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#### ► To cite this version:

Grégoire Sergeant-Perthuis, Nils Ruet, Tonglin Yan, Kenneth Williford, David Rudrauf. Dualities in G-Spaces May Underly Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness. 27th annual meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (ASSC 27), Jul 2024, Tokyo, Japan. 13, pp.365 - 396, 2022, 10.1007/s13164-022-00638-w . hal-04636572

#### HAL Id: hal-04636572 https://hal.sorbonne-universite.fr/hal-04636572v1

Submitted on 5 Jul2024

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# Dualities in G-Spaces May Underly Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness **Grégoire Sergeant-Perthuis<sup>1</sup>, Nils Ruet<sup>2</sup>, Tonglin Yan<sup>2</sup>, Kenneth Williford<sup>3</sup>, David Rudrauf<sup>2</sup>**

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#### Context

- The Projective Consciousness model:
- → Reinforcement learning + phenomenological aspects of consciousness
- → Reproduce the experience of *space* in 'robots' Consciousness involves a subjective perspective, characterized by viewpoint-structured organization, a sense of unity (holistic world), embodiment, and an internal representation of the world in perspective from a specific standpoint.

### **Some definitions**

Partially Observable Markov decision process + Group action

**Definition 1** (Markov Decision Process: Definition 1). *A Markov* Decision Process, is a collection (S, A, T, r) where,

- *S* is the set of configurations of the environment
- A is the collection of actions of the agent
- $T: S \times A \rightarrow S$  is the transition probability; it captures the consequences of the action  $a \in A$  of the agent on the environment that changes from  $s_t$  to  $s_{t+1}$
- $r: S \times A \times S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ ; it is the reward function for an action  $a \in A$  and two states (s, s') thought of as  $s_t$  and  $s_{t+1}$ .

**Definition 2** (Partially Observable Markov Decision Process). A POMDP is defined as a tuple (S, A, T, r, O, Z), where (S, A, T, r) is an MDP and,

- O is the set of possible observations.
- Z is the observation kernel,  $Z: S \times A \rightarrow O$ , which specifies the probability of observing a particular observation given the current state and action.
- *r* is a reward function which domain is  $S \times A$ ;  $r : S \times A \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ .

**Definition 3** (Group-structured space, G-space). S is a groupstructured space for the group G when there is a map  $h: G \times S \rightarrow S$ denoted as h(g, s) = g.s for  $g \in G$  and  $s \in S$ , such that,

1.  $(g.g_1).s = g.(g_1.s)$  for all  $g, g_1 \in G, s \in S$ 2. e.s = s, for all  $s \in S$ 

For a given group G, such space is called a G-space.

isfies the following properties: • S is a G-space • G is a subset of the set of actions A, • for all  $g \in G$ , T(s'|s, g) = 1[s' = g.s]

 $\langle S, A, T, r, O, Z, G \rangle$  where  $\langle S, A, T, r, G \rangle$  is a group-structured MDP (structured by G) and  $\langle S, A, T, r, O, Z \rangle$  is a POMDP.

### **Pre-reflective Self-consciousness**

- Pre-reflective Self-consciousness (PRSC):
- $\rightarrow$  the property of consciousness to be conscious of itself as an intrinsic part of the moment-to-moment constitution of consciousness and not as the result of a secondary, reflective act of constitution of consciousness, taking as an object a previous state of subjectless consciousness
- Our focus is on:
- $\rightarrow$  accounting for how an agent could singularize itself in a prereflective manner, i. e. find a trace of its own presence and existence or be directly informed about its own existence through the representation of the environment it creates, as a result of intrinsic properties of its internal space of representation.

# **PRSC** in *G*-space?

- Simplest example: X is a homogeneous space,
- $\rightarrow$  G-space with  $X = \{g \cdot x_0 \mid g \in G\}$  for any  $x_0$  in X. • In this case:
- $\rightarrow$  For any choice  $x_0 \in X$ ,  $X \simeq G/H_{x_0}$  with  $H_{x_0} = \{g \mid g \cdot x_0 = x_0\}$ .  $\rightarrow$  In other words, a choice of a reference point  $x_0$  in the state space is enough to *frame* the agent's actions in space through the map  $g \in G \mapsto g \cdot x_0 \in X.$

# **Group-structured world model**

**Perspectives**  $\rightsquigarrow$  **Group G** World model  $\rightsquigarrow$  G-space

**Definition 4** (MDP and POMDP with group-structured state space). A MDP with a group-structured state space is a tuple  $\langle S, A, T, r, G \rangle$  where G is a group and  $\langle S, A, T, r \rangle$  is a MDP that sat-

A POMDP with a group-structured state space is a tuple

**Dualities in** *G*-spaces: **PRSC**?

A very simple instance of the **Yoneda Lemma** 

**Definition 5.** The category associated to a group G is the one with one object \* and morphisms [\*, \*] = G with composition the one defined on groups.

**Proposition 1.** A G-space is a functor from the category G to **Set** 

**Proposition 2** (Yoneda Lemma for G-spaces). For a functor F from G to **Set**,

 $[h_*, F] \simeq FX$ 

#### *in a functorial manner.*

In particular,  $\phi \in [h_*, F]$  is uniquely defined by  $\phi(id)$ , where id is the identity map  $id \in [*, *]; \phi(id) \in X$  is simply a choice of point

### Limitation of G-spaces —

- Not all G-space are good candidates for encoding the phenomenology of space and its content
- $\rightarrow$  Assume that a sensory modalities  $s \in \mathbb{R}^N$  is reconstructed into a point  $x \in X$  in the state space
- $\rightarrow$  for a perturbation  $\epsilon \in \mathbb{R}^N$ ,  $s + \epsilon$  is represented as  $\tilde{x}$
- $\rightarrow$  in general  $\{g.x | g \in G\}$  and  $\{g.\tilde{x} | g \in G\}$  are different
- $\hookrightarrow$  *Instability*!
- One possible solution:
- $\rightarrow$  Consider particular G-spaces : with more properties
- $\rightarrow$  E.g. a fiber bundle over a homogeneous space.
- Future direction, explore the relation between the duality of such spaces and PRSC.

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