Liberté, égalité, fraternité : la théorie rawlsienne de la justice
Résumé
This paper adresses Rawls’ theory of desert. Objecting to the classical account of distributive justice, the Rawlsian theory of justice rejects the formula "to each according to his own merit". Rawls considers that our natural endowment in intelligence is no more fair than any inequality associated with inheritance. Furthermore, the intrinsic value of a person does not give by itself any right. In the well-ordered society, the regulation of inequalities defines a system of legitimate expectations independent of merit, whether related to performance, skills or efforts. The classical rationale of justice as adapting retribution and contribution is here dismissed. As long as the principles of justice apply, everyone has a right to what is theirs, but this does not imply that they deserve it.
Domaines
PhilosophieOrigine | Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s) |
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