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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2018

Local Envy-Freeness in House Allocation Problems

Résumé

We study the fair division problem consisting in allocating one item per agent so as to avoid (or minimize) envy, in a setting where only agents connected in a given social network may experience envy. In a variant of the problem, agents themselves can be located on the network by the central authority. These problems turn out to be difficult even on very simple graph structures, but we identify several tractable cases. We further provide practical algorithms and experimental insights.
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Dates et versions

hal-01785231 , version 1 (28-05-2018)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-01785231 , version 1

Citer

Aurélie Beynier, Yann Chevaleyre, Laurent Gourvès, Julien Lesca, Nicolas Maudet, et al.. Local Envy-Freeness in House Allocation Problems. 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2018), Jul 2018, Stockholm, Sweden. ⟨hal-01785231⟩
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