arrests and loyalty investigations that the population of Hawaii (and especially the Japanese community) was under permanent threat.

As an illustration one can mention the fact that working less than 20 days a month was considered as an offence (under Civil Regulation No 67, Section 3). The names of offenders were quickly transmitted to the military and the persons were promptly arrested and tried by a provost court (NARA 37). In most cases the sentence was light or there was just a warning, but this example nevertheless shows that the population was closely monitored.



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The present draft is still somewhat provisional in the sense that for some issues (for instance the Niihau episode) we were not yet able to find the records which would allow clear conclusions to be drawn. However, I am convinced that with the help and support of friends and colleagues it will be possible to bring this project to a successful completion.

## Special terms and abbreviations

### Special terms

#### Legal status of people of Japanese ancestry in the United States

AJA: American of Japanese ancestry. This term is used only for American citizens.

Dual citizen: A Japanese-American born in the United States and whose birth has also been registered with the Japanese consulate which gives him (her) Japanese citizenship. After 1924, the parents of a newborn Nisei had two weeks to register their baby at a Japanese consulate. Between 1924 and 1941 approximately 40% of the newborn Nisei were registered at the Japanese consulate in Honolulu<sup>86</sup>.

Enemy alien Japanese: This is the standard expression used in military reports (e.g. NARA 2) to refer to people of Japanese ancestry who were not born in the United States (and therefore could not become American citizens by naturalization<sup>87</sup>). Sometimes this expression was also applied to persons who were US citizens; an example is provided by Ms. Harada who was called an enemy alien in her arrest warrant.

Expatriated citizen: A dual citizen who had renounced to one of his (her) two nationalities. Whether it is the Japanese or the US citizenship that had been abandoned must be interpreted from the context. A dual citizen who had not applied for expatriation, casting off his Japanese citizenship, could be drafted into the Imperial Armed Forces. A number of Hawaii-born Nisei served in Japan in this way. Sometimes expatriation was not a voluntary act but was imposed by a court decision for instance if the person has served in the military of the other country. Between 1924 and 1941 about 8% of the Hawaii Nisei had renounced Japanese citizenship<sup>88</sup>.

Full citizen: an expression used (especially in military reports) to designate a Japa-

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<sup>86</sup>Burlingame 2002, p. 16-17

<sup>87</sup>A small number of World War I Veterans World War I were naturalized in the 1930s.

<sup>88</sup>Burlingame 2002, p. 16-17

nese American of Japanese ancestry whose birth had *not* been declared at the Japanese Consulate.

**Issei:** Japanese not born in the United States. Because these people were unable to get naturalized before World War II they were also so called Japanese aliens. The inability to apply for US citizenship was the consequence of the US Supreme Court ruling of 12 November 1922 which prohibited the naturalization of people of Japanese descent. This ban lasted until 1952.

The Issei who served in the US Army during World War I eventually became American citizens but it was a fairly long process. About 800 Issei were drafted in Hawaii in 1917. In May 1918, Congress enacted a special Naturalization Act to permit any alien who served in the armed forces to acquire American citizenship by naturalization. Yet, in 1922 the Territorial Government of Hawaii announced that the naturalization of veterans who were ineligible because of their racial background was void. In 1926 the US Supreme Court ruled that the Naturalization Act of 1918 was inapplicable to alien Japanese. In 1935, Congress passed the Lea-Nye Bill which granted citizenship to about 500 Asian World War I veterans (Muller 2001, p.15). According to Yukiko Kimura (1988) only 79 Japanese veterans from Hawaii took advantage of this law to become US citizens.

**Kibei:** The term Kibei was commonly used in the 1940s to designate Japanese Americans born in the United States (and being therefore US citizen) who went to Japan to receive part of their education there and then returned to America. “ki” means “return” and “bei” means America. Intelligence services make a distinction between Kibei who had received all their education in Japan from childhood to about 17 years of age and those who received their early formation in the United States and went back to Japan for only 4 or 5 years of Japanese education.

In October 1940, Congress passed the Nationality Act according to which American citizens of foreign parents would lose their citizenship if they spent less than 5 years in the United States between the age of 13 and 21.

**Nikkei:** This term is sometimes used to designate all people of Japanese ancestry.

**Nisei:** Second generation Japanese American; born in the United States; may have been partly educated in Japan or not.

## **Organizations**

**Emergency Service Committees:** With the support of the Military Government the Japanese-American community in the different Hawaiian islands formed patriotic organizations with the purpose of helping the war effort. They conducted blood drives, promoted “Speak American” campaigns, provided labor for clear-

ing the ground for military installations.

**Morale Committees:** The Kauai Morale Committee, the Hawaii AJA Morale Committee and committees with similar names on other islands were also patriotic organizations with basically the same objectives as the Emergency Service Committees.

**Varsity Victory Volunteers:** This organization of Hawaiian of Japanese ancestry served as an auxiliary labor force to the Army engineers.

## Acronyms

**AFL:** American Federation of Labor

**CIC:** Counter Intelligence Corps

**CID:** Counter Intelligence Division (The dominant counter intelligence investigative agency in Hawaii. The FBI and the ONI were required to furnish the CID with all important information in its area of responsibility.)

**FBI:** Federal Bureau of Investigation (it succeeded to the “Bureau of Investigation” in 1932).

**JACL:** Japanese American Citizens League. Created with the support of the government, this organization helped in implementing wartime goals in the Nikkei community.

**LST:** Landing Ship for Tanks (about 100 meters long with a crew of about 130 men and officers)

**MILS:** Military Intelligence Language School

**OIS:** Office of Internal Security

**OMG:** Office of the Military Government

**ONI:** Office of Naval Intelligence

**USO:** United Service Organization; a social-service agency chartered on 4 February 1941, to provide social and recreational services for members of the US armed forces and their families.

**USED:** United States Engineers Department

**VVV:** Varsity Victory Volunteers (see above)

**WRA:** War Relocation Authority (the administration in charge of the relocation camps where residents of Japanese ancestry were detained.)



## References

### Archive records

*All the documents used in the “Occupation project” including those listed below (plus a number of others which have not been used yet) are available in the so-called “Fonds Roehner 434 W” belonging to the archive bureau of “University Pierre and Marie Curie” (UPMC), 4 place Jussieu, 75005 Paris.*

*In addition to archive records there are also several books, for instance a book with many pictures of the 1941-1945 period in Iceland and two volumes about the occupation of South Korea published by Hallym University.*

*Altogether there are 8 boxes which have the reference numbers: 434 W 1-8.*

- *434 W1-4: Japan*
- *434 W5: Hawaii*
- *434 W6: South Korea*
- *434 W7: South Korea, China, Iceland.*
- *434 W8: Germany*

NARA 1: U.S. National Archives at College Park

Title: Case files, 1942-1944

Creator: Military Government of the Territory of Hawaii. Military Commission (01/1942-07/20/1944)

Record Group 494 (comprise 80 files), stack area 290 / row 44 / compartment 11 /shelf 3 / Box 497.

43 pages

NARA 2: U.S. National Archives at College Park

Title: Daily Report of Investigations, November 1944–October 1945

Creator: Office of Internal Security, Executive Section

Record Group 494

Stack area/Row/Compartment/Shelf/Box: 290/44/4/07/141

[NARA 2 corresponds to a part of the whole file, namely 200 pages of photocopies which cover the period 21 November 1944–30 December 1944. The

whole file (consisting of several thousand pages) covers the period indicated in its title.

According to the archivists no similar files seem to be available for the period prior to November 1944.

The reports have three distinct parts: (i) weekly summaries (ii) summary of the activity of CID in terms of numbers of investigations opened, reports and memoranda written (iii) summary of numbers of persons apprehended, excluded or relocated to mainland.

In a general way, the more serious a case the less details are provided. For instance, in early December 1944 as a crew was to fill a deep-well tank in an army transport ship with metal barrels, one of the soldiers noticed half-pound blocks of TNT scattered throughout the hold of the ship; a precise count revealed that there were a total of 261 TNT blocks. However, the report offers no clue as to how these TNT blocks have been put aboard the ship.]

#### NARA 3: U.S. National Archives at College Park

Title: Case files of persons accused of a violation of martial law, February 1945–July 1945

Period covered by NARA 3 (30 p.): 3 July 1945 – 12 September 1945

Record Group 494

Stack area/Row/Compartment/Shelf/Box: 290/44/11/2/493

[The title of this file is bizarre because in 1945 Hawaii was no longer under martial law.]

#### NARA 4: U.S. National Archives at College Park

Title: Daily reports of investigations. September 1, 1945–October 20, 1945.

About 27 pages. Record Group 494

Stack area/Row/Compartment/Shelf/Box: 290/44/4/07/141

[In spite of the title, this file consists in fact of 8 weekly Counter Intelligence Corps summaries and one monthly counter-intelligence estimate for 15 July 1945 – 15 September 1945. Most of the activity of the CIC was focused on loyalty investigations of Japanese, for instance before recruiting them as interpreters.

Each report begins with the statement that the CIC has investigative jurisdiction over all cases of sabotage, espionage, subversion, disaffection, treason, and sedition in the Territory of Hawaii, and supervisory control over the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Two reasons limit the interest of this source. (i) There is some evidence that the accounts do not mention all events. For instance, on 14 November 1945 (see the chronology), a naval air station spokesman declared that during the month of October 1945 there have been 30 beatings of sailors in Honolulu by

local population. Yet, for the period 1-20 October the present source mentions only two incidents of this kind. (ii) For the incidents which are described, the descriptions are fairly laconic, omitting essential details such as casualties or identification of participants.]

NARA 5: U.S. National Archives at College Park

ARC Identifier: 979010

Title: Subversive program MG-49. Statistical Reports.

War Department. Office of the Provost Marshal General, Internal Security Division.

Record Group: 389

Stack area: 290, Row: 35, Compartment: 14, Shelf: 6, Box: 1896.

[The file that was sent to me has 68 pages; it covers the month of December 1943, but gives also some cumulative data. The data are given by Service Commands. There are 9 Service Commands: for instance 1 corresponds to New England, 2 to the New York area, 9 to western states. Data are also given for the Military District of Washington. However no data are given for overseas possessions, i.e. Hawaii, the Panama Canal zone and Puerto Rico.]

NARA 6: US National Archives at College Park

ARC Identifier: 979171

Title: Subversive program: prevalence of sabotage: 9th Service Command.

War Department. Office of the Provost Marshal General, Internal Security Division.

Record Group: 389

Stack area: 290, Row: 35, Compartment: 15, Shelf: not readable, Box: 1916.

[The file that was sent to me has 19 pages; it covers the 8-month period from 19 September 1942 to 15 May 1943. The description of each case is fairly short. At the end there is a recapitulation of all cases of sabotage reported to the office of the 9th Service Command since 7 December 1941. There are 44 cases. The list shows the name of the person responsible (or "unknown" if the case has not been solved). Surprisingly (on account of the fact that persons of Japanese ancestry living in Western states were sent to detention camps) three names refer to persons of Japanese descent: Manzo Miyamoto, Koma Okamoto, Masaru Wada. Indications about the nature of the incident are given only in a few cases, e.g. "Santa Fe train wreck near Earp, California".]

NARA 7: US National Archives at College Park

ARC Identifier: 979110

Title: Subversive program: Navy, Office of Naval Information.

War Department. Office of the Provost Marshal General, Internal Security Di-

vision.

Record Group: 389

Stack area: 290, Row: 35, Compartment: 14, Shelf: 1, Box: 1908.

[I requested the first 20 pages of this file. It consists mainly of letters forwarding documents from one intelligence service to another; e.g.: "Attached herewith are two copies of letters from the FBI". Unfortunately, in most cases, the attached letters are not included.]

#### NARA 8: US National Archives at College Park

ARC Identifier: 900406

Title: Hawaii, Civilian Internees: Harada, Umeno (Mrs)

War Department. Office of the Provost Marshal General, Enemy Prisoner of War Information Bureau.

Record Group: 389

[This short file (only 12 pages) is about Mrs Irene Harada who through her husband was involved in the Niihau incident of December 7-12, 1941.

The file contains two items (i) The record of the hearing of Mrs Harada by a board of officers and civilians which occurred on 19 December 1941. (ii) The warrant of arrest issued by Lt Colonel George W. Bicknell of G-2 on 20 January 1942. The warrant contains the sentence: "You are hereby commanded to take the body of Mrs Umeno Harada on suspicion of being an alien enemy of the United States". Ms. Harada was in fact a US citizen by birth.

According to Beekman (1982) who was able to discuss with Mrs. Harada in early 1982, she had been interrogated many times during her detention. Unfortunately, her file does not contain any information about these interrogations.]

#### NARA 9: US National Archives at College Park

ARC Identifier: 783544

Title: Sabotage

War Department. Office of the Provost Marshal General, Executive Division, Legal Office.

Location: Record Group 389, Stack 290, Row 33, Compartment 30, Shelf 4, Box 16.

[This file from the Provost Marshal's Legal Office is about the discussion on the modification of the law of 20 April 1918 about sabotage. The whole file has 300 pages but I examined only the last 30 pages referring to the time interval between 13 May 1943 and 1 May 1945. The discussion involved (i) the Attorney General (ii) the Under-secretary of War (iii) the Navy Department (iv) the Provost Marshal General (v) the House of Representatives (vi) the Committee on Judiciary of the House of Representatives (vii) the minority of that committee who issued a dissenting opinion.

MOFA 1: Interview of Irene Harada conducted on 30 September 1955 by Mr. Takegoro Sato, consul of Japan in Honolulu, Hawaii. Document released by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) on 22 December 2008 (in Japanese).  
 [I am grateful to Professors Yuji Aruka (Chuo University) and Annick Hochiuri (University of Paris 7) for their precious help in reading this document.]


NARA 10: US National Archives at College Park  
 ARC Identifier: 979023, Record Group: 389

Title: Subversive program: Military police: Honolulu.

[This file consists of only 4 pages. It is an excerpt from “Yank Magazine”. The article describes how, for over 3 years, GIs had been “gyped” by store keepers of “Clip Town” in downtown Honolulu. Then, in March 1945 many of these stores were put “off limits” by the “Joint Army-Navy Disciplinary Control Board”. The article does not say why military authorities waited until the war was almost finished to act. “Yank Magazine” was a weekly magazine published in New York by the armed forces for soldiers, sailors and airmen serving overseas. With a worldwide circulation of about 2 million it was the most widely read magazine in the history of the US military. In contrast, “Stars and Stripes” which was another publication for servicemen had a different edition in each theater of war.]



**Fig. Ref.1a: Cover of Yank Magazine.** As a morale booster for servicemen, each issue included a photograph of a pin-up girl clad in some form of seductive attire. Many of the pin-up girls featured were well-known actresses. *Source: Wikipedia, entry “Yank, the Army Weekly” (public domain).*



**Fig. Ref.1b: Cover of Yank Magazine.** Actress Dorothy Malone (born in 1925) made the cover of a 1945 issue of Yank Magazine. *Source: Wikipedia, entry “Yank, the Army Weekly” (public domain).*

NARA 11: US National Archives at College Park,  
 ARC Identifier: 1094837, Record Group: 60  
 Title: Japanese internee card for Ishimastu [sic] Shintani.

Stack Area: 230, Row: A, Compartment: 61, Shelf: 4, Box: 9

[Ishimatsu Shintani was one of the two persons of Japanese descent who was living on the island of Niihau at the time of the attack against Pearl Harbor. Born in Japan, Mr. Shintani remained by necessity a Japanese citizen in spite of having been in Niihau for 31 years.

This file has only 2 pages. It gives the locations of the prisoner camps where Mr. Shintani was kept between December 1941 and November 1945. The card says that Mr. Shintani was apprehended on Niihau on Sunday 14 December that is to say exactly one week after the attack on Pearl Harbor.]

NARA 12: US National Archives at College Park,

ARC Identifier: 901183, Record Group: 389

Title: Hawaii civilian internees: Shintani, Ishimatsu.

Stack Area: 290, Row: 34, Compartment: 27, Shelf: 7, Box: 2636.

[The file contains the record of the hearing in the case of Mr. Shintani. (14 pages)]

NARA 13: US National Archives at College Park,

ARC Identifier: 901246, Record Group: 389

Title: Hawaii civilian internees: Takahashi, Yasue (Miss).

Stack Area: 290, Row: 34, Compartment: 27, Shelf: 7, Box: 2638.

[The file contains the record of the hearing in the case of Ms. Takahashi which took place at Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii, on 15 May 1942. A summary can be found in the chronology at this date. (47 pages).

This file is one among a total of about 1,200 similar files held at NARA, that is to say with the same title except for the name of the person. The internment of Hawaiian civilians concerned American citizens as well as aliens. Ms. Takahashi was a US citizen.]

NAVY 1941: Navy Department, Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, D. C.

December 4, 1941 Subject: Japanese intelligence and propaganda in the United States during 1941.

[Available on the Internet at:

<http://home.comcast.net/eo9066/1941/41-12/IA021.html>]

NARA 14: US National Archives at College Park,

ARC Identifier: 900423, Record Group: 389

Title: Hawaii, civilian internees: Hayashi, Kenjiro

Stack Area: 290, Row: 34, Compartment: 27, Shelf: 3, Box: 2611

NARA 15: US National Archives at College Park,

ARC Identifier: 900426, Record Group: 389

Title: Hawaii, civilian internees: Hayashi, Tomoicho



Stack Area: 290, Row: 34, Compartment: 27, Shelf: 3, Box: 2611

NARA 16: US National Archives at College Park,

ARC Identifier: 900473, Record Group: 389

Title: Hawaii, civilian internees: Hotta, Kiyoji

Stack Area: 290, Row: 34, Compartment: 27, Shelf: 3, Box: 2613

NARA 17: US National Archives at College Park,

ARC Identifier: 1087200, Record Group: 494

Title: Records relating to the Alien Internment Boards

Stack Area: 290, Row: 44, Compartment: 8, Shelf: 5, Box: 323

[In addition to the Special Orders relating to the Alien Internment Boards, this file contains many other orders for instance regarding promotions or transfers and assignments of officers to specific units.

The records contain many abbreviations (e.g. auth=authorities, bd=board, aptd=appointed) and acronyms (e.g. HHD=Headquarters Hawaiian Department) which make them difficult to read.]

NARA 18: US National Archives at College Park,

ARC Identifier: 1089684, Record Group: 494

Title: Evidence submitted to the Internment Hearing Board in certain Japanese internment cases.

Record of MAKIHIRA Tamehachi (ISN-HJ-1612-CI)

NARA 19: US National Archives at College Park,

ARC Identifier: 1089814, Record Group: 494

Title: Registers of letters sent (12 Aug 1942 - Oct 1945)

Creator: Office of Internal Security, Executive Section.

[The register gives dates of the letters, senders, recipients and subjects. In its first 30 pages the register lists letters from the OMG (Office of the Military Governor) to provost courts, to the assistant provost marshal, to prisoners, or to prison wardens. In other words, these letters would be a useful source of information about the way provost courts were working.

It should be noted that most of the cases mentioned in this register concern non-Japanese names. Probably the letters about cases of Hawaiians of Japanese ancestry are in another register. An excerpt from these files is described in the following item (NARA 20).]

NARA 20: US National Archives at College Park,

ARC Identifier: 1079702, Record Group: 494, Box 3

Title: Reading Files of Delos C. Emmons, compiled 12/07/1941 - 06/02/1943.

Creator: Military Government of the Territory of Hawaii. Office of the Military Governor (12/07/1941 - 07/21/1944).

[I have seen the first 20 pages of this file; two files are about persons of Japanese ancestry who have been arrested. One concerns Mr. James Seichi Nakamura (case No 8823-F), this message initially comprised an enclosure giving the charge sheet and the arrest record. Unfortunately (as often happens) the enclosure is no longer attached. The second file seems to be about the arrest of Mr. James R. Caldwell (case No 2932-F). As for the first one, the inclosure is lacking.]

NARA 21: US National Archives at College Park,  
 ARC Identifier: 818615, Record Group: 126, Box 724  
 Title: 9-4-113 Hawaii, World War of 1941, Censorship, 1941 – 1945.  
 Stack area/row/compartments/shelf: 150/44/13/2

NARA 22: General correspondence files. Awards and decorations. April 1944–June 1949.

National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 554, Box 37.  
 ARC Identifier 595596.

[I have seen only the 10 first pages of this file. Of interest here is General Orders No 91 of HAFMIDPAC dated 17 December 1945 which granted a “Meritorious Service Unit Plaque” to the 120th Replacement Battalion for exceptional service in Oahu from 15 January 1945 to 30 September 1945.]

NARA 23: 9-4-35 Hawaii<sup>89</sup>, Judicial affairs, 1907-1951.

National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 126 (Records of the Office of Territories, 1881 - 1976) Box 626. ARC Identifier 818469.

[I have seen only the 50 first pages of this file; they cover the period 1907-1909 and consist in letters exchanged between the governor of Hawaii, the Secretary of the Interior and the Attorney General. These letters are mainly devoted to the nomination of district judges, federal judges, Judges at the Supreme Court of Hawaii, district attorneys.

For instance, in a letter of 8 June 1907 Governor George R. Carter advised Secretary of the Interior James R. Garfield against the reappointment of the Federal District Attorney because he “yielded to the temptation of making money to such an extent that he can afford to retire at the end of his term”. Basically, he granted favors to corporations in return of being paid “good round fees” by them in what was a typical corruption behavior.

In a letter of 4 March 1909 Selden B. Kingsbury who has been nominated Judge for the Second Circuit of Hawaii expressed his gratitude to Secretary of the Interior Garfield for “kindly recommending” him.]

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<sup>89</sup>The code 9-4-35 refers to Judicial matters (35) in Hawaii (9-4). There are similar files for many other sectors such as labor, strikes, courts and so on.

NARA 24: 9-4-2 Hawaii<sup>90</sup>, Annual Reports, courts, 80 pages

National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 126 (Records of the Office of Territories, 1881 - 1976) Box 563. Location 150/44/9/7. ARC Identifier 818327.

[I have seen only the first 20 pages of this file. It consists of annual court statistics of the Territory of Hawaii issued by the Supreme Court of the Territory.

Although the file contained the cover letter of the 1943 report addressed by Chief Justice S.B. Kemp to Governor Ingram M. Stainback, it did not contained the corresponding statistics.

The file contained fairly complete reports for 1938 and 1939 from which one learns that there had been 23 homicides in 1937 and 24 in 1938. That represents a rate of 5.6 per 100,000 population (for those two years the US average was 7.3, see Historical Statistics of the United States p. 414).

NARA 25: US National Archives at College Park,

Record Group: 494, Entry 302 (UD-UP), Boxes 527-538

Title: [PROVOST MARSHAL COURT](#), Case Files, 1942-1944

Location: Stack area/row/compartment/shelf: 290/44/16/5-290/44/16/7

[These files consist of 12 boxes arranged alphabetically by name of defendant. As each box contains some 1,200 pages there are 12,000 pages altogether.

We have seen the first folder of box 527. It is entitled ABE, Walter and comprises 18 pages. This case is fairly insignificant. Mr. Abe was fined \$150 for having forgotten to return his identification badge. Subsequently, the amount of the fine was reduced.

It should be observed that these files contain only a small percentage (of the order of 1%) of the cases. This is shown clearly by the the card indexes to defendants (see the next entry NARA 26). In this index there are 20 names in the interval between Aana and Abafo. Among those 20 cases, there is one, namely ABABA, Suila in which the defendant was sentenced to 2 years at hard labor on 27 April 1942. In other words, this case was much more serious than than the one of ABE, Walter.

On what criterion were selected the cases which are in these 10 boxes? This remains an open question.]

NARA 26: US National Archives at College Park,

Record Group: 494, Entry 312 (UD-UP), Box 690, 1942-1944.

Title: [PROVOST MARSHAL COURT](#), Honolulu. List of Japanese cases.

Location: Stack area/row/compartment/shelf: 290/44/19/5

[The pages 1-14 of this file give a list of the cases for 1943. Altogether there

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<sup>90</sup>The code 9-4 refers to Hawaii. The code number 2 refers to the sector of activity. There are similar files for many sectors such as citizenship, strikes and so on.

are about 1,000 cases. After this table comes a list giving the names of the defendants, along with their address in Honolulu, their age, their status (i.e. citizen or alien), the charge and the sentence. So far we have seen only the names corresponding to the trials of 24,27,28,29,30,31 December 1943.

Most often the charge is indicated in a fairly cryptic way. For instance, on 30 December 1944 Mr. Norishige, Richard, 22 year old, citizen, was sentenced to 1 year at hard labor and a fine of \$150. The charge was: "G.O.8 9.01" which means probably "General Order 8 9.01". It is not obvious to find out what this order was about. In about 10% of the cases the charge is not given.]

NARA 26c: US National Archives at College Park,

Record Group: 494, Entry 390 (UD-UP), Boxes 569A-585B (49 boxes)

Title: [PROVOST MARSHAL COURT](#), Card indexes to defendants (no date)

Location: Stack area/row/compartments/shelf: 290/44/13/5-290/44/14/2

[As each card corresponds to a person tried in a Honolulu provost court, estimating the number of cards will give an estimate of the number of trials (remember that most often there was only one defendant per trial).

A clean way to get such an estimate would be to open all 49 boxes and to count approximately the numbers of cards in each box. So far, we were not able to carry out such a count. Two other methods can be tried which are less time consuming but rely on some assumptions.

- One method is to count the cards in just one box and to assume that it represents fairly well all other boxes. Thanks to the assistance of an archivist<sup>91</sup> I learned that each card measures 3inch times 5inch (i.e. 6.6cm times 11cm) and that the first box (569A) contains approximately 1,000 cards. That gives an estimated total of 49,000 trials in Honolulu.

- Does the first box reflect the content of the other boxes? It is known that the archive boxes can hold about 1,200 sheets of standard US letter size (216mm times 279mm). Thus, the surface of a card is only  $6.6 \times 11 / 21.6 \times 27.9 \simeq 1/8$  of the surface of a letter page. Let us assume that the thickness of a card is 4 times the thickness of a paper sheet, then the volume of a card is about one half of the volume of a paper sheet. Assuming that in contrast to the first box the others are almost full, one would arrive to an estimate which is twice the previous one.

The main interest of the second argument is to suggest that the estimate of 49,000 is probably a low estimate rather than a high estimate.

So far, we have seen only the first 20 cards (AANA to ABAFO) The dates of these trials range from 12 January 1942 to 6 October 1944; the later date is 3 weeks before the end of martial law on 27 October 1944. All defendant addresses are in Honolulu.]

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<sup>91</sup>I'm most grateful to Mr. Eric Van Slander for his help.

NARA 27: US National Archives at College Park,

Record Group: 494, Entry 299 (UD-UP), Box 522

Title: [PROVOST MARSHAL COURT](#), Orders of the Military Governor of release from prison, 27 May 1942-31 Dec 1942.

Location: 290/44/16/4

[The first 5 pages consist in a table listing the names of prisoners who were released before the end of their term or whose sentence was reduced. During the 6 months between 27 May 1942 and 31 December 1942 there were 224 cases altogether. The pages after this table give the text of the corresponding orders. On average there are 1.22 page per order which means that there are some 273 pages per period of 6 months or about 500 pages per year. So far, we have seen only the first 10 and last 10 pages of this folder.]

NARA 28: US National Archives at College Park,

Record Group: 494, Entry 306 (UD-UP), Box 542

Title: [PROVOST MARSHAL COURT](#), Island of Hawaii, Proceedings, 1941.

Location: 290/44/16/7

[Altogether there are 14 boxes (542-555) under this title. The finding aid says that only 1941 is covered but this seems incorrect for even in the few cases that we have seen there were cases of January 1942. Most of the trials took place at Hilo, the main city of the Island of Hawaii. We have seen the first 10 and last 10 pages of the box 542. There are about 5 pages for each cases. Two of the defendants received the following sentence: "To pay a fine of \$20 or to be confined at hard labor for 20 days". which (once again) gives the equivalence between fine and time in prison, namely \$1=1 day.]

NARA 29: US National Archives at College Park,

Record Group: 494, Entry 311 (UD-UP), Box 689

Title: [PROVOST MARSHAL COURT](#), Diary of continued cases, 1942-1945.

Location: 290/44/19/5

[I have seen the first 20 pages of this file. It is a hand-written list of names of defendants with the date of their trials. The only point of interest of this file is perhaps that it extends to 1945, that is to say beyond the end of martial law in October 1944.]

NARA 30: US National Archives at College Park,

Record Group: 494, Entry 304, Box 540

Title: [Miscellaneous correspondence relating to Provost Courts, 1942-1945.](#)

Location: 290/44/16/7

[NARA 30 refers to the first 20 pages of this file. They are part of a letter (comprising 37 enclosures) dated 3 October 1942 from Lt. Col. David Marcus



to the Military Governor. The enclosures give information about persons tried by provost court in the district of Hawaii. These 20 pages cover the period of 26 January to 16 March and describe 9 cases. The average confinement term is 2.25 years. The date that is given is the date of beginning of confinement. It is likely that it was identical with (or close to) the date of the trial.]

NARA 31: US National Archives at College Park,  
Record Group: 494, Entry 323, Box 725  
Title: Pearl Harbor Navy Yard orders, 1943-1944.  
Location: 290/44/20/3

[The 20 pages of this file that I was able to read refer to circulation rules, for instance for cars transporting gasoline. Usually it is difficult to know whether or not an order has really been implemented. In other words orders should clearly be distinguished from facts.]

NARA 32: US National Archives at College Park,  
Record Group: 494, Entry 325, Box 726  
Title: Pearl Harbor Navy Yard. Index to the names of defendants.  
Location: 290/44/20/3

[I have read the first 20 pages of this file. The defendants are probably persons working on the Navy Yard. All sentences consist in small fines of \$10 or \$20. The reason of the trial is given in fairly cryptic form such as "G.O.#2" or "G.O.#3" i.e. violation of General Order number 2 or 3.]

NARA 33a: US National Archives at College Park,  
Record Group: 494, Entry 310, Box 586  
Title: [Provost Marshall court](#). Honolulu. Proceedings, 1941-1944.  
Location: 290/44/17/4

[Box 586 is the first of a series of 103 boxes which describe provost court trials in Honolulu. I have seen the first 20 pages of this box. Contrary to the title, the records are not really proceedings. They give only information about the defendant, the charge and the sentence.

The cases are numbered chronologically. Yet, curiously, it starts at case number 45. These 20 pages contain only one serious case, namely case no 50 in which defendant Henry Roque of Portuguese citizenship was sentenced to 3 years at hard labor for assault and battery on a police officer on 7 December 1941. The reason of the action is not given.]

NARA 33b: US National Archives at College Park,  
Record Group: 494, Entry 310, Box 688  
Title: [Provost Marshall court](#). Honolulu. Proceedings, 1941-1944.  
Location: 290/44/19/5



[Box 688 is the last of the series of 103 boxes which describe provost court trials in Honolulu. I have seen the last 20 pages of this box. These pages cover 21 October 1944 to 23 October 1944 (cases 5801-44 to 5815-44). Entitled “Blackout violation arrest form”, these cases are curfew violations. Curfew ended only on 24 October with the end of martial law. The fine was usually \$ 3 or \$ 5.

NARA 34: US National Archives at College Park,

Record Group: 494, Entry 310, Box 701

Title: Provost Marshall court. Kauai. Proceedings, 1942-1944.

Location: 290/44/19/6

[Box 701 is the first of a series of 8 boxes which describe the provost court trials in Lilue on the island of Kauai. I have seen the first 20 pages of box 701. The cases are numbered chronologically but the series starts with case no 3. Whereas for all other cases (no 4-10), the “proceedings” consist in just one page giving information about the defendant, the charge and sentence, for case no 3 the description covers 6 pages. Although it is a case of little importance whose sentence is a fine of \$ 100, it is treated like a trial in a civilian court with a counsel for the defendant, two witnesses, cross-examination of the witnesses with all dialogues being reported. It had probably a public relation purpose in showing how well the rights of defendants were respected. As the defendant was a Chinese American it had perhaps also a specific purpose in terms of foreign relations.]

FDRL1: Franklin D. Roosevelt Library record: “The internment of Japanese Americans. 6 microfilm reels, published by “Gale Cengage Learning. Consulted at the National Library of China.

NARA 35: US National Archives at College Park,

Record Group: 494, Entry 304, Box 540

Title: Miscellaneous correspondence relating to provost courts, 1942-1945.

Location: 494/290/44/16/7

[NARA 35 refers to the last 30 pages of this file. It contains two stories.

The first concerns the hospitalization of provost court prisoners. Despite being civilians such prisoners were considered as military prisoners because they were sentenced by Army provost courts. The report says that many of them were confined in military prison camps such as the Waiakea prison camp. The report insists on the fact that military prisoners should be hospitalized in military hospitals.

The second report concerns the issuance of free gasoline to military personnel and employees of the US Engineer District. This report of 10 June 1942 gives the names of 21 persons who illegally received free gasoline for their private

cars and sometimes also official USED plates to be used on their private cars. The report recommends these persons to be tried in provost court. Among them is Mr. J. Russel Cades. attorney for “Hawaiian Constructors”, a major Army and Navy contractor. The report emphasizes that the whole scheme was backed by Colonel Theodore Wyman, the commander of the Engineer District.

A report issued by a Congressional committee in June 1944 singled out a collusion between Wyman and the “Hawaiian Constructors” as the main reason for delays in defence work on Hawaii prior to Pearl Harbor. It also points out Wyman’s habit of heavy drinking. Even before coming to Hawaii Wyman had a close association with German born Hans Wilhelm Rohl co-owner of the Rohl-Connolly Company builder of the Port of Los Angeles breakwaters. In the hearings of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack there are testimonies which show that the two men organized parties which involved a lot of alcohol and prostitute girls.

In August 1944 Colonel Wyman became the commander of the Cherbourg Area in France. Many incidents between the US troops who operated the harbor and the population have been reported in 1944 and 1945.]

NARA 36: US National Archives at College Park,

Record Group: 494, Entry 320, Box 711

Title: Provost Marshal courts, Maui, 1942.

Location: 494/290/44/20/1

[NARA 36 refers to the first 15 pages of this file.

It contains special provost court orders and provost court proceedings for December 1941 and early January 1942. There are several mentions of the Olinda Prison Camp on Maui Island; together with the Waiakea prison camp on Hawaii Island) it contained 355 prisoners on 30 January 1942.]

NARA 37: US National Archives at College Park,

Record Group: 494, Entry 320, Box 721

Title: Provost Marshal courts, Maui, 1942.

Location: 494/290/44/20/1

[NARA 37 refers to the last 30 pages of this file. They cover the month of December 1942 and January 1943. They contain the identifications (name, address, employment) of persons who were guilty of working less than 20 days per month. For instance, we learn that Mr. Victorio Mina, a laborer in the pineapple fields for the “California Packing Corporation” on the island of Molokai, worked only 16 days in January 1943. He was arrested on 8 February 1943 at 1pm and charged under Civil Regulation No 67, section 3. He appeared before the provost court of Major Shaver by whom he was “warned and reprimanded”.]

## Books and articles

Allen (G.) 1950: Hawaii's war years. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu.

Allen (R.) 1944: Memorandum on newspaper censorship in Hawaii. 5 June 1944. Hawaii War Records Depository, Hamilton Library, University of Hawaii.

Anthony (J.G.) 1955: Hawaii under army rule. Stanford University Press. Stanford. [The author was attorney general of the territory of Hawaii from 4 October 1942 to his resignation in December 1943. He gives an honest account which sheds a new light on several points.

Unfortunately, the book provides no quantitative evidence whatsoever about the activity of military tribunals. In this respect, the author says (p. 18): "Because of the absence of records, it is difficult, if not impossible, to recount accurately the activities of the provost courts". However, for military commissions, records must have been kept if only because of the fact that they were concerned with serious offenses; yet, even in this case, the book does not provide any substantial information.

Appendix B gives the text of a selection of 78 General Orders out of a total of 249 (i.e. 31%).]

Beechert (E.D.) 1985: Working in Hawaii. A labor history. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu.

Beekman (A.) 1982: The Niihau incident. Heritage Press of Pacific, Honolulu.

[The account provided by this book is pleasant to read but it is somewhat fictionalized and the sources on which it relies are not indicated.]

Burlingame (B.) 1992, 2002: Advance Force Pearl Harbor. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis.

[The 1992 edition was published by Pacific Monograph, a company founded by Burlingame in 1989. The book explores in great detail a fairly unknown aspect of the attack against Pearl Harbor namely the role of the Japanese submarine fleet. In particular, one learns that on 11 January 1942 the US carrier Saratoga was hit by a torpedo from submarine I-6. The carrier took on 1,100 tons of seawater and (at least) 6 seamen were killed. In the Preface, the author mentions that in spite of the broad declassification process initiated under president Clinton in the mid-1990s, a number of files pertaining to this topic were still classified or unavailable by 2000, e.g. the records of the Japanese prisoners of war.]

Cayetano (B.J.) 2010: Ben: a memoir from street kid to governor. Watermark.

[The first chapter which is entitled "Life in Kahili" gives a picture of life in the district of Damon Tract in the early 1950s. It may be remembered that it is this

district which was the target of rioting servicemen on 14 November 1945.]

Chaplin (G.) 1998: *Presstime in paradise. The life and times of the Honolulu Advertiser 1856-1995*. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu.

Conn (S.), Engelman (R.C.), Fairshild (B.) 2000: *Guarding the United States and its outposts*. Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington DC.

Counter Intelligence Corps history and mission in World War II (no date) published by the US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (available on the Internet).

Daniels (R.) 2002: *Incarcerating Japanese Americans*. OAH [Organization of American Historians] *Magazine of History* 16, (Spring 2002).

Denis (N.A.) 2015: *War against all Puerto Ricans*. Nation Books, New York.

[The book gives a lively and well documented account of Puerto Rico's struggle for independence from US takeover in 1898 to the 1950s.]

Gilberston (W.E.) 1945: *Sanitary aspects of the control of the 1943-1944 epidemic of dengue fever in Honolulu*. *American Journal of Public Health*, Vol. 35.

Green (T.H.) [no date]: *The papers of Major General Thomas H. Green, Judge Advocate General's Corps, US Army. Martial law in Hawaii: December 7, 1941-April 4, 1943*. (NDL, microfilms YF-A15)

[Before the outbreak of war, Lt Colonel (later Major General) Thomas H. Green was Judge Advocate in Hawaii. After December 7, 1941, he became Executive to Hawaii's Military Governor Delos Emmons. In this position he was largely responsible for implementing the policy of the Military Government. The present account ends in April 1943, not because martial law came to an end (it was terminated only on 27 October 1944) but because Green was discharged in March 1943. A 646-page manuscript contained in the Papers of Major General Thomas H. Green was never published. We do not know exactly when it was written but it was after Green's retirement in 1949.

This account is mainly about general policy; it contains very little specific cases or data. For instance, one learns that during the first 6 months there were about 19,000 provost court trials in Honolulu, but no information is given about the other islands or about subsequent months. In a general way, the author tries to present the Military Government administration as benevolent and in good sympathy with the population. For instance, he says that "the administration of justice by the provost courts was fair, honest and impartial".]

Hallstead (W.) 2000: *The Niihau incident*. *World War II magazine*, November.

[This article is mainly a summary of the book by Allan Beekman (1982).]

Holmes (T.M.) 1994: *The specter of Communism in Hawaii*. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu.

- Hormann (B.L.) 1946: Postwar problems of Issei in Hawaii. *Far Eastern Survey* 15,18,277-280 (September 11 1946)
- Israel (F.L.) 1967: Military justice in Hawaii 1941-1944. *Pacific Historical Review* 36, 2, May 1967, 243-267.
- Kage (T.) 2004: Japanese Canadians exiled to Japan. A speech given at the Nikkei Week discussion, 21 September 2004.
- Kimura (Y.) 1988: *Issei. Japanese immigrants in Hawaii*. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu.
- Kiyota (M.) 1997: *Beyond loyalty. The story of a Kibei*. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu.
- Klass (T.) 1970: *World War II on Kauai*. The Western Foundation, Portland, Oregon.  
[Kauai is the northernmost island in the Hawaiian archipelago. The book is available at the library of the University of Hawaii. It can be noted that it contains no mention of the so-called Niihau incident, in spite of the fact that Kauai was closely involved in its solution.]
- Knaefler (T.K.) 1991: *Our house divided. Seven Japanese American families in World War II*. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu.
- Knightley (P.) 1975, 2004: *The first casualty : the war correspondent as hero and myth-maker from the Crimea to Iraq*. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
- Muller (E.) 2001: *Free to die for their country. The story of the Japanese American draft resisters in World War II*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Neely (M.E.) 1991: *The fate of liberty. Abraham Lincoln and civil liberties*. Oxford University Press, New York.
- Odo (F.) 2004: *No sword to bury. Japanese Americans in Hawaii during World War II*. Temple University Press, Honolulu.
- Okihiro (G.Y.) 1991: *Cane fires. The anti-Japanese movement in Hawaii 1865-1945*. Temple University Press, Philadelphia.
- Potts (E.D.), Potts (A.) 1985: *Yanks down under 1941-1945. The American impact on Australia*. Oxford University Press. Melbourne.
- Prescott (J.), Eldridge (J.) 2003: *Military Commissions: past and future*. *Military Review* March-April 2003, 42-51.
- Report of the Committee on the Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians 1982: *Personal Justice Denied*.
- Roehner (B.M.) 2008: *Relations between Allied forces and the population of Japan*. Working Report, LPTHE, University of Paris (Pierre et Marie Curie).



- Scheiber (H.N.), Scheiber (J.L.) 1997: Bayonets in paradise: a half-century retrospect on martial law in Hawaii 1941-1946. *University of Hawaii Law Review* 19, 477-648.
- Scheiber (H.N.), Scheiber (J.L.) 2007: Taking liberties. *Legal Affairs*.  
<http://www.legalaffairs.org/printerfriendly.msp?id=383>
- Soga (Y.) 2008: Life behind barbed wire. The World War II internment memoirs of a Hawaii Issei. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu.  
 With a foreword by Prof. Dennis M. Ogawa and an introduction by Prof. Tet-suden Kashima. Translated from Japanese into English by Kihei Hirai.  
 [The author, Yasutaro Soga, was the editor of the Japanese-language newspaper "Hawaii Times". When he was arrested on 7 December 1941 he was 69-year old. His internment ended when he returned to Hawaii on 13 November 1945. This account was published in Japanese in 1948. At that time it was certainly an important testimony because few documents had been published on this question. The English translation was published sixty years later and it contains little information not already known at that later time.  
 It should be noted that the author does not restrict itself to personal recollections; he also tells the story of other groups of Japanese prisoners. No indications are given about the sources that have been used.  
 Although the author speaks of several other small groups (of less than 100) of Japanese prisoners, e.g. prisoners of war, Japanese from Alaska, there is one notable group which is *not* mentioned, namely the group of Nikkei sentenced to prison terms by provost courts in Hawaii. Because this was a fairly large group (of the order of 1,000 to 2,000 prisoners, see the discussion in chapter 1) the fact that it is not mentioned is surprising.]
- Stephan (J.J.) 1984: Hawaii under the Rising Sun. Japan's plans for conquest after Pear Harbor. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu.
- Stern (B.W.) 1996: Rutledge unionism<sup>92</sup>: Labor relations in the Honolulu transit industry. University of Hawaii, Center for Labor Education and Research, Honolulu.
- Strikes: Report published annually by the US Department of Labor, 1941-1945.  
 [There have been some variations in the title from one year to another. These reports give the number of work stoppages by month and also by state. Many thanks to Ms. Elizabeth Ashack from the US Dept of Labor for sending me these reports. These reports do not include Hawaii. Ms. Ashack searched the historical archives of the Department of Labor but found nothing about Hawaii.]
- Tuchman (B.W.) 1970: Stilwell and the American experience in China 1911-1945.

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<sup>92</sup>Refers to Art Rutledge, the leader of the transit workers union.



Macmillan. New York.

US Congress 1982: Personal justice denied. Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians. Government Printing Office, Washington DC.

US Supreme Court 1946: *Duncan v. Kahanamoku*, decided February 25, 1946.  
<http://supreme.justia.com/us/327/304/case.html>

War time security controls in Hawaii 1941-1945. A general historical survey. US Army Historical Manuscript File. Office of the Chief of Military History. Microfilm.

[This publication comprises 8 chapters and several hundred pages. It contains some statistical data for instance the cargo transported between Hawaii and the mainland, but for the crucial question of provost court trials, it offers almost no quantitative data, not even the total number of trials. In this respect we only learn that there were 18,848 convictions in the first 6 months of 1942 in the court of Honolulu.]

Wegars (P.) 2005: A paradise in mountains: the World War II Japanese internment camp near Kooskia, Idaho.

Wegars (P.) 2008: Justice Department and US Army Internment camps and detention stations in the United States during World War II.  
(<http://www.uidaho.edu>)

Wieder (T.) 2006: *Les sorcières de Hollywood*. Edition Philippe Roy, Paris.

Wilbar (C.L.) 1947: Control of dengue in Hawaii. *American Journal of Public Health* 17,663-674.

## Occupation episodes and analytical history


By education the present author is a physicist, so it may not be surprising that he tried to transform history into a testable science. How to do that was explained in a book he co-authored with Pr. Tony Syme and which was published by Harvard University Press in 2002.

The main step in transforming history into a testable science is to study not just one case but several similar cases. Indeed, a physicist does not just study the fall of one kind of bodies (e.g. apples), he wants to describe and understand the fall of all kinds of falling objects (e.g. iron balls, drops of water, hailstones, and so on).

Actually this requirement is not specific to physics, it is common to all testable sciences. Thus, in medicine one does not wish to describe solely the influenza of Mr. Martin; one wants to understand *all cases of influenza* whether they occur in China, Europe or the United States.



Bertrand Roehner (Oct. 2012)



Harvard University Press (2002)

That is why the present study is part of a series of several books devoted to various occupation episodes.

### Studies of “occupation” episodes by the same author

#### 1 Relations between Allied forces and the population of Japan

2 Relations between Allied forces and the populations of Germany and Austria.

3 Relations between Allied forces and the population of Iceland

4 Relations between US forces and the population of Hawaii

5 Relations between American forces and the population of China

6 Relations between American forces and the population of South Korea

7 Relations between American forces and the population of Australia

All these studies are available on the author's website at:

<http://www.lpthe.jussieu.fr/roehner/occupation.html>

## Modules and submodules

What we call modules of a major historical episode are simpler elements. Occupation episodes are modules of the Second World War, but these modules have themselves several aspects that can be called submodules. It turns out that many of these submodules are common to several occupation episodes.

As examples of such submodules one can mention:

- Military tribunals
- Clashes between soldiers and the population
- Looting of art items
- Purge of undesirable elements in education and the medias
- Control of political activity
- Introduction of a special currency
- Creation of new universities
- Establishment of exchange programs for teachers or officers in the police and armed forces

For each submodule the various occupation episodes will provide several realizations. These realizations parallel the repeated experiments conducted by a physicist who wants to study a specific phenomenon.

Of course, defining the submodules and collecting all information about them is only the first step. Once this has been done, the historian is in the same situation as a physicist who has finished a first round of experiments.

The next challenge is to make sense of the data. This means asking the right ques-

tions in order to find some hidden order behind them. Once a regularity has emerged, a new set of observations can be planned which will permit to improve its accuracy.